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ART. I.—THE CONTINUITY OF THE GOSPEL FAITH.

THE late Encyclical Letter of the Pope,—in which the progress of civilization, the tendency of modern politics towards human freedom and equality, the rising barriers between Church and State, and the disappearing partitions between one and another branch of the common Church, are treated as indications of a lost faith and a forgotten Saviour,—is a fit expression of those superstitious notions about Christianity as separable from man's common interests, his political and social life, which for ages past have had such power over the world, and which still sway the minds of mere ecclesiastics of all names and orders.

But that Letter does unwitting injustice even to his own Church and office. De Maistre, the most philosophical Roman Catholic critic of the papal polity, clearly shows that the Papacy, at various seasons, has been the sole bulwark of political liberty against the encroaching tyranny of emperors and kings; and we know the debt which art and learning owe, for the shelter they found in the Church's cloisters, or under its sanction and care. True, it was neither political liberty nor mental progress that the Church was seeking, even when it promoted both most efficiently. Had it only done what it aimed at, and supposed it was doing; had its sacramental notions of Christianity been the real measure of its power and its benignity,—

where would Christendom have been to-day? But, in building up even its own official and priestly sway, it was always building up art and learning; always stirring imagination, faith, and aspiration. The powers it nurtured were sure to break loose from the hand that had bound them to its own service; to overthrow the superstitions that had generated them; to shatter the vessels that held, close sealed, that "sincere milk of the word," which, but for their hermetical protection, could not have been brought to the lips of later generations. The Church was always building better than it knew. In spite of its bad theories, and trivial forms, and poor polemics, it was probably the only vehicle capable of transporting that costly freight from the Pagan era, in which our faith was born, to the period in which the world might in some sense be called Christian. It was only an imperative and formal *cultus*, only a rigidly instituted ecclesiasticism, that, humanly speaking, could have successfully contended with the rigorous heathenism which—centuries after the foremost intellects of Rome had abandoned all faith in it—still stoutly held its ground, sustained by the enormous prestige which ages of faith had given it among the masses of the people. And, when that classic Paganism was dead, no discipline less stern could have triumphed, in the name of "the white Christ," over the darker superstitions and the fiercer barbarism of the Pagan North.

How sure the popes and councils of the mediæval hierarchy must have been, that Christianity, thus painfully established, would perish with the success of the Lutheran Reformation! How little their faith in their own divine ecclesiasticism could allow them to think that that blasphemous Protest would become the Christian faith of the most advanced and practically believing people in the most enlightened period of human history!—nay, that millions of believers, within a few centuries, would be denying them the Christian name, and stamping their triumphant "universal" Church as the Roman Apostasy, as the Scarlet Woman, with the mark of the beast in her forehead! Yet we have lived to see this. The old persecutor craves defence from persecution. The vicegerent of the Almighty leans helplessly on the support of the infidel

and the foreigner. That awful excommunication, before which monarchs quailed, and whole kingdoms shook, moves men's minds no more than the ravings of bedlam. And this, not because the moral and spiritual influence of Catholicism is positively less in the world now than of old. We suspect that it is more, and not less; that the disciples of Rome are more numerous, her sway more real, her influence better, her struggles and sacrifices more genuine, her priests purer, and her aims higher. But, happily, there are many moral and spiritual powers besides her own at work in the world now, which make her relative influence vastly less,—powers which have qualified and exalted the character of Roman Catholicism itself, which have broken all its absolutism over any but the ignorant, the interested, or the eccentric. We have outlived its pretension to an exclusive stewardship of the grace of God, its once proud and successful assertion of itself as “the Church,”—a pretension only more ridiculous still in the Anglican, and most ludicrous of all in the American, Protestant Episcopal Church! We are as indifferent to its anathemas against that war which Protestant ideas are waging with ignorance, superstition, and caste,—whether spiritual or political,—as we have become to the diatribes of England and France against the late war in defence of our nation's life. The world has pretty generally learned that Christ's real power resides, not in political or ecclesiastical vicars, papal or otherwise; not in symbols or sacraments; but in moral ideas, in spiritual affections, in efforts to console with gracious hopes and ennoble with solemn sanctions the hearts and lives of men.

When we see the Catholic Church engaged in this work, we wish it God-speed. We applaud and greet its ministry to a class which Protestantism does not yet reach. We can well afford to boast and rejoice, that that Reformation whose aim was to abolish the Church of Rome has done no such thing, and is now as little likely to do it as ever. But we have still more reason to boast and rejoice, that the Protestantism which broke the worldly sceptre of a Church that had usurped civil power, and lorded it over Christ's heritage with tiara and sword,

proved an immense revival in the spiritual authority of Christ's religion. Protestantism has wonderfully increased and developed the power of that religion. It has loosened the bands about the human mind. It has led men to read and think; to revere conscience in place of the priest. In breaking down the walls of what for ages was her home, it has actually let the gospel out of a splendid prison, to hold free intercourse with men. In assailing the sanctities of the old tradition, it has opened the way to a new and a nobler knowledge of the living Christ.

Since the decline of the Papacy, and of the Church as a political organization, Christianity has gained immense moral and spiritual force. Instead of the ruin of the gospel, we have seen new and glorious manifestations of its spirit. We have witnessed the rise of popular education, freedom of conscience and of the press, the growth of political rights, the diffusion of wealth, the elevation of masses and multitudes of men,—all keeping pace with the spread of a Christianity which had loosened itself from a Church that claimed infallibility, and insisted upon absolute docility to its formulas. It was, indeed, most natural to doubt whether the Christian religion could live out of the hot-houses in which it had lived so many centuries, without the protection of State authority, without the prestige of a divinely authenticated and inspired priesthood. We cannot wonder, that wise and good men, statesmen alike in the Church and in the world, feared to trust the gospel to the rigors of a climate it was destined to find outside of those magnificent cathedrals, which—as if in echo of the Roman boast of unchangeableness—maintain within their walls a mild and uniform temperature, summer and winter, year in and out. But men who had its very life throbbing in their hearts felt its warmth and power too vitally to share any of these misgivings. To them we owe it—to their noble courage and interior life—that it escaped its self-appointed custodians, broke its gilded manacles, and asserted its independent life; a life in which doctrine, not priestly authority and set ritual, became its sanction, strength, and inspiration.

For three centuries past, the recognized power of the gospel

has dwelt mainly in the creeds of Protestant Christendom. During this period, certain grand dogmatic statements, coming out from their sacramental hiding-places or shaded haunts, have stood nakedly forth as the gospel itself. The creed of Christendom, not the Church of Christ, has embodied the dominant faith. A grim creed it has been, — powerful, stern, awful, commanding; and leaving ineffaceable channels in the soul of our race. Beginning with the fall of man, followed by the curse of God, it has proclaimed the ruin of a race depraved from its ancestral beginning, and devoted, from before its conception in the womb, to everlasting torments, — plucked out of this hopeless destruction, in part, by the interposition of the Son of God, himself his Father's equal, the second Person in a trinity of co-equals, who took flesh, and came into the world to be the substitute of a lost race, and by his own agony remove the penalty of universal and eternal death; the need of a supernatural influence from a third divine Person, the Holy Ghost, to work that change of heart which alone makes faith and repentance possible; the verbal and plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, so that it was blasphemy and infidelity to question the authenticity, genuineness, or absolute authority of any book or text found in the sacred canon, or to deny any doctrine which Protestant theologians had agreed to say was taught in those inspired pages; the participation of visible nature and the historic world in the depravation and disorder of the Fall, so that Satan, and not God, rules in unchurched society and the outward universe, — common life, with all its interests, pleasures, and concerns, being profane, time an empty vapor, the world a vale of tears, life a mere probation, and "vanity of vanities" the proper inscription over the whole career of humanity, considered as a natural development of intellectual, moral, and social life.

Such was the spirit and substance of the dogmatic creed, which supplanted the Catholic Church in the faith and obedience of a large part of Christendom. In such scholastic problems the simplicity of the gospel took refuge, when driven out of the warmth of its old home. Any garments, rather than nakedness! In such misshapen vessels the water of life stood

closely stopped, or was poured from them in penurious drops. Any thing, sooner than evaporation! The simplest truths became mysteries, the plainest ideas riddles, under a professional manipulation which handled them, — much as the apothecary gives his rain-water over the counter as *aqua pura*, and his bread pills as *pillulæ panis*. Indeed, the dogmatic idea of the gospel was a strictly medical one. The Church was a theological pharmacy and hospital. The gospel was medicine, not food. Christ lost the character of the good Shepherd in that of the great Physician. The care of men became the cure of souls. Mankind were not sheep going astray, and needing to be folded: they were wolves, that must be changed back to sheep, before any folding was possible. As to any natural aptitude in the human heart for knowing or loving God, it was wholly alien from him and hated him. There was nothing in Christ or Christianity which any child of Adam, anterior to supernatural grace and miraculous change of heart, could either love or understand.

Yet are we to suppose that the gospel of Christ was ineffectual, and produced none of its proper fruits, in this dogmatic, abstruse, and repulsive form? Far from it. The doctors who taught these creeds were, in the main, noble-hearted, morally exalted, spiritually minded men; and, for the time, the most enlightened. They truly feared God, — as well they might, with their views of his character. Their hearts and souls were fired to the vindication of his righteousness. They adored the mystery of an accursed race saved by the atoning blood of Christ. And they made as noble a use of these rough tools to emancipate the souls of their own time, as later heroes and martyrs have made of much finer instruments for the freeing of their generation. What they took out of the Godhead by their harsh notions of God as the Father, they put back into it by their tender notions of God as Son and as Saviour. What they took out of man's character as a rational being, they put back into it in his allowed openness to supernatural grace. They worked on a much ruder material than we do, in their earlier civilization; and fear had, in great part, to do the work of love. But the blessed gospel of Christ —

which can live without any dogma at all, without any skill or disposition whatever to dogmatize about it — shows its vitality still more strikingly by consenting to dwell, and that efficiently, in the most repulsive and self-contradictory dogmas; to occupy the meanest or the most uncomfortable and confused theological home, and make it radiant with its spirit and its truth. Who has not seen and loved the saintly sweetness, the thorough gospel piety, the Christian beneficence, of those who have entertained, and even hugged to their hearts, the most absurd and cruel dogmatic theories? Who does not know that Christianity has borne some of its sweetest fruits grafted on the wild thorn — bristling with five points here, and thirty-nine there — of that theology which we read in the Westminster Catechism or the English Articles? Thank God! the life of the blessed gospel neither ecclesiasticism nor scholasticism can extinguish! It will live under a bishop's jewelled mitre, or a schoolman's musty logic, or a Calvin's bloody Institutes. The account which people in different ages give of it, the healing comfort and blessing they have in it, has little to do with its real power, or the essential spirit which passes into them from its use. The limestone broth which Lawrie Todd made for the poor woman in Scotland, out of her own meat and vegetables, with a piece of marble in the bottom of the pot, owed nothing of its excellence to the stone, although the innocent soul thought it was all in that wonderful ingredient. And as little does Scotch Calvinism (that hardest sort) owe to the gritty and gravelly ingredients it puts into the gospel porridge, for the piety and worth of its disciples. You cannot bring people near to Jesus Christ; you cannot keep them intimate with the spirit of the Scriptures; you cannot lead them to know Paul and John, Peter and James, David and Samuel, without giving them a saving influence strong enough to neutralize any thing wayward, eccentric, violent, in the methods of Church government or creed, by which in their case the communion has been effected. In narrow and crooked quarters, of Lutheranism or Calvinism, Christianity still lived and flourished. She lived in the Church of England, in spite of Laud, in spite of the rollicking clergy of Charles II., in spite

of bishops with estates rivalling those of princes, and habits to match. She lived and still lives in Methodism, with the lovely memories of John and Charles Wesley sanctifying her itineracy all the way to distant Oregon, where it still follows its faithful pioneer labors, the primer in one hand and the Bible in the other, planting schoolhouses and churches in the wilderness. In every Church she lives, spite of their creeds and forms, spite of their discipline and dogma; and in all does her own beautiful, effective, and indispensable work.

But who does not know that all these churches and communions are loosening their cords, accommodating their discipline and requirements to a changed mind, and a new sort of life among their own members? Will culture and refinement allow men and women in the immodesty of reciting their deepest religious experience in promiscuous gatherings called for that purpose? Will educated and independent Methodists attend class-meetings? Do Orthodox churches often discipline their members for heresy? Do they not allow even their ministers to deny and contradict their doctrinal platforms? Are not their most successful and popular clergy manifestly heterodox in the judgment of those who know what heterodoxy is,—no matter what they or their Orthodox brethren may say about it? We have known of ministers with Unitarian sentiments who have preached acceptably for years in Trinitarian pulpits,—sentiments which they avowed in every thing but the bald name. That name they professed not to like; but the thing they liked wholly, and the people liked it too. Is Christ, therefore, tottering on his earthly throne, losing his dominion among men, because of these manifest givings-way in the dogmatic structure which has so long passed for his religion? Are the truth, power, and grace of the gospel identical with, dependent on, to be measured by, the security of those ideas hitherto known as the creed of Christendom?

For it is past denial, that these dogmas, in any such sense as they were received in, a century or a half-century ago, are now abandoned and repelled. There is not one of them which is not so loose and roomy, by the wear and tear of time, by

the stretching and accommodation of service, that a Unitarian of moderate scholarship and subtilty cannot live in one corner of it, and his Trinitarian brother in the opposite corner, with equal intellectual comfort and ease. Christ—who is “the express image” of the Father’s person, who could say, “he that hath seen me hath seen the Father,” who shared the Father’s glory “before the world was”—is “God with us,” just as the vicegerent of royalty is in some sense the king; as the sun reflected in water is still the sun; as the heat is the fire; as the word is the mind that utters it. And so we might run through all the dogmas of modern Orthodoxy, accepting each with an interpretation as honest, doubtless, as that in which they are received by multitudes of their most educated and influential adherents. But to what end? It would be, after all, a mere darkening of counsel. It would be to accept them in a sense that would leave our own Unitarian faith still unharmed. It is far more important, at this stage of the Church’s history, to be unmistakable as to the points in which we differ from popular Orthodoxy, than as to those in which we agree with it. Religious reformers must keep their eyes and their hearts upon their business. If they are in earnest, and believe the truths they emphasize to be important to the progress of the gospel, they must emphasize them with vigor, persistency, and plainness,—not blur and blot the lines for the sake of peace and good-nature, or to escape contumely and abuse. Oftentimes the hard blows and harder names they have to bear are the best advertisement of their course. They may easily be too popular, or at least too easily borne with, for their own growth and good.

Suppose, now, the Christian gospel,—free from ecclesiasticism, with its assumed political power, its exclusive sacraments, its infallibility; free from human creeds, and all that theologians and scholars have done to cast it into doctrinal moulds; free from every thing but its own moral and spiritual principles, as commended by the holy Jesus, and kept in perpetual alliance with his historic memory and his spiritual person; enforced only on the intrinsic authority of its own truth and use,—are we to think it is in any danger of being

forsaken? Is it to be more neglected than it always has been? Is it to be outgrown and flung away,—its altars forsaken, its ministry abandoned, its simple memorials disused, its name, place, and real authority lost? Is society less under its control now than when those rigid dogmas or that rigorous churchism prevailed? Have free thought, and enlightened conscience, and diminished superstition, and less implicit belief, and more honest doubt and denial about the human outworks of the divine word, hindered or impaired the spread of its real power? Have they allowed more of irreverence and blasphemy towards God, more of hatred and malice among men? Are the schools, hospitals, asylums, and vast charities of modern times; are the ends for which wars are now waged and the spirit with which they are carried on; is the freeing of the serfs in Russia and the slaves in America,—indicative of a lessening power in the faith of Christ?

Christianity has nothing to fear from freedom of thought, freedom of limb, freedom of worship, freedom of doctrine, freedom of investigation; nothing to fear, and every thing to gain, in emancipation from scholastic dogmas and ecclesiastical authority; nothing to fear from science and philosophy, more than gold from the fire that purges out its dross, or sunlight from the winds that clear away the mists and clouds through which it has been struggling. This is Christ's most glorious day, because his truth is freest now. Never was his religion so practically loved and revered; never his invisible Church so wide, so full, so bright with love and worship!

ART. II.—DE QUINCEY AND THE RELIGION OF THE GREEKS.

THERE are few questions which the scholar finds more difficult to determine than that of the relations of Greek life to Greek Mythology. Common enough are treatises rehearsing the names and offices of the divinities, and vulgarly recount-

ing the stories of Olympian amours and eccentricities; but which bear no more intimate relation to genuine learning, or to any questions of permanent interest to philosophy, than the catalogue of Homer's ships does to the great purpose of the *Iliad*. But very rare and fragmentary have been the attempts to penetrate into the hidden meaning of those protean fables which are perpetually recurring in every variety of skilful combinations, and, like Bacon in the "*Wisdom of the Ancients*," to unfold that cryptical science of myths, in which the learning and genius of antiquity lie hidden.

It is difficult, because it is the attempt to translate from the poetic language, which is native to them, into philosophic expression, the high thoughts which dwelt among men in those fresh young days, when, as all tradition and revelation inform us, the earth and the skies held close neighborhood, and men talked with God face to face. Our Christian education throws us so far out from the proper centre of observation, as to make our views of the phenomena we speculate upon confused and contradictory. We must not undertake to adjust the social and theosophic relations of Greek life according to the principles of a Christian constitution of society, any more than to criticise a Greek temple by the rules of pointed architecture. It in no way depletes the Christian religion of its full force and vitality to acknowledge so plain a fact. And accordingly we find that every discussion of the subject which has proceeded in neglect of this premise has become involved in endless and irreconcilable contradictions, and has established whatever conclusion the necessities of the author might require.

Justin the Martyr furnishes a notable example in point, in his "*Exhortation to the Greeks*," which was, so far as we know, the earliest attempted adjudication between the claims of the Christian and the Grecian theologies. Though eloquent and erudite, it is constantly involving itself in the most palpable contradictions; and there is no possible theory of Greek cosmogony or theology which it does not clearly establish, and, anon, as clearly overturn. By abundant and learned proof and quotation, the holy Father demonstrates to

the Greeks that they were polytheists now, and now monotheists, and again atheists, and, in fine, both and all sides of every question which any speculator may start. So that the reader of the "Exhortation" alternately fancies that it is now vindicating and now assailing the Pantheon;* and, for the *coup de grace* to his perplexities, it concludes by appealing to the Greeks, by the authority of their own oracles, to abandon the religion in whose service these very oracles divined. If the oracle is true, the Greek might well reply, it must be Apollo who teaches; if it is not true, why do you appeal to it?

This subject of Mythology has received new interest, and may be discussed on larger data, since the discoveries of the ethnological connection between all the various branches of the Indo-Germanic race, and the establishment of a philological character for Olympus. Zeus and Pallas can no longer be esteemed as the whims and monstrosities of the Hellenic mind, or as the abnormities of a perverted moral nature, when it is seen that they have been the worshipped gods of the Aryas, or noblemen of the human race, from the beginning of time. Whatever the Athenian might have thought, Athéné was no special divinity of his; and there were other temples than the Parthenon in which she was worshipped in other languages than the Greek. The great goddess was restricted to no such meagre pasture as the little peninsula, but had her theocratic state wider and more varied than any her choice Athenians dreamed of. The best-settled point in comparative philology is the essential identity of all the Indo-Germanic languages. These languages, represented in their most primitive form by the Sanskrit, like the races which spoke them, however widely both the one and the other may now be separated, had one common point of departure. And, as the words expressing religious conceptions are the oldest and most elementary of language, often reaching back beyond the

* It is curious to notice that throughout Justin treats the Septuagint as the inspired version of the Old-Testament Scriptures, laying special stress upon its *ipsissima verba*.

furthest etymological research,† they would, in the case of dispersed but kindred races, be carried away as a common inheritance, commemorating a common descent. And though the details and specialties or the distinctive objective elements of their mythologies were worked up after the dispersion of the races, and variously according to the idiosyncrasies of each nation, yet we are not disappointed in finding a certain community of theological thought from the mouths of the Ganges to the banks of the Yellow Tiber. The divinity of Zeus would have been acknowledged by the Brahmins at one extremity of the world, and by our Scandinavian ancestors at the other; for they both would have recognized him, in their own tongues, to be the King of Heaven. *Ζεύς, Διός*; Latin *Jovis*, or, in its older orthography, *Djovis*; Gothic *Tius*, — from which comes our Tuesday, Anglo-Saxon *Tiresday*, — are all represented in their primitive form and meaning by the Sanskrit *Dyaus*, “the starry, resplendent sky.” And what more natural than that men should first find God in the brilliant and mysterious heavens above us? Strange influences — as Milton says the ladies’ eyes “*rained* influence” upon the knights in tournament — rained from the blue glancing stars upon the simple souls of a humanity as yet unclad with philosophy or tradition. The awakening mind of the child is no more certain that God must be among the stars, than were all men in the childhood of the race. God in Nature was the first, and has proved the most enduring, thought of the human mind.

And so all the Aryan races show us, in their languages, that the original perception of natural phenomena lies at the basis of all their mythologies. How like is the old Norse *Tivar*, the gods, to the Sanskrit *diva*, Latin *deus*, Greek *θεός*; and, again, *Jupiter* is only *Ju-pater*, Sanskrit *Dyaush-peter*, the father of the gods. The old German god *Mannus* is precisely the Indian *Manus*, who renewed the human race after the deluge, as the Greeks fable *Deucalion* is said to have

† For example, of our English word “God,” for which no certain etymon has yet been found, neither Webster’s nor Worcester’s derivations can be accepted. See Bopp’s “Comparative Grammar” (Eng. ed.), i. 32.

done. Now, *Mannus* signifies "the thinking," from the same root as the Latin *mens*, which discovers to us its identity with Minerva; that is, Minesva "the mindful." These considerations disconnect Greek mythology from questions of national history and social development, ally it to universal philosophy, and make it a part of the history of the human mind.

Now, Thomas De Quincey was a good Greek scholar, and knew these facts, no man better than he; and yet from the hands of no man have the gods suffered more wretched injustice than from his. In general, there is no class of questions in the discussion of which his genius authenticates itself more satisfactorily than in questions of historical criticism. Especially when it is the history of opinions and morals which is involved, his choice scholarship, joined with an unsurpassed dialectical skill, enables him to illustrate the most recondite subject in a manner which might excite the admiration of Cicero,— "*Est enim admirabilis quædam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia ex alia nexa, et omnes inter se aptæ colligatæque videantur.*" And we hardly know which the most to admire, the accuracy of his learning, the subtilty of his logic, or the fine philosophic perception which illuminates them both, and makes him one of the most original thinkers of his age. He is, too, one of those rare men whose genius, like that of Chevalier Bunsen and Frederick von Schlegel, has been christianized. Religious force and culture with him did not abide down in the will and affections alone, but mounted to the intellect, and somehow gave a Christian coloring to all his ideas. It is wonderful to see how every subject under his hand grows into Christian connections, and gathers to itself unthought-of pious significancies. In brief, he had that understanding heart which always lies very near the highest wisdom.

And yet, in his essay entitled "Christianity as an Organ of Political Movement," * he has fallen into the errors which we

* Theological Essays and other Papers. By Thomas De Quincey. Vol. I. Boston: Ticknor, Reed, & Fields. 1854.

are about to comment on, probably through this very positive bias of intellectual character. The article in question announces its object to be to demonstrate that Christianity is the *only* religion capable of becoming an organ of political movement. But it is needless to remind the reader of De Quincey how immense is the discrepancy frequently between the *real* and the *ostensible* subject of one of his essays, and how impossible it is to predict what he *is* going to say from what he *says* he is going to say. So, in the present instance, he sets out bravely enough to show why Christianity *is* an organ of political movement; but, in the end, has only shown why paganism is *not* an organ of political movement. He realizes in himself the character which he has ascribed to Burke, that of being borne on by the fervor of composition and the vivacity of his own temper to the announcement of ideas and conclusions which were not present with him in the beginning, — often conclusions, too, which, unless the impetus of his own mental elasticity had thrown him on them, would have been rejected. Men may be led, or may lead themselves, stealthily and by circuitous paths, to the adoption of theories, which, if presented to them at once, *per saltum*, would have met with instant and astonished rebuff. Old writers used to asperse St. Augustine, "that he was rather forced into his opinions than made choice of them:" the same charge may fairly serve to vindicate our author for opinions adopted in the heat of intellectual conflict, and under the pressure of controversial necessities. The emergencies of his argument disturbed the just balance of reason. In order to lay a wide basis for the difference between Christianity and Paganism, in respect of the one being and the other not being a political force, it seemed necessary to discredit the Pagan religions in all those elements which move either the conscience or the affections of the people. And this is the way he does it: —

"All moral theories of antiquity were utterly disjoined from religion. Religion, in the eye of a Pagan, had no more relation to morals than it had to ship-building or trigonometry. But, then, why was religion honored among the Pagans? [Take notice, he does

not answer *that* question.] How did it ever arise? What was its object? Object! it *had* no object; if by this you mean ulterior object. Pagan religion arose in no motive, but in an impulse; Pagan religion aimed at no distant prize ahead; it fled from a danger immediately behind. The gods of the Pagans were wicked natures: but they were natures to be feared and to be propitiated; for they were fierce, and they were moody, and (as regarded men who had no wings) they were powerful. Once accredited as facts, the Pagan gods could not be regarded as other than terrific facts; and thus it was, that in terror, blind terror, as against power in the hands of divine wickedness, arose the ancient religions of Paganism. Because the gods were wicked, man was religious; and because Olympus was cruel, earth trembled; because the divine beings were the most lawless of Thugs, the human being became the most abject of sycophants."—p. 6.

Ignoring the superfluous rhetoric of this passage, there is a residuum of positive statement to this effect:—

1st, The Pagan religion had no moral element.

2d, The Pagan gods were wicked natures.

3d, The Pagan worship was mere sycophancy and terror.

Now, there are two distinct elements in the Greek religion, the philosophical and the poetical. The exquisite fabric of Greek mythologies was the handiwork of the poets. The old Hellenic religion existed before it, and would still exist if it were all again blotted out. The gods of Olympus were the creatures of Homer. He created them in the sense that he gave them their special characters, positions, and histories. Raphael, Lucifer, and Satan are no more completely the offspring of Milton's genius, than are Apollo, Poseidon, and Pallas the offspring of Homer's. In this respect as in others, Homer, whether he were an actual or a symbolical personage, really represents the long-accumulated poetical thought of the nation. It was he who fixed once and finally in his immortal verse the evanescent myths which had been floating among the people, and gathering from generation to generation. On the basis of the national religious thought and tradition, he built up their beautiful temples of mythology. And though it may seem strange to us, whose religious theo-

ries are so sharply defined that they sometimes cut our carnal throats, that their religion should be so interwoven with their poetry; yet we must remember—the world to this latest generation has grateful occasion to remember—that the education and life of the Greeks was essentially poetical. How else than by Greek poetry can we imagine that Greek character to have been formed, which has been the world's magazine of great examples? How else could have been matured that Greek soul, so beautiful, so wise, so mighty, that, ever since, men seem to have done little else than to imitate and emulate it? Among all nations there has existed an intimate, though it may be unconscious, connection between religion and poetry. All national† poetry has been more or less religious; and the foundations of all national religion lie in those half-instinctive feelings for the Infinite which are of the essential nature of poetry. But no race was so loved of the muses as that old Hellenic race, and never was a love so honored. And so their religious thought must have blossomed in poetry. If Zeus was the king of gods and men, as the old religion taught, then the aspiring imagination of the poet must create him in form as a king,—must establish him in an Olympus to govern, and make him play a royal part in the history of the universe. And how better could the poet historically express the character of Pallas, the “mindful” goddess, patron of wisdom, than by singing her to have sprung from the brain of Zeus, full grown and full armed? for wisdom is never young, and never without her armor. In fine, give a *fundus* of the few primitive and universal religious ideas, and the Greek character to work upon them, and you could have no other result than Homeric mythology.

But, clearly, this mythology, in the gross and objective details of its narrations, was not the religion of the people: it was merely and inadequately an historical incarnation of

† The Chinese excepted. Frederick von Schlegel, in his “Philosophy of History,” remarks, that Chinese national poetry distinguishes itself from that of all other nations in *not* being mythological.

certain religious ideas. And, if we have no right to judge Christianity by "Paradise Lost," we have no right to judge Paganism by the "Iliad." Pythagoras condemns Homer to the direst punishments in the lower regions for having degraded the divine character in his poetic fictions; and Plato, as Justin quotes, banished him from his republic for being a liar. But we have on this point the clear authority of Herodotus, who has lately grown into credit with the *savans*. "Hesiod and Homer," says he, "whom I do not think to be more than four hundred years older than myself, invented their theogony for the Greeks, gave the gods their epithets, fixed their rank and occupation, and described their forms." Now, it need not be proved, that the Greeks did not suppose Homer and Hesiod to have been gifted with any special revelatory powers. No one fancied that they had returned from the Elysian Fields without having drunk of the waters of Lethe, or that they were in any way inspired to proclaim the secrets of Olympus. If, therefore, Homer *invented* their theogony, this theogony was no essential part of the original religious belief of the Greeks. It seems, indeed, at first difficult to say in what sense they believed in these Homeric gods. They believed in them partly, no doubt, with that *quasi* belief which attaches to the symbolical representations of natural phenomena, and which is common enough among the vulgar to this day; and partly because they were beautiful and fit to their imaginations, because Homer had sung them; and had they not the statues of Phidias? In what other sense they believed in them, we shall shortly attempt to show.

But it is evident, that, before the building of the Pantheon, or the fabled fall of Troy, there existed a primitive religious belief, the root on which were grafted all the blossoms of mythology. Now, this religion was a pure monotheism. The authorities to this effect are decisive. The old Orphic hymns say, "Come up hither, and contemplate the sole King of the universe. He is one. He is self-existent. He alone created all things, and all things are pervaded by him." Christian or Mohammedan never posited the true faith more

nicely. Justin the Martyr adds this further testimony: "The ancient Sibyl, who is mentioned as a prophet by Plato, Aristophanes, and many others, says, *There is one only God, supreme, self-existent, almighty, himself beholding all things, but not perceptible to mortal flesh*; and asserts that Homer himself believed in one God.

But it would be tedious to recount authorities on this point; and needless, too, when the indirect evidence is so conclusive. The whole literature of Greece and Rome, not even excepting Homer, shows a perpetual consciousness of a *distinction between God and the gods*. The treatise of Cicero is curious evidence: he entitled it, it is true, *De Natura Deorum*,—"deorum," no doubt, out of the unbounded respect he had for that numerous class of his fellow-citizens who would never get beyond the titlepage; but the treatise is really, *De natura Dei*; and were it not for a rhetorical allusion, now and then, to Jupiter and Minerva, the last new volume of sermons could not more cavalierly ignore the dignitaries of Olympus. And Cicero was an augur: no wonder he represents some one saying, that he marvelled greatly how the augurs could look each other in the face without laughing. *Mirabile videtur, quod non rideat haruspex, quum haruspicem viderit*. We will conclude the evidence on this point by the testimony of Aristotle, in the precision of whose statement the reader will doubtless have confidence: "All that is said about the human shapes of the inferior deities is mere fiction, invented to instruct the common people, and secure the observance of good laws;" and he adds, "This is *the genuine doctrine of the ancients*." Now we shall endeavor to show, that this genuine doctrine of the ancients continued to be the genuine belief of the people; that, if the Hellenic theology was monotheistic in its beginnings, it was monotheistic to the end. Before, however, we can set up such a claim, we must find some fitting position for those mythological gods who played so grand a rôle in Greek history and literature.

In what way, therefore, did the Greeks conceive these inferior deities to be related to the *Deus ipse*? This answered,

all is answered. And we answer, in essentially the same way as the mediæval Catholic conceived the saints to be related to the Lord: that is, as beings like himself, but greater and better; beings to be prayed to, whose favor was to be purchased, and whose wrath most of all to be deprecated. The analogies between the two cases are very complete. The worship of patron saints in the Middle Age, by citizens of certain favored localities; the dedication of temples to them; the erection of statues in the public places; the offerings of devotees; the official consultation of the saint on great public occasions, as of war or plague, — are all mere reproductions of the old Hellenic worship under different names and a different architecture. Did the virgin Pallas aid her beloved Athenians equally by her wisdom and her ægis? Did not the Virgin Mary counsel and give victory to the armies of Joan of Arc? And the Athenian no more and no otherwise believed in the Maid of Eleusinia, than did the French in the white saint of *la Pucelle*. Burton, in his "Anatomy of Melancholy" [part iii. sec. 4, mem. 1, sub. 2] hits very near the same truth: "Mars, Jupiter, Apollo, Æsculapius, have resigned their interest, names, and offices to a company of fictitious saints. As those old Romans had several distinct gods for divers offices, persons, and places; so have they saints, as Lavater well observes, out of Lactantius, *mutato nomine tantum*." If Homer, to the great scandal of all sound theology, put his divinities in epaulets, and made them fight out the petty quarrels of mortals, do not the legends of the Middle Age tell us that half the battles of their times were determined by the interposition of the saints? "St. Sabine was seen to fight for Arnulphus, Duke of Spoleto; St. George fought in person for John the Bastard of Portugal against the Castilians; St. James, for the Spaniards in America;" and, if there had been any Homer for those days, these events would have been as familiar as are the contests of Mars and Minerva about the walls of Ilium.

Now, if the ancients had gods for all localities, passions, and occupations, — *dii tutelares*, *Lares*, *Lemures*, *DioscURI*;

for birth and marriage and death ; for labor and laughter and sorrow ; for culinary and post-culinary operations : if any one insists upon turning their rhetoric into logic, and making gods where they only meant to make tropes, we can call up an army of mediæval saints, — that “rabble of Romish deities,” as Burton calls them, — which will outflank their best muster of the gods. Look at the saints, — Gregory for students, Luke for painters, Crispin for shoemakers, Katherine for spinners, Anthony for pigs, Gallus for geese, Wenceslaus for sheep, Petronella for ague, and what need to say more ? — the old divinities, *mutato nomine*, turned Christian, taken out of the Pantheon, and put into the Calendar. Lactantius scoffs at the Greeks, that *quos adorant in templis, ludunt in theatris*, — the same gods whom they worshipped in the temple, they laughed at in the theatre ; but, if the part which the gods played in the classic drama was not always such as to excite the reverence of “the public,” what shall we say of the antics of the saints in the Mysteries ? It is safe to say, that the idea of the one God above all was as prominent in the thought, the literature, and the daily life of the Greeks, as it was among the people who whitened the path to Jerusalem with the bones of their crusaders, and built the cathedrals of Europe to protect and commemorate the relics which they brought back with them. In both cases, there was an underlying belief in one God, a substratum of genuine divinity, down in the hidden depths of their consciousness, which they were always seeking to bring up into the clear light of day. These semi-divine beings were the resting-places, half way between heaven and earth, where the human soul, designing the idea of the great First Cause, but not yet strong enough for so bold a flight, stayed to nurture itself awhile for the final ascent. The attitude of the mediæval Catholic towards the patron saint of his family or city was just and precisely the attitude of the Greek towards his tutelary divinity. The lively imagination of the Greeks kept *their* gods occupied, meddling with human affairs, and intermeddling with each other, — very eccentric and *undivine* in their behavior sometimes, but yet averaging towards justice and virtue ; while

the sluggish and uncultivated temper of the Mediævals could find nothing for their divinities to do but to listen to their devotions, perhaps annually winking a doubtful recognition.

This theory of the matter is further confirmed by the fact, that it renders unnecessary such violent hypotheses as that of De Quincey, which are always distasteful to the even judgment of the educated mind. It explains how Greek philosophy and Greek mythology could exist in the same people; how Homer and Plato came to be the products of the same national life. That a people so beloved and honored of Nature above all her other children, with an eye so quick to discern the beautiful, and a genius so fruitful to create it; a heart so open to honor and justice and patriotism, — the *dii majores* of the human soul, — that the divinity of these Greeks should be weak, mean, and wicked, is a supposition too offensive to our notions of character to be admitted till the last resources of contrary conjecture is exhausted. Not only so, but the positive testimony to the existence in the Greek mind of the distinction between God and the personages of mythology, is found equally in the national history and literature. The same phenomenon is found among the Indians, in the distinction between Brahma and Brahm, — the one being the highest order of derived beings, of masculine gender; the other, underived Being itself, and of no gender, because above all accidents of human nature. Plato says distinctly, that "God made the heavens, the earth, and *the gods*," — a statement equally absurd and blasphemous on any other supposition than that proposed. And even Homer himself was ever and anon recurring to a power genuinely divine, which controlled as much his gods as his heroes. What else does he mean when he speaks of *Θεὸς αὐτός*? How could the phrase be otherwise than unintelligible to the Greek mind, unless it had knowledge of a God indeed more above Olympus than Olympus was above Athens? And when this God is in question, so great is his remove from all finite creatures, that, in the awful distance, the gods and men of even Homer's verse shrink to one common level.* And, finally, the Eleu-

* See *Iliad*, ix. 238.

sinian mysteries, which were the only authoritative standard of Greek theosophy, made it their chief object to teach the unity of God.

This fact being once admitted, the gods immediately recede to a position which we can liken to nothing so well as that of the saints of mediæval mythology. The chief distinction between them consists in the difference of the phenomena in which they originated. The saints all arose from real or legendary human beings; but only a few of the deities, and of the "lower orders," had ever been of human blood; and they were the children of mortal women by the superior gods.* For the most part, the gods took their origin from the perception of natural phenomena, the perception being wrought upon by the tendency of the imagination to personify its objects. This is obvious enough from the very names and provinces of the various divinities: Jove being the first, who is the starry sky, the first object of the universe; then Neptune, who is the ocean; and Pluto, the inner earth. And the untiring activity of Greek imagination, overcharged with wonder and thick-coming fancies, would not rest until all the manifold powers of nature had become fitly incarnated. Each constellation of the heavens became the empire of some divinity, and every mountain found itself sanctified in being the dwelling-place of some Oread. The sailor, when the multitudinous sea mutinied against him, invoked the trident, and sacrificed to an Æolus. The soldier, when the battle —

"hung like a pendulum

. 'Twixt a smile and a tear,"

made vows to a bloody Mars, and demeaned himself before a steel-clad Minerva. The lover flattered Aphrodité, that he might win his mistress; and the matron made rich offerings to Venus Verticordia, that the chastity of her fair daughters might never suffer reproach.

* The Fathers generally retained the old idea, that "the *angels* of God" (as it is in the Septuagint) came in unto the daughters of men, and they bare children unto them (Gen. vi. 2); but, curiously enough, they thought the children to be any thing but divine.

"Man gifted nature with divinity
 To lift and link her to the breast of love ;
 All things betrayed to the initiate eye
 The track of gods above."

In respect that the gods were symbolical representations of natural forces, the Greek did not differ from most polytheisms. But the special symmetry and power of the Greek mind is shown in the fact, that with it the simple human form divine was adequate to the representation of every variety of Olympic character. Hence, in the Greek theogony, our taste is not shocked by any of those abnormities so common in India and Egypt. That divine power, which others could express only by endowing their divinities with twenty hands, the Greek fully enough embodied in the single frown of the Olympic Thunderer. A god with twenty hands would have been incontinently kicked out of the Pantheon. And the multiplied heads of the Indian deities were contrivances to represent knowledge, cheap and vulgar in the comparison with the prophetic eye and majestic front of Apollo.

But, what is more to the purpose, while the gods of Egypt and the Barbarians remained the mere barbaresque symbols of unspiritualized nature, the gods of Greece rose to be *moral persons*.* The former were dead facts ; the latter were living forces. The one was the statue ; the other, a statue, and a living soul in it.

But while the Greeks conceived of their gods in the human form, because there is nothing so beautiful as the human form, yet no flesh and blood was necessary to that conception. At the same time that they preserved the form, they ignored the substance. *Nec tamen ea species corpus est, sed quasi corpus, nec habet sanguinem sed quasi sanguinem.*† Their doctrine on this subject differed only in expression from the present popular notions of the "glorified bodies" of the saints and angels. There are certain conceptions which lie outside of the province of exact thought, and hence of exact

* Heeren's *Ancient Greece*, "Original Culture."

† Cicero *de Natura Deorum*, i. 18.

expression, but only *just* outside. The mind is always straining itself to get a clear glimpse of the uncertain shapes of them, and attains (in Edgar A. Poe's expression), not an idea, but an idea of an idea. Among these are our notions of the "resurrection bodies" of the saints, and Greek notions of the shades of the departed, and of the unsubstantial bodies of their divinities. It is an inconsiderate zeal which inquires too nicely into these matters.

That the gods of the Greeks stood to them in no position of absolute divinity, but rather of limited partakers of an unpersonified divine nature, is further evident from the fact, that, in the first centuries of our era, an acceptance of Christianity by the Greek or Roman catechumens did not necessarily imply a rejection on their part of the old gods. Why should it? Why could not the gods remain the tutelary divinities of nations and of nature, though Jehovah were God indeed, *Ens entium*? Astounding as this statement may appear, it is abundantly sustained by the much-neglected history of those transition ages. For many years after the conversion of Constantine, his coins and medals continued to bear the symbol of Apollo, the special divinity of his earlier worship; and he affirms himself and others to have heard Apollo speak, bemoaning the advent of Christ. And even after he had presided at that famous Council of Nice, which first authoritatively proclaimed the Christian faith, he decorated the capital of his eastern empire with the statues and the rebuilt temples of the gods.*

The theory of mythology which we are advocating will receive additional force from its applications to the practical difficulties of the question. Let us recur to De Quincey. In explaining the fact that the Greeks never proselytized, and that they would not have "deemed any such attempt as rational," he says:—

"An ancient Roman could have had no motive for bringing you over to the worship of Jupiter Capitolinus; nor you any motive for

* Jerome relates to have seen Satyrs; and all the Fathers appealed to the Sibylline prophecies in argumentative support of Christianity. Other evidence is abundant.

going. 'Surely, poor man,' he would have said, 'you have some god of your own, who will be quite as good for your countrymen as Jupiter for mine. But, if you have not, I am really very sorry for your case; and a very odd case it is: but I don't see how it could be improved by talking nonsense. You cannot beneficially, you cannot rationally, worship a tutelary Roman deity, unless in the character of a Roman. . . . *Ipsa facto*, and without any separate choice of your own, on becoming a Roman citizen, you become a party to the Roman worship.'

Now, we might object, in the first place, that the statement does not square itself very exactly with the facts. But granted — *datus non concessus* — that the real Roman would have talked just as his hypothetical Roman has done, what follows? What but that the Roman felt himself in the same attitude towards Jupiter Capitolinus that the Florentine stood in towards St. Mary, or the Irishmen towards St. Patrick, or, in general, as the inhabitant of any mediæval state towards its patron saint? The Florentine could not rationally worship a tutelary Venetian saint; but, if he became a Venetian citizen, he would, "*ipso facto*, and without any separate choice of his own," come into the worship and under the protection of the Venetian saints.

When we once acknowledge this to be the real *status* of the Roman deities, how handsomely does the Roman *cultus* accommodate itself to it, and the whole matter clear itself up! Clears itself up, too, without the necessity of resorting to any such unintelligible suppositions as that the religions in question were wanting in any "doctrinal body of truth." We say "unintelligible supposition," because, even in De Quincey's felicitous representation of it, it *is* unintelligible, that there can be any worship without a basis of doctrines on which to erect it. For what is a ceremonial worship but a symbolical embodiment of certain religious ideas, which we call doctrines, or the expression of certain moral feelings which grow out of such ideas? De Quincey's elaborate assertion, on which his whole treatment of the subject turns, that the Pagan religions had *only a cultus*, is a solecism. In the natural history of religion, either as it grows in the indi-

vidual mind, or as it is recognized in the State, the *cultus* is the *last* act. To commence with the *cultus* is like commencing at the top to build a house downwards; or, rather, it is doing in theology what Sidney Smith accused the classical scholars of doing in education, "laying a foundation so far above ground that there is absolutely no room to put any thing on it." How is it intelligible that the Roman could worship any god, unless we suppose his mind to have been cognizant of certain facts,—firstly, as to the character of his divinity; and, secondly, as to his relations to him? Worship necessarily presupposes these two knowledges on his part; and under these two may be categorized all theological doctrines. Nor is it true, as De Quincey's position compelled him to assert, that what he calls "doctrinal religions, or religions of the Book" (which he reckons to be only three in number), are necessarily proselytizing. The Jewish religion was doctrinal certainly up to his full standard, and yet was in its very nature *local* and *national*.* And, again, Pagan religions do proselytize, and on the grandest scale. Witness Buddhism,—it is unaccountable that the author should have overlooked it,—which, starting from the smallest beginnings, extended itself with a rapidity, and has maintained its conquests with a pertinacity, which the history of no other religion can parallel. The persecutions which the Christians suffered at the hands of the Romans show, that the proselytizing spirit might be fierce enough with them, when once aroused. *Aut lita, aut morere*, "Sacrifice or die," said the executioner in Eusebius. But, in general, they were tolerant, for the reasons already urged; and, further, because there was no interested order of priests to arouse the *odium theologicum*. Greece and Rome were both more or less governed by philosophers, and not at all by ecclesiastics; and, no doubt, the views of the governing classes were well expressed by Symmachus, the orator:—"Because God is immense and infinite, and his nature cannot be perfectly known, it is convenient he should be as diversely worshipped as every man shall perceive and understand."

* See Archbishop Whately in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, i. 467.

Let us now recur to the statement of the positions of De Quincey, made at the outset, and see how they square themselves with our re-adjusted views of the mythologies. Is it true that the gods of the Greeks were "wicked natures," — "mere odious facts," as he elsewhere calls them, "like scorpions or rattlesnakes, having no moral aspects whatever, and bearing no relation to men but that of capricious tyrants"? The question is not whether they seem so *to us*, but whether they were so *to them*; for the gods were such exactly as they conceived them to be. De Quincey asserts, through every variety of phrase and illustration, that they were; and that so great was the human hatred of divine beings, that, if "annually one hour of periodical eclipse should have left them at the mercy of men, there would have been a general rush from their own worshippers for strangling them like mad dogs."

In your private ear, reader, — this comes of *opium*. De Quincey, *minus* opium, never would have been guilty of writing, "annually one hour of *periodical* eclipse." And, at this stage of the argument, it seems hardly necessary to answer such vague declamation. As Cicero said of Epicurus, so might we of our author, *Orcitans hallucinatus est*. He brings no special charges against the deities; tells us of no instances in which they have been caught tripping, or in any way behaved themselves unhandsomely; does not even object to them as *individual* divinities; has nothing against the special godship of Apollo or Minerva; would probably even admit that Apollo might have been a rather brilliant and fascinating member of society, and would have enjoyed a balcony *tête-à-tête* with Aphrodité; but, when you come to their being *gods*, then he is out. As the Duke of Alva, in one consummate sentence, condemned to death the whole population of the Netherlands; so has he crowded all Olympus into one grand bill of indictment, and sentenced the indiscriminate rabble as mad dogs and public nuisances. Opium, reader, opium.

Now we vindicate the gods by the following brief but overwhelming considerations: —

First, the *dii majores* were the impersonations of the powers of nature, as their names, offices, and myths combine to teach us. If, therefore, Nature herself is not wicked, capricious, and malignant, neither can the gods be so. Nothing so simple. Their very genesis avouches their good character. It is Jupiter who arches the protecting heavens; Phoebus Apollo who sweeps the certain courses of the sun; Neptune who bears up a thousand ships on his heaving breast; Æolus who keeps nursery for the winds, letting them out to play, and locking them up when grown too frisky; Ceres who warms the earth with fruitfulness, that the never-tiring blessings of seed-time and harvest may not fail. Indeed, what good or beautiful thing was there that did not come direct from the graciousness of some god? We repeat with Schiller, —

“Man gifted nature with divinity,
To lift and link her to the breast of love.”

But, secondly, we are willing that our divine clients should waive the benefit of their allegorical characters, and to rest the case on their personal and historical reputation. And we affirm, that the dealings of the gods with men were any thing but malignant or tyrannical; that they show, in general, that protection and guidance which great and good beings, but neither infinite nor infallible, would be like to extend to weak but presumptuous mortals. However aberrant and perplexing their conduct may sometimes appear, it *averages* towards truth and justice. Homer takes the gods as the standard measure of highest human virtue; and all things that were of good report among men were called ὡςτε Θεός, “like a God.” The just appealed to the gods against the unjust, the innocent against the guilty, nor appealed in vain. Oaths were sworn in their name. Men and women offered up their lives for their country and for each other, in the full assurance of divine rewards. The noblest men and unspotted virgins were chosen to minister in the temples; and they did not enter the presence of their deities without significant lustrations. And, finally, men of pre-eminent valor, or who had rendered some signal service to their race, were reported

either to have come of divine descent, like Æneas, or to have been elevated to divine honors, like Hercules. Now, collate these plain facts with the idea, that the gods were wicked, malignant, and corrupt, and you see how immeasurably false it is.

ART. III.—THE AMERICAN EXECUTIVE.

The Constitutional History of England, since the Accession of George Third. By THOMAS ERSKINE MAY, C.B. In two volumes. Boston: Crosby & Nichols. 1862-3.

The Trial of the Constitution. By SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1862.

English Institutions and their most Necessary Reforms. By FRANCIS W. NEWMAN. London: Trübner & Co. 1865.

IF an American is called upon to defend the system of government of his country against adverse criticism, there is probably no feature of it which he finds harder to justify than this,—that it does not permit us to change our rulers when, and only when, we wish to do so, as is the case under the English Constitution. This is the weakest part of our national fortress. Changes of administration do not necessarily coincide here, as they do in England, with changes in political opinion, and movements in national life; but are forced upon us arbitrarily at fixed epochs, so that they often occur at periods of popular inertness and indifference, when party leaders are obliged to excite an artificial heat for the purposes of the campaign. This is no doubt one cause of the hollowness and insincerity of ordinary American politics.

A cursory review of our political history for the last fifteen years will at once make this clear. At the presidential election of 1852, there were no real issues between the two great parties, and the community was equally indifferent to the two candidates who represented them. It was a contest

neither for principles nor for men, but for spoils. On the other hand, both 1850 and 1854 were years of great political excitement, such as in England would have demanded an appeal to the people. What was done under our democratic form of government? In 1850, the long and heated contest was brought to an end by a purely accidental change of administration, in the succession to office of a president whom the people had not chosen to that position, and by a compromise which opened the door to all the disgraces and iniquities of ten disastrous years. In 1854, the expressed voice of the people was studiously disregarded, and the Nebraska Bill was forced upon the country by the politicians who had been floated into office during the stagnation of 1852. In both years, it is true, members of Congress were chosen, but *not till after the mischief was done*. In 1856, the election was conducted on real and immediate issues, although less so than would have been the case in 1854; but there is no question that the successful candidate would speedily have been ousted in the indignation aroused by the Lecompton frauds, if the Constitution had not fastened him upon the nation for four years.

When we contrast the business habits of Americans and Englishmen,—our rapidity and impatience, with their methodical thoroughness,—it is hard to believe that it is we who put up with the most senseless routine and most complicated knots of red tape in public affairs, while their machine of government works with a speed, precision, and manageableness of which we do not dream. Seeing that we claim to be the model democracy, it is a little humiliating to reflect that Great Britain always has the man whom she really prefers as her executive head, with the power to change the moment she sees good cause to do so; while we must drag on year after year under a Tyler, a Pierce, or a Buchanan, whom the whole nation rejects and despises after three months' trial. In England, when Parliament is dissolved, writs of election are at once issued, the elections are held, and the new members take their seats immediately; when the whole machinery of State goes on again as if there had been no interruption.

The people have given their decision, and it has taken immediate effect. In the United States, on the other hand, the elections are scattered along during a twelvemonth. In 1861, Congress sat before the members for Kentucky were chosen. In 1862, New York, Ohio, and Indiana chose representatives of whom they had reason to be heartily ashamed long before they took their seats in Congress. Nay, often two members are chosen on the same day for the same district,—one to fill an accidental vacancy, the other (as if assuming that the first would fail to give satisfaction) for the full term to follow.

The unnaturalness of our present method needs no further illustration. It is indeed so evident, and our system is so universally acknowledged to be inferior to the British in this respect, that it has led many hasty observers to the conclusion that our Constitution and form of government are, as a whole, inferior to the English. This does not at all follow. In comparing them, indeed, we need not be influenced by any false pride. We of this generation did not frame the Constitution. We received it ready-made from our ancestors; and, if it should prove not to serve our purposes, we should have no more scruples in altering it, than in altering a house which we have inherited. But, as we have said, this conclusion does not follow. When we speak of the British Constitution, we mean its monarchical and aristocratic features, of Crown and House of Peers, as well as the democratic feature of immediate dependence of the executive* upon the popular will. But we are far from envying Great Britain her throne and aristocracy. There is nothing more striking in the study of the constitutional history of England during the last century, than the persistency with which these two powers have placed stumbling-blocks in the path of every wholesome reform. Their whole efficiency, as peculiar and

* It is understood, of course, that the term "executive" may be applied indifferently to the king and the premier, because the executive power, which with us belongs wholly to the president, is in England divided between these two functionaries. We shall, by this term, denote the premier, because he possesses in practice all the executive powers of the government.

distinct estates, has consisted in this. We do not mean a healthy conservatism, such as is essential in every State,—a check upon over-hasty and ill-considered legislation,—but that blind, wilful resistance to progress which was exemplified in George III. and Lord Eldon, and which characterized these two branches of government until the present reign. From this, and from this alone, has come every shock which has seriously threatenēd the English Constitution during this period.* And while in matters of detail we may find points in which each Constitution excels the other,—as is natural when one of them was mainly formed upon the model of the other,—it is nevertheless true, that the feature under discussion, democratic in its character, is perhaps the only one of any importance in which the English Constitution is really and unquestionably superior to ours.

England and the United States, differing widely as they do in theory and form of government, stand at the head of free nations. The founders of the new nationality of the West naturally copied the framework of government of the mother country, so far as it could be copied in a Constitution which gave up three such fundamental institutions as King, Lords, and State-Church. The safeguards of liberty, in the Bill of Rights, were copied in full; and it is in these that the lofty prerogatives of the two nations consist. The outlines and functions of the various departments were also largely borrowed, and by necessity much of English tradition crept in insensibly with the common law and the usages of political affairs.

* Another just complaint against the House of Lords we find in the English correspondence of one of our newspapers:—

“Richard Bethell, an outlaw in England, and a man of whom every species of crime is known, cannot be prevented from being a peer of England on the death of his disgraced father! Within the week, Earl Granville has complained that the peers—of which there are over five hundred in London—would not come to the House, and that the public business therein has to be carried on by less than a dozen; and the ‘Times’ and other authorities declare that the young Peers will not allow the affairs of the country to interfere with their rides in Hyde Park, and dinner, and the sacred duty of shooting pheasants. Some of the papers think they will have to enforce a quorum in the House of Peers.”

There is one point of difference, however, of very essential importance, touching the appointment and tenure of office of the executive, — not confined to this, however, but running through nearly all parts of the Constitution. It has reference, not so much to *form* as to *mode of operation*. The machines are very much alike; the motive power is different. In one it is the will of the aristocracy; in the other, that of the people. But this is of little moment. A democracy, as well as an aristocracy, is a *corporate* government. The real difference is in the running gear. In one, all depends upon the constant watchfulness of the engineer, and the efficient control exercised by him; in the other, the machine is intended to run smoothly and regularly without any engineer.

The two methods in question have been variously analyzed. They may be called the *English* and *American* methods, although we should be sorry to imply, by this expression, that the American method is so ineradicably rooted in our political procedure, that it cannot be modified by the best features of the other.

The distinction is often said to reside in the fact of our having a written Constitution; but the so-called "constitutional" governments of the continent of Europe have written constitutions on the English model, and follow the English practice in the appointment of the ministry; although with them, too, it is merely a matter of usage. And, as we shall attempt to show, the only drawback to the perfection of the English plan is precisely this, — that it rests only on usage, and not on written law.

By another theory, free governments are divided into two classes, — *ministerial* and *presidential*, as they have been called; the distinction being, that in one the chief executive is appointed by the legislature, and in the other by the people. The insufficiency of this analysis is shown by the fact, that the original plan considered in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 (the so-called "Virginia plan") provided for having the president chosen by Congress for a term of seven years, — a method that might or might not have been better than the one finally agreed upon, but which would, at

any rate, have been open to the same objections on this score.

It is still more plausibly urged, that the disadvantage which we acknowledge that we are under is one that is inherent in a republican form of government; that it is the sacrifice we must make in consideration of our clear and manifold advantages in other respects. It is certain that this distinction is true in point of fact, if not by necessity. It is only monarchical and vice-regal governments that are conducted on the English plan; and it must be admitted, that much the easiest way of having the executive depend directly upon the public will, is, that there should be a person above all parties, and perfectly impartial, whose only object is to appoint whatever premier the people desire. If we were only sure of having such a king! But it must be remembered that Queen Victoria is the first sovereign in history who has attempted to carry out this theory, and that even she has more than once permitted her personal will to influence her in the appointment of her ministry. It seems, then, that monarchy is not an absolute security for the establishment of such a rule. We hope to show that republicanism is not inconsistent with it.

The most accurate analysis will be one which shall suggest the characteristic advantage of each system, and, at the same time, describe the whole operation of the respective constitutions. On this ground they may be termed the *methodical* and the *elastic* systems, inasmuch as the American Constitution aims especially to secure regularity of action; the English Constitution, elasticity. Each succeeds in its special object; but each neglects the particular virtue which is sought by the other. Our form of government lacks elasticity and adaptability; the English lacks regularity. Ours is too strictly a *form*. It was based too much (as was perhaps unavoidable in a pure experiment such as this was) upon theories of government, too little upon human affairs. Men are not machines. Society does not move by clock-work. Events do not run in regular cycles; and any attempt to tie down political action, even in the most tranquil times, to fixed

periods of three, four, six, or seven years, must often occasion embarrassment and inefficiency.

It is interesting, in this connection, to compare Mr. Mill's prophetic remarks, in his article upon the French Revolution of 1848, upon the danger to the French Republic from this very lack of elasticity in its Constitution. "It is to be feared, that, by placing face to face an assembly and a first magistrate,—each emanating directly from popular suffrage, and each elected for a term fixed, only capable of being abridged by death or resignation,—the Assembly have organized a perpetual hostility between the two powers, replete with dangers to the stability of the Constitution. For if the president and the National Assembly should hereafter quarrel, there may for three whole years be no means by which either can relieve itself from the hostility of the other, except a *coup d'état*."

There has been some ground for apprehending a similar crisis in our own country this very year. Suppose that President Johnson, instead of considering his plan of reconstruction an experiment, as he has more than once assured us it is, were disposed to regard it as a finality, and to force it upon the country by executive power and influence. We know how Congress stands towards it; and, in such case, there is no manner of doubt that it would come to open warfare between executive and legislature. But have we any way of knowing which of the two most truly represents the people? Both were chosen at the same time, almost a year and a half ago, in a totally different state of the country, and on totally different issues from the present. Neither would yield to the other's claims. Is it not clear, that, in such a condition of affairs, the fierce struggle which—coming just at the end of a civil war—must shake the republic even more terribly than it has already been shaken, might be averted by a fresh appeal to the people? The English practice of "going upon the country" in such emergencies is the great safety-valve of their institutions. We have no such safety-valve. Our American method gives us no means of escape from perils of this nature,—as if assuming our insti-

tutions to be strong enough in themselves to stand any strain, however severe,—but leaves it for the workings of events and the relative strength of the contending parties to determine finally the points at issue.

On the other hand, the English government prides itself too much on being merely practical, and would often be improved by a little of our superfluous regularity. An American administration unquestionably has an advantage, in being able to reckon with assurance upon a certain and sufficient length of time to carry out its plans; and, for this reason, enjoys a greater degree of independence than the English ministry. For instance, Lord Derby formed a ministry in 1858; but, in less than a year, he was turned out on a purely party issue, to make room for the very Lord Palmerston who had been dismissed a year before for subserviency to the French emperor. So, at the time of the Trent affair, the English Government—as the newspapers at this time boasted—would not have dared to adopt any but a menacing tone towards this country in face of the popular fury at home; while our Government, being fully protected against popular excitement by its tenure of office, was enabled to disregard an almost unanimous public opinion, and to pursue without hinderance the policy it thought right.

The English method is, therefore, by no means so manifestly superior to ours as is commonly taken for granted; nor would attention probably have been so exclusively directed to its merits, if it were not that, from causes in a great degree independent of the systems themselves, it happens of late years to have worked well, and our method very badly. The false theories of democracy which have prevailed, together with the long rule of the slave oligarchy, have placed power in this country in unworthy and incompetent hands. But it never fell into such hands before the spread of those theories, and the growth of that oligarchy. If the names of Harrison, Tyler, Polk, Fillmore, and Pierce, make but a sorry figure by the side of Peel, Russell, and Derby; so do those of Addington, Perceval, and Liverpool by the side of Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Adams. These last twenty

years have seen the English Constitution in its fullest development, its most perfect equilibrium, its most harmonious operation. They have seen the American Constitution subverted by sophistical theories, abused by demagogues, and almost overthrown by oligarchs.

But, after all, one thing is certain. In England, the people always have the man of their choice at the head of the State, and at the very moment that he is wanted. This one excellence casts all defects in the shade. Their manner of accomplishing this is bungling and illogical; but its results are satisfactory, and that is enough. Thus, when Lord Aberdeen's "ministry of all the talents" was obliged to retire from office in 1855, three trials were necessary before a successor could be determined upon. The place of prime minister was offered first to Lord Derby, and then to Lord John Russell; and it was not until after these acknowledged party leaders had failed, that Lord Palmerston — whom either the people or an impartial looker-on would have designated at the outset, but whom the queen disliked — was accepted as the man for the hour. No doubt this method, which succeeds at the third trial, is so far better than ours, which does not succeed at all, unless by accident. But neither method is the best conceivable.

The cause of the perfect working of the English Constitution during the reign of Queen Victoria is, that now, for the first time, all classes are practically agreed — at least for the present — as to its character. The contest for centuries has ended in the establishment — perhaps permanent, at any rate undisputed — of the aristocracy as the ruling power in Great Britain. The Georges, and even William IV., did their best to maintain the prerogatives of their station; but this gentle, unambitious lady has been content to act only as the formal mouthpiece of the aristocracy. She "reigns, but does not govern." So, too, the efforts of the chartists and republicans have been quietly suspended, seeing that the just and beneficent administration of government gives little encouragement to cries for reform. But there are serious reasons to doubt whether this condition of equilibrium will

last. The theory of the Constitution is still monarchical. The king is sovereign, — absolute owner of all the land, lord of all its inhabitants, and (in connection with Parliament) maker of its laws, — head of State, Church, and Army. The people of England are his *subjects*: he commands, and they obey. The ministers are his servants, and must do his bidding. He makes treaties, declares war, and agrees to terms of peace. His veto is absolute. The coin of the realm is his; the very language is the “King’s English.”

Suppose, now, that a king should come upon the throne of England who would not be content with being a cipher, — a king who should have the will and the ability to succeed where William IV. failed, when he tried in 1834 to form a Tory administration under Sir Robert Peel, against the opposition of Parliament; a king such as the Duke of Cumberland might have been, had the scheme to set aside the succession of Victoria in his favor succeeded. Mr. Pitt and Lord Melbourne both resisted successfully that custom which is now regarded as a part of the Constitution: what if some ambitious minister or sovereign should resist it again? It is hard to say what such a king, with all the executive power of the nation in his hands, with all the theories of the government on his side, might not accomplish. There would be no usurpation, only the resumption of a legal prerogative. The principle of ministerial responsibility would be no adequate protection. A minister may, it is true, be tried and punished for his acts: but the power of appointment and removal belongs wholly to the king; and when king and premier agree, like George III. and Mr. Pitt, they have the letter of the law on their side.

Or suppose the danger to the aristocratic rule to come from the opposite direction, from democracy instead of monarchy. Suppose that the enfranchising process goes on until the House of Commons comes really to represent the people of England. Would such a House be permitted, without a severe struggle, to dictate the appointment of the ministry in compliance with a mere custom? There are many indications that the present tranquillity in the political atmosphere

of England is but the calm before the storm, and that a strife of parties is about to succeed as violent as our own country has witnessed,—as violent as that in England in the last part of the eighteenth century. For we must bear in mind, that the savage party spirit, the unscrupulous party management, and the shameless corruption in public life, which have disgraced our generation in the United States, are but a copy of equally disgraceful scenes and practices in the times of Lord North, and of Fox and Pitt. Whenever the suspended contest of those days is renewed, we may look to see again the unrelenting persecutions which patricians, oligarchs, nobles, slaveholders, in all ages, have employed in defence of their privileges. And it is only by a written constitutional guaranty, by making law what is now mere custom, that this fundamental right, wrested from the kings, can be preserved against usurpation, treachery, or indifference.

The danger here spoken of is a distant one; perhaps it does not exist at all. There is reason to hope that the progress of English institutions towards democracy will continue gradual and peaceable,—that the English aristocracy will be the first in history to abdicate its exclusive privileges frankly and gracefully. It would be worthy of its exalted character and its liberal antecedents.

There is, however, an actual evil of considerable magnitude, resulting from the loose and irregular method of appointing the English executive. When the ministry is defeated in the House of Commons, who is to decide whether this is an indication of loss of confidence, or of a mere difference of opinion? It is notorious that members belonging to the party of the government, and even independent members, often vote for a measure against their judgment, from an unwillingness to defeat the ministry, and thus bring on a "crisis." In like manner no scruple is felt at rejecting a useful bill, if this will be the means of turning out an administration of the opposite party. Mr. Disraeli's budget in 1859 was voted down, not because it was a bad budget, but because Lord Palmerston was wanted for premier in place of the Earl of Derby.

We have pointed out what appears to us to be the only defect in the constitution of the English executive. If its responsibility to the legislature were made to rest upon statute instead of usage, and if its administrative functions were restricted within their proper sphere, it might be justly considered a model executive. This would impart to the English system the element of *certainly* in which it is at present deficient. It would still, however, be wholly destitute of *regularity*, and the ministry would retain their present excessive control over Parliament.*

As the English Constitution is distinguished for elasticity and promptness, so ours sacrifices every thing to regularity, which, in truth, degenerates into rigidity and an absurdly methodical slowness. The Government should not only represent the people, but should do this speedily and immediately. Its relation to the people should be close and constant. This truth is obvious enough; but so far are we from recognizing it in practice, that not only do we choose all our officials for definite terms, but we seem to take pains to exaggerate the stringency of this rule and all the inconveniences that result from it. We chose members of Congress, a year and a half ago, who did not take their seats until within three months. Then the issue was War, now it is Reconstruction. This is our usual practice. In ordinary times it is followed by no worse consequences than the very serious weakening of the mutual bond between representative and constituents. But a Congress which may have in its hands the fate of the continent, at a time when strange events are crowding upon each other from day to day, and issues change every month, should be chosen only by the fullest light that time, events, and free discussion can throw upon the questions to be decided; and should assemble as soon as chosen.

It would not be possible, even if it were desirable, to give to a republic with a written constitution equal elasticity with

* "At present, the power of a minister to threaten a dissolution — which means, to threaten a *fine* of some hundreds or even thousands of pounds on single members, if the voting be not to the minister's taste — is a disgrace and a grave mischief." — *English Institutions*, by Mr. F. W. Newman, p. 27.

a monarchy whose institutions are the growth of time. The throne itself, as has been often acknowledged, is a great conservative institution which only a monarchy can possess. In a republic, a written constitution must take its place as a basis of conservatism. How well it can do this is shown by the veneration which has attached to ours. But is it necessary that the element of elasticity should be wholly wanting? This is a question which appears hardly to have presented itself to the framers of our Constitution. To them the only choice seemed to lie between fixed terms of years on the one hand, and life or good behavior on the other. There were many, among them Alexander Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris, who were in favor of having the president, or the senate, or both, chosen for life or good behavior. These propositions were with good reason rejected, as leaning too much towards monarchy or aristocracy. And when afterwards the Republic of Colombia adopted this principle, and chose a president for life, the experiment succeeded only during the lifetime of the illustrious "Liberator," after which it was abandoned in favor of a term of years. This tenure for life or good behavior is appropriate to the judiciary; the first principle of which is freedom from liability to change at regular periods, and from dependence on popular opinion. On the other hand, an essential feature of the executive and legislative tenure should be this very dependence upon public opinion, and readiness to change with its changes. Any such tenure, therefore, as that of life or good behavior, is open to the objection of inelasticity, equally with the term of years.

It does not seem to have occurred to the minds of the members of the Convention of 1787, that it was possible to incorporate into a written constitution for a republic the grand principle of the English system,—indefinite terms of office. Perhaps it is not possible. At any rate the question deserves to be discussed. Few will dispute the advantage of such an incorporation: its practicability may be open to doubt.

We should not wish to adopt this principle to the extent in which it prevails in England. There, both the executive and

the legislature hold office for indefinite terms. Both are removable at pleasure. The premier can dissolve Parliament, Parliament can (practically) dismiss the premier, either at a day's notice. We have pointed out above what appear to be the dangers of a system which, like this, has nothing stable in its tenure of office, as well as the more obvious evils of a system which is intended always to run in the same groove. If now the problem were to draw up a plan for a republican mode of administration which should combine the advantages, and avoid the disadvantages, of each of these, the first question would be, in which department—executive or legislative—the tenure of office should be for a definite term, and in which the term should be indefinite.

There seem to be good reasons for introducing the element of elasticity into the executive, rather than the legislature. The regular expression of the public will at stated intervals would be given with greater certainty in reference to a large number of representatives, well known to their respective constituents, than to a single magistrate who at best will lack *personality* to a vast majority of the voters. Moreover, a remorseless change at a given epoch had better be made in comparatively unimportant men, whose duties are deliberative and legislative, than in the great executive head of the nation, in whom just at that moment there may be centred interests of vital importance. There is no such imperative reason for getting rid of an incompetent Congress as of an incompetent president at a moment of great public peril. Neither is it necessary to decide so rapidly what laws shall be made, as what action shall be taken. It may therefore be assumed that the members of Congress shall, as now, be chosen for terms of two years: the question will then come up whether it is possible for the president to be elected for an indefinite term.

Any reform must begin, however, with Congress. The absurd practice of choosing representatives thirteen or fourteen months before they are to meet, should cease. This is a matter which rests entirely with Congress itself, inasmuch as the Constitution only prescribes the first Monday in Decem-

ber as the day for its convening, "unless they [the Congress] shall by law appoint a different day." If the first meeting of every Congress were to be on the 4th of March, the day on which it legally comes into existence (or better still, by an amendment of the Constitution, on the 1st of January, the elections being held in November), it would be fresh from the people, and would really represent them. As it is now, Congress does not represent the present people of the United States, but that which existed a year or two ago, and may have had wholly different sentiments from the present.

Suppose, then, that the House of Representatives (not the Senate, but the House, which has freshly come from the people) should have the power at any time (but never twice in the same year) to order an election of president.* In this there would be nothing compulsory or final. If the president in office were satisfactory to Congress (which would be likely to reflect the sentiments of the people), no attempt would be made to turn him out. If it seemed otherwise to the House, still their action would determine nothing; he could be re-elected if acceptable to the people. If no such action were taken, or if the election were to result in his favor, no change would be made in the administration; and an efficient and popular chief magistrate might remain in office as long as Mr. Pitt, while an unsatisfactory one would be dismissed as speedily as Lord Goderich.

It is an argument in favor of this plan, that as the election would, of course, be ordered to be held within a reasonably short time,† the change would be made quickly, and there would be less opportunity for the scheming and machinations of professional politicians. Much good is, no doubt, accomplished by a presidential campaign, in quickening the national life, and instructing the masses on political subjects. But the expense, scandals, and loss of time, are out of all proportion

* No discussion should be allowed, or parliamentary manœuvres; a plain vote, yes or no, on the simple question of ordering an election.

† The Constitution might provide that it should be held within a given time, and that the new president should be inaugurated within so many days after the election.

to the gain. A vigorous canvass conducted honorably and decently would accomplish in six weeks what now wastes half a year in tedious discussion, vituperation, intrigue, and all the unscrupulous manœuvring of party tactics. There would not be time in a month or six weeks, especially as it could not be known with certainty beforehand that an election was to be held, for party managers to excite prejudices and jealousies against all illustrious names, until at last nobody is found available but some military chieftain or third-rate lawyer. The actual will of the people would be much more likely to be discovered by the rapid process that would be necessary, than it can be with all our cumbersome machinery of nominating convention and presidential canvass. A new president would be chosen whenever the people really wanted one, and at no other time.

Another advantage gained would be, that upon the plan suggested an election would be held immediately upon the death of a president. It has become almost a rule to nominate insignificant men for vice-president,—a rule that has twice been followed by disastrous results. That a different principle was followed in 1864 is a good sign, but we cannot depend upon its being adopted in future.

As our plan confines us to the task of pointing out the defects in our government which arise from this excessive attachment to method, and lack of elasticity, we will not enter into the discussion of the mode of choosing the president. We will only say, that if direct election by the people should be adopted, as the tendency of popular thought seems to indicate, it would be necessary first to amend the Constitution so as to establish a uniform rule of suffrage *in national elections* throughout all the States. Otherwise individual States would be able to secure disproportionate power in the election by their laws regarding the elective franchise.

There is, however, one abuse connected with the election of president, so gross and so unaccountable, that we cannot forbear touching upon it. This is the choice of electors by general ticket,—the most complete disfranchisement of minorities that has ever had sway. It gives the large States not

only undue power in the election, but almost undisputed control over the nominations. Nobody asks at a convention, "Who will be acceptable to Vermont or Delaware?" but, at the Chicago Convention of 1860, almost the sole question was, "Who will carry Pennsylvania?" We have no reason to regret the actual result in that case; but we should not forget that it was solely the importance of this question that made Simon Cameron a prominent name in that convention, and might have made him president of the United States. If electors were chosen by districts, or by the people of the whole State, on Mr. Hare's plan, or if the people voted directly for president, one State would have no more influence over the election, as a State, than another.

There is still another branch of the government in which we see traces, although less marked, of the rigidity which we have criticised in the executive. We refer to the Senate, a body which shares the functions of all three departments of government. It is legislative, in so far as it has an equal share in legislation with the House; executive in so far as its assent is necessary to executive appointments and to treaties; judicial inasmuch as it sits as the great court of impeachment. In the Constitutional Convention, it was made at first a general receptacle for whatever of the functions and operations of government did not fall readily under any particular head; by which means it was so loaded with labors and honors that it was soon necessary to transfer some of them elsewhere. Still the peculiarly exalted character of the American Senate was early recognized, and has seldom been forgotten in selecting its members. The position of a senator as the representative of his State in her sovereign capacity, the nearness of his relations with the president in the control over his appointments, and association with him in treaties; the solemnity of those judicial powers which have so rarely been exercised; the smallness of the body to which he belongs; and its traditional dignity and urbanity,—all these concur to invest the office with peculiar honor.

Mr. Mill has some remarks upon the organization of a Second Chamber, or Senate, which contain such just and

striking views that we shall quote from them at some length.*

“Of all principles on which a wisely conservative body, destined to moderate and regulate democratic ascendancy, could possibly be constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate, itself the most consistently prudent and sagacious body that ever administered public affairs. The deficiencies of a democratic assembly, which represents the general public, are the deficiencies of the public itself, — want of special training and knowledge. The appropriate corrective is, to associate with it a body of which special training and knowledge should be the characteristics. If one House represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and fortified by practical experience. If one is the People’s Chamber, the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen, — a council composed of all living public men who have passed through any important political office or employment.” — “Were the place vacant in England for such a Senate (I need hardly say that this is a mere hypothesis), it might be composed of some such elements as the following: All who were or had been members of the Legislative Commission described in a former chapter, and which I regard as an indispensable ingredient in a well-constituted popular government. All who were or had been chief justices, or heads of any of the superior courts of law or equity. All who had for five years filled the office of puisne judge. All who had held for two years any cabinet office: but these should also be eligible to the House of Commons; and, if elected members of it, their peerage or senatorial office should be held in suspense. The condition of time is introduced to prevent persons from being named cabinet ministers, merely to give them a seat in the Senate; and the period of two years is suggested, that the same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a senatorship. All who had filled the office of commander-in-chief; and all who, having commanded an army or a fleet, had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes. All governors general of India or British America, and all who had held for ten years any colonial governorships. The permanent civil service should also be represented: all should be senators who had filled, during ten years, the important offices of under-secretary to the treasury, permanent under-secretary of State, or any others equally

* “Representative Government,” chap. xiii.

high and responsible. The functions conferring the senatorial dignity should be limited to those of a legal, political, or military or naval character. Scientific and literary eminence are too indefinite and disputable; they imply a power of selection, whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves: if the writings by which reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special qualities required; while, if political, they would allow successive ministries to deluge the House with party tools."

Although these special suggestions of Mr. Mill are only applicable to England, they are very well worth consideration by us. Mr. Mill goes on to say, that of course the House of Lords must be the basis of any Second Chamber which could possibly exist, but that there might not be any "insuperable difficulty in aggregating the classes or categories just spoken of to the existing body in the character of peers for life." In like manner the American Senate, as at present constituted, would, and justly, continue the nucleus of any more extended body; but the adoption of Mr. Mill's principle would add very much to its character, dignity, and ability. We complain of the deficiency in trained ability among our public men; but are we aware of the extent to which the practice prevails of dismissing them to private life as soon as they have reached a tolerable eminence? With regard to the president, this is taken as a matter of course; but one is surprised to observe how common it is for obscure men to be summoned to the cabinet, and then, after four years of the most admirable training for statesmanship, to be dismissed back to obscurity. Who have been our secretaries of State and the Treasury for the last twenty years,—two offices which necessarily instruct their incumbents most thoroughly in foreign affairs and domestic interests? Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Clayton, Mr. Webster, Mr. Everett, Mr. Marcy, Mr. Cass, Mr. Walker, Mr. Meredith, Mr. Corwin, Mr. Guthrie, Mr. Cobb, and Mr. Cameron. Five of these are dead; of the others, only Mr. Guthrie is now in public life. And, with regard to the presidency, it seems hard that to confer the highest honor in the State upon a man should be equivalent to dismissing him from the public service for the rest of his life. What more honorable

retirement for a statesman leaving the presidential chair, than a body so pre-eminent in dignity and wisdom as the American Senate should be?

We will not undertake to say how far the principle recommended by Mr. Mill could be advantageously carried out in this country. The question deserves consideration, however, whether it might not be applied to certain cabinet offices, first class missions, and the like. We might in this way prevent some of the ill results of our inelastic system of election. If the members of the Senate should be too much increased thereby, it would be possible to balance this by allowing each State only one senator instead of two; and it might be well still further to elevate the character of the body, and to make it more completely a chamber of statesmen, by having its members selected from among those only who had already filled some important office,—either governor, representative to Congress, or justice of the highest State court.

In yet another way we would add to the dignity of this body. The expediency of permitting *placemen*, or, as we term them, "officeholders," to sit in Parliament, was long a matter of debate in England; it being doubtful whether this would add more to the efficiency of the administration than it would take away from the independence of the legislature. It was finally settled upon a principle obviously correct. "The multitude of subordinate functionaries ought to be excluded. A few functionaries, who are at the head or near the head of the great departments of the administration, ought to be admitted."* The principle is obviously correct, as we have said; and yet there is an odd mixture of good sense and absurdity in the application of it. All the ministers of State must sit in the Parliament; but no method is provided of securing them seats, and, still worse, the acceptance of an office vacates a seat already held.

Whoever, therefore, is appointed to a cabinet office from private life, must find a constituency somewhere which will elect him; and whatever member of Parliament is appointed must

* Macaulay, "History of England," vol. iv. chap. xix.
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go again before his constituency, and go through all the trouble and expense of a canvass for re-election.* And if the constituency is refractory, as has happened, and refuses to choose him again, some unlucky member of the party who is of no account himself, but whose constituency is sure for the party, must be prevailed upon to accept the "Chiltern Hundreds," and let the rejected minister offer himself for this pocket borough.

This is the English system; as usual, very absurd in theory, but very efficient in operation. That our Constitution forbids placemen from holding seats in Congress is one of the chief points criticised by all English writers upon our Constitution, and with considerable reason, although far less than they imagine. In the British Parliament, all the legislation originates with the ministers, as being members of Parliament, and its acknowledged leaders and mouthpieces. It is an understood thing that the English executive is directly dependent upon the legislature, no attempt being made to keep the two departments distinct and independent of each other. In our Constitution, on the other hand, the distinction between them is fundamental; and here, as elsewhere, we carry out our theory to its utmost, not only by jealously guarding Congress against the slightest interference or encroachment on the part of the executive, but by forbidding a natural and desirable intercourse. Congress is supposed by our theory to be the sole source of all legislation; and it accomplishes its work by the admirable system of standing committees, which exercise the same influence over legislation, in preparing bills and engineering them through the Houses, that is performed in England by the ministry. Any proposition to lessen the powers and dignity of these committees would be regarded with distrust by the American people, and would be far from meeting with our approval.

* "We have seen the still greater anomaly of ministers of high rank and character unable to obtain a seat in the House of Commons, and reduced to the humiliating, and we will say unconstitutional, position, of being excluded from the great council of the nation by the very fact of being called to the official council of the sovereign." — *Quarterly Review*, July, 1849.

Every one will, however, acknowledge that the lack of harmonious co-operation between the president and Congress is a very serious evil in our system, and that it is caused by this very jealousy of any direct connection between the two. It may be well, therefore, to ask whether we have not suffered our theories to carry us too far in this direction. Even during the last administration, when the political friends of the president formed a large majority of Congress, how frequently it was found necessary to secure some unofficial expression of the desires of the president and his secretaries!—protested against sometimes as an arbitrary interference of executive influence, but nevertheless acquiesced in as unavoidable and salutary. Of course it must be so. The executive officers are naturally better acquainted with the immediate requirements of the public service than any of the members of Congress. There are many things which must be kept secret; many, the importance of which can be learned only by the closest familiarity with the details of a department. The wisest senator, acting as an unofficial mouthpiece of the administration, cannot master the subject by a week's cramming so as to present the arguments with half the cogency that a member of the administration itself, to whom these details and arguments are a matter of daily concern, can give to them. It seems clear that much blind and insufficient legislation would be corrected, if the cabinet ministers had seats in Congress, with the right to speak, but not to vote. This would give to the executive no control over legislation, but would be a very efficient means of harmonizing the action of the two departments, and preventing misunderstanding. In this case, the Senate would be the appropriate place for the secretaries to have their seats, as being by its constitution a body intermediate between the executive and legislature. The Constitution of the rebel confederacy provided that seats might be given to the heads of departments, with the right of speaking, but not of voting: we think it would be better to provide that they *shall* be so given.

We have passed beyond the limit of mere criticism, in treating this important subject, thinking that it was not

enough to point out the defect, but that we might also venture to suggest a remedy. Free discussion will, we trust, bring out some satisfactory plan for meeting the difficulty. The framers of our Constitution did not hesitate to acknowledge that the executive department caused them more perplexity than any other feature of the government, and that they felt far from confident of its working well in practice. Their descendants, therefore, may be pardoned for presuming to point out mistakes that they made, and defects that they overlooked.

ART. IV.—THE SECRET OF HEGEL.

The Secret of Hegel, being the Hegelian System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter. By JAMES HUTCHINSON STERLING. In two volumes. London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, & Green. 1865. 8vo, 2 vols.

“HEGEL is a royal thinker, the most tenacious, the most deeply incisive, the most long-breathed, the world has ever witnessed.” Such is the honest and hearty testimony of Mr. Sterling; so honest and hearty, that he has devoted more years than he would like to say to the study of the works of Hegel, and has now published these two large and carefully written volumes, that the world also may share in the result of this prolonged labor. His position is a little startling. Hegel, he says, has never been understood before. He, first and alone, holds in his hand the key to the mystery. He anticipates that the opening of the system of Hegel will give a fresh and sudden impulse to philosophy.

“If it be true, then,” he says, “that it is to Hegel we are indebted for the new thew, whereby we have obtained the new power over the old philosophy, and if it be also true, that this Hegel himself has hitherto remained, like some swart Magus, charmed into insoluble opacity by virtue even of his own spells, we may well—when this Hegelian trance shall have been unbound—anticipate for the history

of philosophy, and for philosophy itself, such perfection in a speedy sequel, as, but a short while since, no one would have permitted himself even to dream."

In reading such exultation at success, and such large prophecy for the future, the reader naturally makes some allowance for the enthusiasm of the student, who, after years of toilsome groping, sees light break upon him. How long and severe this groping was, he honestly and repeatedly tells us:—

"It would be hard to believe," he writes in one place, "the immense length of time the present student lay without power of movement, before this particular sentence: the relative page of the relative volume of Hegel, at all events, is about as brown as the opening pages of a boy's school-book. Yet the difficulty does not appear great now." In another place, he confesses that he "lay in leaguer for years."

All of this illustrates the honesty, the pertinacity, and the minute accuracy of the writer, and also the difficulties encountered by the student of Hegel. With all this we can hardly wonder, that one, who has been thus fighting his way for years through a wilderness, where he could find no path, and no trace of former explorers, should come back as from an absolute *terra incognita*, claiming all the rights and honors of a discoverer.

This claim, exaggerated in itself, becomes little else than absurd when it is maintained that the discovery was made in spite of Hegel himself; that Hegel actually concealed the clue to his system, in order that he might live in a world apart, and enjoy the mysteriousness that enveloped him. We think that Mr. Sterling could have been moved to make this charge against the philosopher, for whom he feels such unbounded admiration, only by the natural sentiment of vanity, which enhances to one's self the value of one's own discoveries. The charge we think utterly unfounded, and the proof that is brought to sustain it completely fails.

The work of Mr. Sterling consists of two elements. There is a translation of a part of Hegel's Logic, together with a

commentary thereon. This is preceded and followed by general remarks in regard to the Hegelian system. If the translation fails, it is because Hegel is absolutely untranslatable. We do not know how the work could be better done; but, to the average German scholar, the original is easier reading. Indeed, one has to turn to the original at every step, and remind himself that a "There-bëent" means *ein Daseyendes*, and that "sublated" means *aufgehoben*, before he can have any idea of the meaning of the words. If the commentary is unsuccessful, it is because, if one cannot understand the original, no commentary can make him. A capability of understanding the fine distinctions of Hegel is like an ear for music. You cannot give a commentary upon one of the symphonies of Beethoven, which shall enable an untrained ear to appreciate the chords: so the fine harmonies, the delicate transitions, the subtile distinctions of Hegel, cannot be made clear to one to whom they are not clear after sufficient study in their original presentation. For ourselves, we found that the commentary involved a threefold labor. First, we had to understand the original; then, which was sometimes no less difficult, the commentary; and, finally, to discover that both meant the same thing: though at times we cannot help feeling that the commentator had missed something, or has introduced something foreign to the text, which is, however, the failing of commentators the world over. At the same time, we cannot give this translation and commentary too high praise, the only difficulty being in the undertaking itself. There is, indeed, something almost ludicrous in the assiduity with which this follower of Hegel undertakes to help ordinary mortals along the track of the "long-breathed" giant over mountain and ravine. "Just step across there," he seems to say. He will even take hold of your foot, to put it in its place across the chasm; while all the time the only trouble is, that your leg is not long enough. Our advice to one beginning the study of Hegel would be to read carefully the general discussions in Mr. Sterling's book, including those at the beginning of the commentary, and then to take up the Logic, as it is issued in

a shorter form, as the first volume of the *Encyclopædia*. This he will find much easier than the three-volumed *Logic*, even with the help of translation and commentary.

The general remarks in these volumes, which precede and follow the translation, contain much of interest and of value. The style is unequal, though often very rich and striking. It possesses the faults and the virtues of the fashionable English of the present day. It is now full and tender, and now it is fierce and overbearing. The book is a wonderful mingling of breadth and narrowness. It is perplexing and tantalizing to the reviewer; it suggests so many side questions, and is so full of assumptions on every point. Buckle, the "Essays and Reviews," Sir William Hamilton, are almost beneath contempt. Hegel is enlisted on the side of a bigoted conservatism. In fact, the feeling with which we read the first of the book was almost that of repulsion. Soon, however, we found that the author's earnestness and honesty, and clearness and strength of thought, made amends for these superficial blemishes, even for the lack of order in the thought itself; and that he had, indeed, given an introduction to Hegel which supplied a need long felt. His great service to the student of Hegel is the minute elaboration of the relation of Hegel and Kant. There is in this discussion occasional exaggeration. Points of resemblance are pressed too far. The author has a hobby which both adds to and detracts from the value of his book. The charge, that Hegel sought to conceal his relation to Kant, is, as has been intimated, unfounded and absurd. It is a matter of regret that the author's projected work on Kant, to which we look forward with interest, had not preceded that on Hegel. But still we believe that no one can read this part of the discussion without gaining new knowledge and insight.

With these criticisms, which could not be avoided, but which, if we have expressed our own feelings, have been overpowered by hearty praise and recognition of the real merits of the work, we will leave it. We think we can best help the reader by giving in our own words the secret of Hegel as we understand it. To understand Hegel, you can-

not take him by himself. Thus taking him, some, like Mr. Sterling, see in his system the completion of philosophy; and others, like Mr. Lewes, only a play upon words, without sense or meaning. Hegel is in many respects the greatest of philosophers. Yet the world is not at an end. Philosophy is not yet completed. Hegel was partial. He had his complement. Strange as it may seem, this complement of Hegel was Schopenhauer, a man who could find no words bitter enough to express his contempt of him. Yet, to comprehend Hegel,—that is, to get round him, to see where he begins and where he ends, how he fits into the present, the past, and the future,—you must understand Schopenhauer also, their relation to one another, and the relation of both to Kant.

Kant drew, sharp and impassable, a line between the known and the unknowable. On the one side was the world of thought, a sphere within a sphere, all mutually and vitally related. On the other side was “the thing in itself,” of which we can never reach the reality. Our conceptions and our thoughts remain always our conceptions and our thoughts. They follow a law of their own. Outside of these lies the real being. The thing in itself only sets our own thoughts and feelings into activity. Itself remains apart uncomprehended and incomprehensible. What the universe, what the smallest thing in the universe, is, in itself, we cannot guess. Strip the world of what the mind gives it, and the mind can have nothing more to do with it, save to wonder.

This dictum of Kant, which was intended to put speculative questioning and theorizing at an end, had the precisely opposite effect. It stated the great problem of philosophy boldly and distinctly, as it had never been stated before. What was meant to set questioning at rest, by establishing an impassable barrier, was received as a challenge, and aroused speculative minds eager for the truth, to accomplish a feat which Kant himself had declared beyond human possibility. In the ferment that ensued, two tendencies became manifest, one of which culminated in Schopenhauer, the other in Hegel. As Schopenhauer confesses himself, up to a certain point a follower of Kant, and as he has marked out distinctly the

connection between his system and that of the great master, we will consider first the result which he reached.

The claim of Schopenhauer is nothing less than to have solved the mystery of "the thing in itself;" that is, he will tell us what the world and every thing about it and within it is, independently of our consciousness and our thought. We stand, he says in effect, outside of all the phenomena of the universe, save one. Each of us is himself one of these phenomena of the world. Each is shut out from all, save himself. In his own nature, he is admitted behind the scenes. In his own person, he passes from the phenomenal to the real. Being thus at the core of one of the phenomena of the universe, he can use what he discovers there for the explanation of all the rest. The point to be decided then is, What is the real and essential nature of man? Schopenhauer affirms that it is Will. By will, he means not the conscious determination according to known motives, but the blind driving of the nature itself. Consciousness is only, so to speak, an accident. What is essential is the will. It must be confessed, that Schopenhauer derives this notion of the will, as a blind and persistent pressing in one direction, from the outward nature, rather than from his own consciousness. We are conscious only of the will as an acting according to conscious motives. While, in appearance and in intention, Schopenhauer was explaining the outward world from the interior consciousness of human nature, he was in reality explaining human nature by the facts of the outer world. Notwithstanding this, the chapters in which he unveils this secret driving of the nature, which he calls the will, are among the most splendid contributions to psychology. He shows how this will uses the intellect, and abuses it; how it deceives it, and, in a word, is a despot holding it in subjection to its caprice. The will consults the intellect, its official adviser, and then determines for itself.

Hegel, though he does not, like Schopenhauer, formally introduce us into his system, yet undertakes to solve the same problem in the same way. He accepts the dictum of Kant as a challenge. He, too, attempts to solve the problem

of the universe from the human consciousness. But while to Schopenhauer the inner and ultimate reality of man is Will, to Hegel it is Thought. The reality of every thing, according to Schopenhauer, is its own will,—blind, unconscious perhaps, yet persistent and unchanging; the simple will to be, the will to live. The heart of the universe itself is only the will to its own existence. According to Hegel, the reality of every thing is thought,—unconscious and objective thought perhaps; and the reality of the universe itself is this ever-unfolding thought. We hardly know which of these statements will sound most fantastic to the reader who is unused to the higher philosophical studies. Yet each of them is, in reality, the utterance of a strong and deeply penetrating spirit; and each of them throws a flood of light upon the circumstances in the midst of which we live.

The peculiarities of the two systems are all involved in the fundamental principles just cited. The system of Schopenhauer, based upon the will, recognizes no such thing as progress. The system of Hegel, which recognizes thought as all, and all as thought, involves, by necessity, the conception of infinite progress. Schopenhauer is microscopic in detail, unfolding with marvellous accuracy the elements of whatever comes within his focus of vision. Hegel is magnificent in the far-reaching sweep of his speculations, telescopic in the almost limitless range of his vision, taking in the symmetry and the order of all things; but in detail vague, and often bewildering to the reader, who finds no solid foothold beneath him. The system of Schopenhauer is, by its very nature, pessimistic. The will in the universe, and the will in every individual of the universe, seeking only its own self, with nothing outside of itself to satisfy it; ever yearning, and ever unfilled; ever seeking, and alike dissatisfied with failure and success,—all this springs from his fundamental postulate, and is the saddest, the most sublimely terrible conception that the brain or the heart can conceive. The system of Hegel, being the incarnation of thought, is of necessity optimistic; for thought is the perfect order and the total completeness. As the most hopeful can hardly read the

sad picturings of Schopenhauer without catching a shadow of gloom, however transient; so the most hopeless can hardly sweep, with the thought of Hegel, along its triumphant career,—that thought which believes that there is nothing in the universe which is not subject to it, and that only “the untrue is the unattainable,”—without catching something of the same buoyant enthusiasm. Each system is the complete embodiment of its central principle. No system ever bound the will by such intense interest as that of Schopenhauer; and none ever taxed the thought like that of Hegel. The one is the embodied will; the other is the embodied thought.

The unphilosophic student is bewildered by two such antagonistic systems, each so positive, and each so complete. Neither recognizes or seems to leave place for the other. Yet they are bound together. They are double stars, each revolving about the other. When we listen to the sharp tones of Schopenhauer, who can find no words bitter enough to express his contempt of the “charlatan” Hegel, the homelier comparison is suggested of a married pair,—the wife continually assailing the husband with shrewish vituperation, the husband all the while affecting the most entire unconsciousness and indifference, provoking her all the more by this imperturbable coolness. Each is imperfect without the other. The two are united for weal or for woe, and man cannot part them asunder. But the philosophical student of philosophy, the disciple of Hegel, who has broken the bonds of discipleship, may see in this division and apparent antagonism a unity that is working itself out even by means of this strife. The separation and opposition are not final. They are only the working of the sublime dialectic of thought itself, which thus divides that it may become reunited in a more perfect and concrete wholeness than had been possible to it before. The principle of Schopenhauer and that of Hegel are not antagonistic toward each other, but polar. Thought and will are the two poles of our inner nature of man, and of the inner nature of the universe. If the systems of Hegel and Schopenhauer are so sublime in their separation, each the half of a divided world, what shall

be the system which will evolve itself at some day out of their difference, and shall orb them into one perfect whole! Indeed, do we not find in the faith of the humblest Christian these opposite principles quietly united, resting in their polar quality; as, in his conception of God, thought and will, wisdom and love, are together worshipped as supreme?

We now have to turn back to the system of Hegel, in its separateness, and try to make more clear its central and vital principle. We may perhaps make it more clear by reference to the famous sentence which furnished the first solid foundation for the feet of Descartes, after he had given up all the prepossessions and assumptions, among which he felt that he and all the world were floating. The sentence is this: *Cogito, ergo sum*; "I think, therefore I am." Thought was the one thing certain, from which he argued that there must be a thinker. Another deduction, it is obvious, can be made from the same starting-point: "I think, therefore thought is;" *Cogito, ergo cogitatio est*. In thought we have a world that is real. We have already seen that Kant constructed a world of thought, its concentric spheres springing out from and returning to one another. Outside of this stood "the thing in itself," unknowable, unattainable. What need, Hegel cries, of this pale ghost of the thing in itself? What different would our world be if we could reach it? What different if it were struck out of existence? Thought, undeveloped indeed, and as yet *unthought*, is the thing in itself. In other words, there is nothing in the universe that cannot be thought. Every thing is imperfect till it has been thought. But if every thing may and does pass into thought, then there is the same ground—identity between it and thought—as there is between water, ice, and vapor. They are different, yet at heart the same. And, as thought is the end and consummation of all, all is in itself thought. Mr. Sterling makes this conception in part easier, by saying that the world is the thought of God made objective, and in man it becomes again subjective thought. This may illustrate, though it obviously does not fully explain, the position.

But, when Hegel has said that thought is the one only

reality, he has as yet not begun his work. We have a world, indeed, objective,—for it is not my thought nor yours; we do not control it, but it controls us; and real,—for, whatever else may be or may not be, thought is. We have thus the basis of a system, but not a system. The first thing to be done is to discover the laws of thought; and the next thing is to apply these laws to the analysis of the stubborn material with which we have to deal. This study of the laws of thought will be found in the subjective logic of Hegel, which forms the first part of the third general division of his “*Logik*.” This subjective logic, though we think not yet appreciated according to its deserts, will be the most important of what will remain to the world, as common property, out of the Hegelian system. It completely re-creates the science of Logic. It takes the materials that had been lying these centuries, just as Aristotle left them, a formless mass, when compared with the beautiful proportions of other sciences, and infuses into them life and beauty. The science of sciences leaves his hands worthy of its proud title. All of this is accomplished in a few pages, and, though the very heart of his system, is apt to be hardly referred to in the summaries of it. We have only space to say here, that he finds the course of thought to be always from the simple abstract, through division and perhaps antagonism, to a concrete unity, in which these divergent elements are still retained, and which is thus full and rich, by means of this previous division. This is the twofold negation of which the student of Hegel hears so much. The simple unity is negated, and we have division or opposition. This opposition, or, in other words, this first negation, is negated in its turn, and we have affirmation; the full concrete individual unity. This process by means of negation is the pulse-beat of the Hegelian system. The index to any of the works of Hegel you find marked off with the regularity and precision of military appointment. You have threes of all letters and figures; three within three, you have 1-2-3’s, A-B-C’s, a-b-c’s, and α - β - γ ’s. This form of division meets you at every step. You never get beyond the 3 or C

or 7; and when, after reading Hegel, one takes up another writer, and finds him going on to fourthly and fifthly, he feels as if he were drifting out into a formless and shoreless sea. All of this precision and strictness of method seems at first artificial. But it is not. If this is the pulse-beat of thought, it is also the pulse-beat of nature. It is curious, and at the same time most encouraging to any one who may doubt whether all speculative philosophy is not false, and all scientific speculation equally vain, to know that Herbert Spencer has hit upon almost the same formula as Hegel. Spencer's progress through differentiation and integration is Hegel's progress through a twofold negation. The two started from opposite sides of the mountain, and then tunnelled through and met. Herbert Spencer speaks slightly of Hegel, and probably has no idea that their thoughts move to the same rhythm.

The threefold movement just described is the method of Hegel. It seems slight, yet it is of immense efficacy. The mineralogist, knowing the natural joints of a crystal, understands just where to put his instrument; so that a touch of his mallet will divide into fresh, shining surfaces, a stone which another, with all his strength, could only and hardly crush. Hegel, by his method, understands the natural joints of whatever subject he approaches, so that the hardest mystery opens at a touch. The method of his philosophy is to ascend to the most abstract of thoughts, which is absolute Being. From this he descends, by the triple movement of affirmation and twofold negation, till he sees the world of life and of spirit build itself up about him. The reader of Hegel must understand that this movement is not from a starting-point forward, but from within outward. He starts not from the beginning, but from the heart, of the world. There was never a time when this pure Being—which, in its undivided absoluteness, is indistinguishable from nothing; as pure, unbroken light is indistinguishable from darkness—was by itself alone; but this absolute Being is yet the foundation and the groundwork of whatever is.

We stand now on the very brink of the Hegelian Philoso-

phy. We have half a mind to take the reader by the hand, and plunge in, for the exercise and the refreshment of a little struggle with its waves. But it would take time, and we are not sure that the reader is inclined. Moreover, Mr. Sterling stands ready for the leap with any who may wish to make the trial; and him we would recommend as a safe and willing guide, with the harmless idiosyncrasy, that he thinks the ocean belongs to himself.

In conclusion, we will meet the question that will suggest itself with much pertinency to the reader: whether Sterling is right in claiming the support of Hegel for the most conservative views of social economy and of religion. In political economy, Hegel was doubtless a conservative. In regard to religion, we find a doubt which has divided his followers into two schools, the right and the left. The system of Hegel fits itself admirably to Christian, and even to mediæval theology. He describes the Christian religion perfectly and beautifully, as philosopher and theologian has never described it before. Yet we must not forget the transition that follows from religion to philosophy, in which religion finds its solution. However much doubt may remain upon this point, it is doubt which is every way unimportant. The method belongs to the world, while the individual opinions of Hegel were his own, and do not directly concern us, more than the opinions of Aristotle concern those who use his logic. And, at the same time, it remains true, that real Hegelianism can never become materialism. Thought and matter are not identical, so that you can take either at will, as the reality of the other. Thought is the fulfilment, and thus the reality, of matter. The spirit is, and must be, supreme.

ART. V.—MORE OPEN QUESTIONS.

Essays on the Supernatural Origin of Christianity, with Special Reference to the Theories of Renan, Strauss, and the Tübingen School.

By REV. GEORGE P. FISHER, Professor of Church History in Yale College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 8vo, pp. 586.

PROFESSOR FISHER is entitled to the credit of stating frankly the fundamental questions at issue in the chief religious controversy of the time, and of grappling, in a fair, able, and scholarly way, with the most eminent masters of those schools of criticism which he opposes. The service which such a writer does is one which we are heartily glad to recognize. He helps to show, that the great debate, of what we call the natural and supernatural in Christianity, is still an open one; and to prevent its being too hastily closed. It is greatly to the interest both of Christian belief and the religious life, that it should not be too hastily closed; that each member of that antithesis, now so sharply marked, should be thoroughly wrought out, so as to prepare for the higher synthesis, in which we trust to see them one day reconciled. In this view, we are glad to be thrown back on that track of learned criticism, and to review once more the ground of Christian antiquities, of which we had possibly been too apt to concede the jurisdiction to more recent schools of scholarship. It is well that the confident assumptions of Strauss, and the striking inconsistencies developed in the school of Baur, should pass the muster of a strict and unfriendly criticism. And especially it is right, that the advocates of a special revelation, in the strict dogmatic sense in which Christianity has been held,—as the *only* manifestation of God on earth, and the *only* way of escape from eternal death,—should remind us how great is the stake at issue, and how sharply marked are those ancient boundaries of belief and unbelief.

This subsidiary service we consider to be fairly rendered in the book under review. We do not suppose it will have much effect to alter the direction, or check the force, of the

mental revolution which it deplures. But it may do its part to make its movement more thoughtful, balanced, and considerate. It is one of those protests, wholesome in the main, which an honest conservatism makes against the arrogance and haste of progress. It reminds us that there are principles to be respected and methods to be observed, if the advance of modern criticism is to secure the best result. But the motive of that advance, and the forces which impel it, are such as no merely learned argument can reach. The habit of thought against which Mr. Fisher argues has, no doubt, its dangers; and we thank him for reminding us of them,—the danger of hasty and confident assumption among the rest. There will be many of those who believe already with him in the main, whom his argument will both satisfy and comfort in their belief. It will also rouse, in some, a protest of conscience against the drift towards which they find themselves borne by the prevailing current, and, possibly, keep them from being swept into it. But the intelligent and courageous thinker knows that that drift is determined by deeper causes, and that the points at issue denote a mental revolution more profound, than can be met by a course of argument which, with all its ability and candor, is, after all, narrow, technical, and scholastic.

Such a book does service, moreover, by indicating what are, in fact, the "open questions in theology," at the present day. It is completely silent as to those purely dogmatic matters which have so long been contended for as the very core of Christianity,—the Trinity, the Atonement, the Fall of Man,—excepting as a personal judgment may be hinted, here and there, in referring to the opinions of the early Church; while its whole stress is spent on points of philosophy and criticism quite beside that old ground of controversy. So that it is itself a waymark of the revolution which it seeks to check. And so we shall for the present regard it. In one sense, indeed, those doctrines may still be considered as presenting open points of controversy. As was said a few years ago, by one of the most distinguished preachers of New England, before the Massachusetts Convention of Congregational

Ministers, "All the battles of theology are drawn battles; all its questions are open questions." This is due partly to the nature of theological discussion in itself, escaping all the recognized tests of scientific certainty; partly to the habit of reliance on texts, which vary in their sense through the advances and caprices of scholarship, or the infinite pliancy of human speech; but more, probably, than either, to the metaphysical method and temper in which the discussion has been urged. It may fairly be considered doubtful, whether any question in pure metaphysics *can* be so settled, to the mind of one generation, that it shall not present itself to the mind of the next generation fresh and unsolved as ever. When, for example, we compare Dr. Bushnell's expositions of the Trinity with the hints of similar opinion in the early controversies of the Church, we are inclined to accept the decision, that the argument, from the very nature of it, must run in a circle, and for evermore repeat itself.

Still, there are two very clear limitations to be put upon this statement. In the first place, there are many topics which are quite lost from sight by mere distance in time, and the laws of mental perspective. They may recur, now and then, in the speculations of some eccentric intellect; but they lay no real hold on the general mind of men. The pages of ecclesiastical history bristle with the titles of obsolete and forgotten controversies. In some cases, the old heresy may figure to our generation under a new name; but, in many another case, the very habit of mind which generated it has been completely outgrown and left behind. It is only a curious scholasticism that takes account of the once famous dispute of *homo-* and *homoi-ousian*; the pages of Athanasius, so important to the historical student, contain, to our recollection, no one argument that a controversialist now would care to employ or refute; and that solemn anticipation of an approaching day of doom, which so shaped the religious conceptions of the first century and of the tenth, despite the vaticinations of Miller and Cumming, serves only to point a scurrile jest, or degenerates to a vulgar machinery of religious terror.

In the next place, a change is brought about—a change, so far as we can see, absolute, irrevocable, and once for all—just so far and so fast as scientific methods are substituted for metaphysical. That all theological discussions are destined to grow obsolete, and to interest us only as we are interested in alchemical and cabalistic dreams, we by no means believe; though this is the boast and threat of the “positive philosophy.” Those questions which touch the nature and destination of the soul, and the moral government of the universe, can never become obsolete, while human nature remains what it is. But, practically, the method of science usurps far more broadly upon the domain of theology, as commonly understood, than most theologians are aware, or would willingly admit. The progress of thought in other directions has not only cast many an eagerly debated question into the shade of oblivion, but has completely weaned the intelligence of the world from that mood in which it will consent to entertain such questions. They are remanded from the sphere of living debate to the sphere of history, literature, dilettantism, or technicality. The questions presented by the whole array of technical orthodox theology are in no true sense “open questions” to the mind of the present day. The Trinity, Vicarious Atonement, Human Depravity, Scripture Infallibility, Diabolic Agency, and the rest, in their old dogmatic sense, are no more matters of serious discussion, in the real thought of this generation, than the Ptolemaic theory of the universe. Take, for instance, the cardinal doctrine of the Fall of Man in Adam, which still figures so largely in the dialect of the pulpit: it is not so much as once alluded to, even for contradiction or contempt, in the active discussion going on as to the origin of the human race. There are doubtless *strata* of intelligence where it is otherwise, just as there are classes of our population—children and plantation negroes, for instance—to whom the earth’s motion round the sun would seem a novel and incredible assertion; but those are not the minds we take note of in our estimates of contemporary thought. In short, the entire well-understood body of doctrine at issue,

fifty years ago, between the orthodox and liberal mind of this country, presents, in the view we are now considering, no real "open question" to the mind of the present day.

Or take the test offered by the volume before us, in the names with which its argument chiefly has to do. They are these four, — Strauss, Baur, Comte, Renan. Each of these names represents a well-marked phase of theological discussion; each stands for a strong and definite impression made on the current thought of Christendom, whether critical, scientific, or popular; each signifies, in the strictest sense, an "epoch," or crisis, in the evolution of opinion.

If, now, we look at them together, to see what qualities they present in common, we shall find this very striking thing. They are all completely outside, and as it were unconscious of the entire range of theological controversy, as it has been understood hitherto. We do not speak of the position of implied antagonism in which they all stand alike to the current beliefs of Christendom, — to the fact that they represent so many "latest forms of infidelity." For, in the first place, we are unwilling to regard their influence, so wide in its range, so large in its effect, as purely an antichristian one. And, in the second place, there is no such conscious antagonism present to their thought; at least, not as a motive to their work. Each in his own way has taken up the task to which he felt drawn by temper, training, and circumstance; but has done it in a spirit as completely indifferent to the effect it may have on the particular beliefs it collides with, as if it were an investigation into the laws of language, or the antiquities of the human race.*

But, still further, the form which these men have given to their discussions is not polemic or antagonistic, — at least but incidentally and rarely so. On the contrary, the task which they have set about, each in his way, is a task purely — and it would seem honestly — *constructive*, as opposed to negative or polemic. Each seeks to win for the human mind

* From this statement we ought to except the recent popularized recast of Strauss's *Life of Jesus*.

a larger horizon of ascertained reality. Each in his own way has attempted, not the overthrow of any existing dogma, but the positive solution of some problem before which the intellect of the day had come to a halt. Strauss attempts to solve the literary problem of the Gospels; Baur, that of the development of early Christian thought, in connection with the New-Testament writings; Comte, that of the broader relation of the purely scientific method with historical and social questions; Renan, that of the historic incidents and probabilities offered in the fragmentary biographies of Jesus, and of the relations between the Christian history and the wide world of Oriental thought. Each assumes, as a date of his discussion, the current disbelief he finds in the technically miraculous and supernatural; and, without offering the affront of directly controverting the traditionary Christian belief as to these things, offers the perhaps keener affront of giving it no place whatever in the treatment of his topic. Whatever our personal opinion as to any of the points at issue, we are invited to consider only certain positive results, and the method by which they are sustained. We may be offended at Strauss's saucy rationalism, or Baur's bleak intellectualism, or Comte's surly dogmatism, or Renan's lack of earnestness and moral depth. But these are personal faults and short-comings. They justly affect our judgment of the men; but leave the work where it was, resting on its own merits. That work, so standing, becomes the inevitable butt of controversy. But, in itself, it has nothing to do with controversy, except as it marks itself off, on this side or on that, from one or another style of opinion, and asserts its own individual right to be. We are invited to regard it as a purely scientific construction. Grant it as imperfect in itself as Mr. Fisher attempts to show,—imperfect as the crudest chemical or geological theory of a hundred years ago, it is yet a "tentative hypothesis," essential in the development of opinion, and has its own contribution to make towards the final result.

Let us make our statement a little more definite, by setting forth, in brief, the result which each of these four men con-

siders himself to have established. The point on which Strauss's critical exposition turns, is contained in this assertion,—that both the religious ideas and the literary form which we find in the Gospel narratives were already contained in, or necessarily resulted from, ideas, habits of thought, legends, and religious fancies, existing among the Jews. The characteristic thing in the mass of erudition, the clear and sharp precision, which we find in the *Leben Jesu*, consists in the application of this one key (wherever possible) to every phrase, every incident, every peculiarity of structure, in the evangelists. The one task which Baur has done so cleanly and thoroughly, that it will never need to be done again, has been to trace throughout the New-Testament literature, beginning with the Pauline Epistles, the relation of the two antagonistic elements—Judaic tradition and the independent Christian protest—out of which the Church theology was developed, long struggling and wavering before it could be fixed. Whatever modification may be made hereafter in details, it is safe to say that Baur's is the master-mind which has first shown the possibility of a purely scientific treatment of the problem, and has given, once for all, its approximate solution. While yet a student, Comte had already fixed in his mind the thesis which it was the single aim of his intellectual life to enunciate in detail; namely, that the method and analogies of natural science, increasing in complexity according to a well-marked scale, are sufficient to deal with the most exalted questions of morals, society, and politics; and so to bring for ever to an end the resultless controversies in which the human intellect has bewildered itself for centuries. Time and other minds are imposing the necessary limitation on his arrogant and ponderous scheme; but the massive strength of it, warping more powerfully than any other the average intelligence of the day, is one of the stubborn facts which most religious thinkers are as reluctant to acknowledge, as they are unable to comprehend.* And, lastly, Renan, a master of Oriental learn-

* Of Comte, in particular, Mr. Fisher's judgment is extremely superficial. He probably knows of him only by distant hearsay, and is ignorant even of the spelling of his name.

ing, a keen and vigorous critic, an historian of lively and subtile apprehension, has attempted to present the simply human and historic features of that life in Galilee and Judæa, in its perfect blending with such conditions of time, place, and circumstance as an ample scholarship can ascertain. By general consent, he has greatly failed to reproduce the man Jesus "in his habit as he lived" to the religious heart and apprehension of this generation; but his fascinating sketch will stand, as one of the definite approaches to realize, as veritable fact and incident, that wondrous history which has held the mind of man, as it were, spell-bound now these eighteen hundred years.*

In roughly indicating these four main points of departure of the controversies that vex our own day, we do not claim that the questions involved are profounder than those of other days, only different. Philosophy sounds the depths: theology travels nearer the surface. Theology is the outgrowth of philosophy, at the line where it touches the conscience, affection, and sense of reverence; where it interprets the *practical lessons* of God to the soul. Strauss and Baur, not as representing the left wing of Hegelism, but as critical expounders of the Christian records; Comte and Renan, not as French materialists, but as scientific interpreters of history, — mark the direction and define the quality of the discussions in which we find ourselves involved. And, as we cannot fail to see, the debate touches more nearly the substance of the Christian revelation than most of those that have gone before. We are even tempted to say, that the open question to the mind of this generation is, whether God has spoken to man at any time, or in any manner; whether all of Nature or all of Life shall be interpreted to us in a religious or in a non-religious way; whether there is any such thing as the witness of the Spirit to the soul, or a Divine government of the universe. But questions deep

* In this we speak only of that work by which Renan is best known to the general public, without referring to the Essays, which are still more important than the *Vie de Jésus* to our understanding of the intellectual movement he represents.

as these are not the open ones of theology proper. Theology is content to assume what philosophy seeks ever to explore. It does not reason to, it reasons from, some fixed religious conception of nature and life in general. The distinction is one important to keep in mind. If it should be neglected, theology abandons its true province, as interpreter of the Divine word, and casts itself afloat on the soundless sea of metaphysics.

But it cannot be disguised, that the line of controversy here indicated touches the very substance of Christianity itself, whether considered as a peculiar method of salvation, or as a separate and special revelation of truth. We do in fact find — as soon as we get outside the range of writings strictly professional or else apologetic — a line of daring and radical speculation, getting familiar to the mind of this generation, which scarce any breadth of definition will include within the boundaries of Christian belief. We find this, not merely in philosophical and scientific writings, but in religious books and newspapers, having no hostile intention whatever to the name or interests of Christianity. The true way to regard such speculations appears to be, as critical *studies* of the popular faith, which they mostly assume as a point of departure, and which they aim to enlighten and correct. The moral authority of the Scriptures; the personal infallibility and authority of Jesus; the law of moral liberty, holiness, and guilt; the nature and reality of the Divine judgments; the law of right and wrong as applied to the infinity of human acts and institutions; the hope of a personal immortality, — all these, let us not attempt to disguise it, are offered before the mind as *open questions*, so soon as the sanction of an infallible revelation is removed; and they are frankly discussed as open questions in many religious writings of the day. Shall we say that the mind is thrown back, in regard to them, to the condition of blank unbelief or aimless speculation that prevailed in the Pagan world? No: for the existence of Christianity itself, for eighteen centuries, with its magnificent and constant testimony to truth of the purely spiritual order, is a fact which not the most blind or bigoted

rationalist can fail to take account of; a fact, even from a purely naturalistic point of view, of incomparably greater weight and moment than any other single one. What, even in the view of a Comte or a Strauss, would be the religious life of humanity, with that chapter of it left out?

As to the questions which have been thrown open to the mind of our generation, and which have to many appeared mere deeps below deeps of scepticism, we must regard them rather as the appointed problems and tasks, to prove the intellect of man, and to measure his moral fidelity to truth. We see the impossibility of foreclosing them—at least yet—by appeal to the infallible dictum of a revelation. Whatever the result hereafter of the controversy now in progress, it is plain that very many persons, of no secondary order of intelligence or moral worth, are by no means prepared to accept such authority; and the argument in support of it, in any form of statement hitherto made, does not meet their fair and honest intellectual demand. The moral causes which make it so, they may perhaps outgrow; but not yet. Meanwhile, what will best meet their want is not the polemic, but the purely scientific, or else the purely religious and practical, treatment of such matters as do come within their range of apprehension. “To be still searching what we know not by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneous and proportional), this is the golden rule in theology as well as in arithmetic, and makes up the best harmony in a church; not the forced and outward union of cold and neutral and inwardly divided minds.”*

And so it is of the highest consequence, that no honest and conscientious thinker should be regarded as an enemy to Christianity, however hostile to our Christian belief may be some immediate results of his thought. One condition is imperatively demanded by the freedom of the modern mind. It is, that no intellectual process should have to go on under menace; that the seeker after truth should be tormented by

* Milton, *Areopagitica*.

no relics of the old intolerance. It is impossible for us now to go back to the condition of belief which gave birth to that intolerance. It is impossible for any sane man now to hold his own view of truth to be, in the old sense, *essential*, — a matter of life or death, of salvation or damnation. How thoroughly the world, even of theologians, has outgrown that horrible superstition of the past, is seen in the calm and scholarly temper in which such books as that now under review deal with those arguments of their opponents which they treat as deadliest to the Christian faith. They never once offer the gratuitous insult of insinuating that a Strauss or a Baur is in peril of being damned for unbelief. They never hint at the rejection of a Comte from that hope of a future life which he ignores. All such things — implied throughout the controversial theology of the past, nay, made insolently prominent as the outwork of many a scheme of orthodoxy — are felt to be an insult to human reason, and a disgrace to the Christianity which they profess to defend. The battles of theologians now, in comparison with the grim warfare of old, are like the bloodless contests of Valhalla, where he that falls, as well as he that smites, is sound and vigorous for a fresh fight to-morrow morning. The weapon of excommunication is foiled and broken; the threat of perdition would provoke mere ridicule; there is left only the *odium theologicum* with blunted sting, and the appeal to ignorant prejudice and hate. These may wrong the man, but they do not help the cause; they may embitter the life, but otherwise make no ripple on the strong sweep of the tide of thought.

One word more. It seems not altogether improbable, as many hold, that the present materialistic and scientific tendency will be succeeded by an equally powerful swing in the direction of the interior and spiritual life, — a tendency which may make what now seems supra-natural and visionary, plain and easy to the understanding trained in methods more refined than now. Such a condition of thought would open the way to many a solution of our present difficulties, as yet impossible. But that condition of thought will not

come by suppressing, reviling, or crowding back any of those efforts by which the mind is winning the knowledge of its faculties, and the freedom of its powers. The direction towards material science must be followed to the uttermost of man's present ability, before the mind can pause and turn, satiated that in that *alone* is vanity. The best hope of a future plane of religious life for humanity, higher, broader, and more glorious than any in the past, rests on the completest justice being done to those powers, of which men are conscious now, in those directions towards which they are (as we say) spontaneously drawn. That "spontaneous" movement of the human mind, whose results we can only see in the large and at a distance, we take, reverently, to be the guiding of the Infinite Mind, which will not that any should walk in darkness, but that all should come to Him that they may find light.

ART. VI. — ROBERTSON AND THE MODERN PULPIT.

1. *Life and Letters of Frederick W. Robertson, M.A.* Edited by STOPFORD A. BROOKE, M.A. In two volumes. 1865.
2. *Sermons, preached at Trinity Chapel, Brighton.* By the late FREDERICK W. ROBERTSON, M.A. Five vols. 1857-64.
3. *Lectures and Addresses on Literary and Social Topics.* By the late Rev. FREDERICK W. ROBERTSON, of Brighton, M.A. Boston: Ticknor & Fields. 1859.

ENOUGH has been said of Robertson as a man of society and letters in various ways, and his personal history is familiar to most of our readers. Our task it is to treat of him in his relation to the pulpit of our age, and especially to consider his characteristic thought and influence. We are all ready to say at once, that he is a memorable and striking phenomenon of our modern religion; and we are not able to define his place precisely by any antecedent or contemporary men. He is himself, and not anybody else; and we find that readers, of the most diverse position and character, are his enthusiastic

admirers. Acute men of letters and fervent devotees, daring radicals and mild churchmen, stout soldiers and gentle women, hang with delight upon his pages; and any fair attempt to give an ample account of the varieties of mind that have welcomed the publication of his life and letters would require as wide a range of portraiture as a biographical dictionary. A few, a very few voices dissent, and it is well that they do; for the morose conservatism, that insists upon dull conformity as true reverence, and which brands freedom as license, and originality as presumption, can honor a true man only by its blame, and doom him only by its praise. We are sure of Robertson's greatness, after noting the wrath of the Philistines, who are unable to match him with the form and feature of any of the idols in their temple of Dagon.

Yet, striking as his genius is, it will not do to rest his claim to our regard upon any strange charm of style, or felicity of statement, or fascination of character. We cannot give a high place to any man in the modern pulpit, who is not a thinker, and who has not characteristic thought of his own. Nor are we satisfied with knowing that he has *thoughts*; for all men of ability have them, and, in one way or another, they think for themselves. The great question is, Has the man *thought*, decided thought of his own, "that makes its mark upon his works and his time"? It may not be easy at once to settle this question for Robertson, or say what his leading thought is; so versatile is his mind, and so generous his spirit upon all subjects, from Papal Rome to Pagan Hindostan. Yet when we consider his attitude and intellect carefully, we discern the traits that give him a place by himself among the leaders of Christian thought in our time.

What this general position is among Christian thinkers, there can be no doubt; for it is evident and generally acknowledged. He is not a Calvinist, nor a High Churchman, but a Liberal Christian; and his struggles with Tractarianism and Evangelicalism, especially with the latter, are conspicuous in all the record of his early studies and pastoral labors. Less is said of the hold that John Henry Newman, and the leaders of the Tractarian movement, had upon him, than we

could wish ; nor is it quite easy to see how he could turn so sharp a corner, and go from the charmed ecclesiasticism of Oxford to the harsh dogmatism of Geneva. But we must remember, that his mind, ideal and speculative as it was, was essentially military in its make, and demanded a positive base of operations. He could not stand on the Tractarian or Puseyite ground ; he soon saw beyond all doubt — and perhaps his soldier's eye divined far better than Dr. Pusey's theological spectacles — the consistent conclusion to be drawn from the doctrine of supreme priestly prerogative, and made him shrink from the path that either leads to Rome, or makes Anglicanism a second Rome. He could not, and would not, train in that company ; but he must train somewhere, and with comrades who had a posture and character as decided as his own. So he went with the Evangelicals, so called. At Geneva, on his travels, and at Cheltenham, in his pastorate, he fell into the monstrous extravagances of the ultra-Evangelical school ; ignored the first principles of reasoning, and the simplest results of modern scholarship ; and insulted the plainest instincts of the human heart, and the sacred traditions and convictions of the Christian Church, by his views of total depravity, and the cursedness of all natural life in the sight of God. He seems to have been very unhappy in his days of Calvinism ; so much so as to make us think that he took his position more as a strategic necessity than an inward choice, and went with the Evangelicals because he did not see anywhere else to go. He could not go with the priests' party of Oxford, for he saw Rome in their creeds and temper ; and he was from first to last a thorough-going Englishman, and a hater of Popery, although a fair and even generous critic of the principles and doctrines of its avowed Catholicism, even of its Mass and Mariolatry. Nor could he go with the moderate, old-fashioned churchmen of the establishment, who grew fat upon their temporal privileges ; who insisted upon the tithes more than upon the Commandments, and upon the comforts of the glebe more than upon the Beatitudes of the Mount. There was no great Liberal Christian party for him to join. Archdeacon Hare was more a man of letters than

a party leader; and Dr. Arnold, whom he knew and admired, was a name that stood more for an individual man than for a definite and effective movement. He was, therefore, left very much to himself. Even Dr. Arnold, as a religious thinker, could not satisfy him, or give him the intellectual peace which he craved; for Arnold was more a specimen of solid English manhood and scholarly integrity than of spiritual illumination or comprehensive philosophy. It may be, that personal fastidiousness kept him aloof from the gifted men who, in various paths, were feeling their way towards a satisfactory position of faith and liberty. Whatever may be the cause, the fact is undoubted, that he saw little of the persons most able to help him in England. Rich as was his knowledge of the works of the poets and men of letters of Europe, he shows little acquaintance with the philosophers and theologians of Germany and France, who could have done much to meet his wants, and whose thinking was very much after the type of his own. A talk with Channing or Martineau or Rothe or De Wette, would have been a great comfort to him, and helped him greatly on his way from perplexity to peace, during his years of seeking and trial.

But it was probably best for the depth and intensity of his experience, and the force of his influence, that he worked out the problem so much by himself and for himself. He was eloquent in part, because he had an eloquent experience. With a great sum, not of money, but of anguish and tears, had he won his freedom as a Liberal Christian. So he came to this distinctive type of thought as the thorough-going and heroic liberal thinker of the English Church, the Episcopalian Transcendentalist; and, we may almost add, the Quaker Churchman, who tried all doctrines by the interior light, and arraigned all wrongs before the interior spirit. He differs from all his Broad-Church associates alike in the ground and the force of his thinking. He insists more than any of them upon the necessity of basing all doctrines upon the essential mind of God as discerned by the intuitive reason, and of carrying out all great principles to their consistent practical conclusions. So he was hero as well as saint in his thinking,

and the *dynamic* element was as marked as the *speculative* in his thought. Compare him with Arnold or Hare, of the old Liberal School; or Maurice or Kingsley or Stanley, of the new school of Broad Churchmen,—and how marked is his position! How much purer is his sense of the exact idea in a doctrine or a text; and how much braver and more electric is the will that carries out the idea into work, and makes every generous truth a trumpet-call to battle against the old wrong, in behalf of the eternal right! He does not go so far in positive liberal views as Maurice, Kingsley, and Stanley, yet he goes much farther in his liberal courage; and, while hesitating about wholly giving up belief in the personal devil and eternal hell, he deals right and left such blows against the prevalent methods of sustaining those views as to distance far those scholarly churchmen in undermining the bulwarks of the popular theology. He has more insight than Stanley, more force than Maurice, and vastly more singleness of purpose and manliness of mind than Kingsley. We are not fond of separating men who are brothers in arms, and are glad to name Robertson as the true hero and seer of the Broad Churchmen of England. Yet we cannot withhold our regret, that Kingsley has so far lost caste by his shabby treatment of John Henry Newman, and his dastardly defence of the slaveholders' assault upon the life of our American Republic. Robertson would have scorned both acts, and taken his stand with Channing and our liberals as to the treatment of a fair theological antagonist, and of a foul political rebellion.

What Robertson actually believed, these five volumes of Sermons preached at Brighton, upon this Broad-Church Platform, after his severest intellectual struggles were over, ought satisfactorily to show. Yet it is not easy to gather his distinctive views into a definite system, and give him a decided place among the theologians of our time. It may be his theological distinction, that he was content to be known by his theological principle, rather than to set forth the results of that principle in positive doctrines. His principle is very decided. It is at once transcendental and historical, rational

and Christian. His theological base was the Incarnation, or the Union of God with man in the person of Jesus Christ; yet he did not, as is usual with his Episcopal brethren, rest the proof of the Incarnation mainly upon external miracles, but upon internal evidence. He acknowledged miracles to be "a great corroboration and verification of His claims to Sonship. Still the great truth remains untouched, that they, appealing only to the natural man, cannot convey the spiritual certainty of truth which the spiritual man alone apprehends." He was not inclined to regard the Incarnation itself as so exceptional and marvellous a fact, as to break the continuity of the Divine plan. He does not anywhere, that we know, say in so many words, as so many bold thinkers, with Malebranche at their head, have done, that the Incarnation would have taken place, had there been no sin. Hence, God's plan in creation could be complete only by this perfect union with man, the crown of creation; but he does say, what amounts to the same thing, that "God's idea of Humanity is, and ever was, Humanity as it is in Jesus Christ; that, so far as it fails of that, his idea may be *said* to be never realized." He is certainly pre-eminent among our recent theologians for so emphasizing the rational and moral character of the Incarnation itself, instead of looking mainly to the sufferings of Christ, and the final act of atonement as having moral efficacy. To him Christ himself was the All in All, the real presence of God with man; and Christ himself was to be best known and loved, he thought, by being brought home to the reason, conscience, and heart of disciples. His Christology, in this respect, is very much like that of the old mystics and their successors, the Friends; yet he abounds in luminous illustrations of his idea, and he is at once a rationalist and a mystic in his faith. If we cannot claim for him decided originality in his theological position, we may claim for him a certain originality in his method of holding it. He held it like a good soldier of the cross, and made it rather a fortress of strength than a tower of observation. We know of no man who combines, as he has done in his word, the historical, transcendental, and practical aspects of Christianity, and

who sees so deeply into the truth, and makes it tell so bravely in the field of service.

All sound thinking depends upon the two elements, the universal and the specific, or individual; and the human mind, which has its individual sensibility and its universal reason, is fitted by the Creator to note the individual traits and the general laws of the Universe. No man of our day equals Robertson in his power of illustrating universal truths by specific instances. He does not deal in dissertations and diagrams of nature and man, but takes you into the field, and makes the world and life speak for themselves. He is in this respect a marvel of an expositor of the Scriptures. He makes every text and character tell some truth of God. He deals with the Bible, as the true naturalist deals with his minerals, plants, and animals, when he makes each flower and rock and bird and beast display its nature and functions, instead of discussing only abstract types and exhibiting drawings and dried specimens. As a commentary on the Scriptures, the five volumes of Sermons are unsurpassed by any work in the language; and no small measure of his power over his readers comes from the personal life that speaks in every page, and presents every truth in striking embodiment. Herein he excels Channing, Bushnell, and our liberal preachers in general; and he that runs, though a child, may read the difference. The general discourse, so common with our best intellects, may soon weary the attention, and set the reader or hearer afloat in the air, or on the tide of dreary reverie; as when he looks upon distant hills or seas or stars, that reveal no face nor feature nor familiar voice. But Robertson's pages are all alive with events and characters and persons; and you must attend to them as you do to what is going on in your home or social circle, in a drama or battle directly before your eyes. This personality, in connection with his penetrative insight and brave manhood, is perhaps the secret of his great popularity with such widely different classes of readers. In this characteristic, he is a disciple of his Divine Master; and "without a parable" he rarely spoke or preached. He is John Bunyan and Joseph

Butler and Philip Sidney, in certain respects, at once ; and his Sermons give us our Pilgrim's Progress with its pictures and persons in all the lights of the best thinking and the noblest manhood.

No little influence is to be ascribed to this last trait of his character, his noble manhood. He was a true gentleman ; and, in this respect, we are sorry to say, he is somewhat an exception to the average of popular preachers, especially to those who deal with controversial subjects. Men who have their own say, and who are not in danger of being openly contradicted, and who perhaps further their own influence by exaggerating the prejudices, and pandering to the sectarianism of their congregations, are apt to fall into a very sweeping denunciatory and ungentle way of dealing with their adversaries. The polemic pulpit is often little above the caucus or the court-room ; and those of us who are in the minority, and know what it is to have our views and doings spoken against, are not likely to be in love with the dominant theological divinity. How charming in contrast is the temper of Robertson, who so scrupulously gave every man and movement its due, and, upon points in which he occupied ground decidedly opposed to the views in question, endeavored to present those views in a favorable light, and show the truths that were bound up with their alleged errors ! He meets the Roman Catholics, for example, with wonderful candor, and finds something to like and retain in all their chief doctrines and usages ; and surely he stands by himself among preachers in the nominally Orthodox ranks, for his fairness to our position and its leaders. He has spoken of Channing with praise such as no Unitarian has ever ventured to bestow ; and he everywhere accepts the truth which he considers to lie within the Unitarian view of the dignity of man and the Fatherhood of God. Under his touch, moreover, the old Pagan nationalities rise up before us in their nobler aspirations. Jew, Greek, Roman, Asiatic, show the common human heart, and its yearnings after the God who condescends to be our Immanuel, and is at one with our souls in the beloved Son.

When such gentle manhood is willing and called to suffer for God and humanity as his was, its power is unspeakable. There is something most Christlike in Robertson's career at Brighton,—his struggles, labors, disappointments, sickness, and death. All that he said and did seemed to come from the same dominant principles; and his actions, quite as much as his words, were but specific applications of universal truths. His will had the dignity of his intellect, and elevated particulars into the sphere of ideas. Thus his treatment of his social inferiors sprang from no aristocratic patronage or democratic sycophancy, but from the high and gentle humanity that impelled him to respect the image of God in every soul, and treat the mechanic, and even the servant, with the same essential courtesy that he extended to his equals and superiors in rank. No knight of romance ever had a more chivalrous sense of womanly worth, its dangers and its dues. As a preacher and a reformer, he testified to the power of the feminine element in Christ and his gospel, and to the monstrous wrong of society in allowing so many of the sex to sink into infamy. The world might laugh at his simplicity or Quixotism; but God and good angels smiled upon the saintly soldier of the Cross, and the act had more true chivalry than any feat of arms in the old lists with kings and princes for empires, and peerless beauty for reward.

There was something most memorable and effective in the force with which he brought his principles to bear upon specific points, and he carried a noble militant spirit into his word and work. Gifted with rare acuteness and breadth of view, such as easily make a man an ambitious theorist, he never surrendered his mind to the pride of speculation. He had a soldier's eye for the next duty before him, and saw and carried his point with masterly ability. His style is as business-like as his thought. With his refinement, taste, and subtilty, it is remarkable that he is wholly free from the passion for fine writing and over-fine thinking that are so characteristic of our day. His thought evidently was best suited to extemporaneous speaking; and, when he had the idea clearly in mind, he liked best to bring it to bear upon

the practical point with all the freedom and the fire of off-hand utterance. Many of his Sermons that come to us are only his outlines or draughts of his plan; and some of his most thoroughly finished compositions were written out after delivery. His ready sympathy and his earnestness made the extemporaneous method the easiest, and probably the best, for him. While his study gave him the thought, his audience gave him his glow and his object. He could plan the battle beforehand in general; but the details of the onset came of themselves to him when in the field, with his comrades about him, the enemy in full view, and banners waving, and bugles sounding on to the charge. Thus his manner of speaking corresponded well with his habit of mind, and has most to do with accounting for his remarkable power over his hearers and readers. Quite sure we are that the extemporaneous style should prevail, even in the written diction of the pulpit, and that the offhand manner should point and quicken, and generally form and temper, the written style, instead of the written manner mastering the pulpit, and crowding out the offhand style. Preachers should write something every week carefully, but they should also speak every week without reading; and it may be that the best sermons a man can write will be those that he has written out after meditation, and fervent and inspired utterance.

It is not our theory that effective and even intense labor is unhealthy, and that the bush that burns most brightly must be soonest consumed. Yet Robertson evidently did not keep his health, but burned out before his prime, in a blaze that was none the less the fire of martyrdom, because so full of glory. We must consider two or three facts of his career, before we accuse him of imprudence or self-neglect. We must remember, in the first place, that there is one kind of labor and experience that is always painful and exhausting, and cannot be safely long protracted. We mean the labor and experience that mark the birth-throes of the soul, and attend the first development of the principles that are the foundations of spiritual life. It is healthy to grow from a completed birth, or to build upon a fixed constitution; but the birth is

a trial, and to lay the foundation of the constitution is of the same tendency. Robertson's experience was a long and agonizing birth of the spirit under peculiar conditions and difficulties. He did not build upon any already existing foundation, but delved in the mines and quarries of thought for himself, and deserves a place among those masters of religion who have deepened and broadened the base of faith, and cleared away obstructions from the only foundation, "which is Jesus Christ." In some respects, his experience was as memorable as that of Augustine or Wesley; and he is a proof that rational and liberal religion may have its souls of flame, and martyrs of sacrifice, as well as the old creeds and new conventicles.

Again, we must remember that he was a man of exquisite sensibilities and exacting sympathies, and was all his life in an uncongenial position. It is wonderful that he was so little understood in his own day. Years after his death, Oxford gave him a memorial window; but, during his life, the working men of Brighton, with a few gifted men and women beside, were his most devoted and persistent admirers. There was probably more to interfere with his due appreciation, than the depth and elevation of his views. He did not worship the idols of the provincial town, and neither accorded to the priesthood their claim to magical power in baptism, nor did homage to the small gentry, as the exclusive possessors of the divine birthright and image. So caste and creed, the *gens* and the hierarchy, joined against him, as Pilate and Caiaphas against the Master. He was virtually put down, and resigned his charge, before his death, in bitter disappointment and shameful insult, being refused the easy favor of having a curate to his own mind to help him in his sickness. He died with the crown of thorns upon his Christlike head. Some time before his death, his pain was so extreme, that he would lie upon the carpet, hold his head in his hands, and shriek. Why should not the disciple sometimes repeat the Divine Master's agonizing cry, before commending his spirit to the Father? After the Cross comes a different crown, and his disciple has entered into his Master's joy.

We cannot leave the subject without a few words upon the probable influence of Robertson, and his school of thought, upon the mind of the age, and especially upon the future of the pulpit and Church. The fact of his influence is unmistakable; and it is so wide-spread, and reaches so many orders of minds, as to prove that it is rather a sign of the times, a mark of the general growth of liberal principles, than a casual incident or happy congeniality. The most important of all events is growth itself. We must judge of an age of the world as we judge of an individual life, and give more importance to organic development than to mechanical methods or speculative opinions. We have certainly grown up into a higher stature of thought and faith. Our height and muscles, more than our words, show that we have put away childish things, and have become men. As well argue down the beard and the roast-beef of manhood, and plead for the smooth lip and the milk of childhood, as to argue down the life that speaks to our life in Robertson's pages, and to try to bring back the sway of the old dictators. There is especial adaptation in his works to our American mind, and to our liberal Christian community. We shall write more simply and honestly if we make the case our own, and consider his service to ourselves and our children.

Our point of starting in theology is very much what his was. We Unitarians went out from the extreme Evangelical school of New-England Calvinism, and have been, very much in his temper, working our way towards a satisfactory platform. We have neither gone over to the Tractarians nor to the Deists, but have kept our position within the Church, acknowledging Jesus Christ to be our Lord. We desire to be Liberal Christians, very much as he wished to be; and we claim to be a branch of that Broad Church to which he belonged. We are grateful to him for the help of his large and brave spirit, as well as for the light of his leading thought. If we are to define his intellectual service to us, the statement would be somewhat thus:—

We came out from the old Calvinism, because it seemed at once to offend our reason and our conscience by denying the

unity of God, and affirming the utter depravity of human nature. Throwing off the old belief, we were somewhat troubled to supply its place by a satisfactory faith. Rejecting the doctrine that there are literally three persons in the Godhead, as virtual if not open Tritheism, we were troubled to find a sufficient ground of faith in Christ, when we had refused to regard him as the second God. Some of our teachers tried to make up for the discarded doctrine of the absolute Godhead of Christ by assigning to him pre-existence and true and super-angelic glory; and they who could not be content with this virtual worship of a demi-god, and who taught his simple humanity, tried to make much of his person by dwelling upon his miracles. Thus arose the two schools of early American Unitarianism, the Arian and Humanitarian, neither of which met the wants of reason or faith, since neither ages nor miracles can give the divinity which the soul craves in the object of its trust. We have been gradually correcting the errors and limitations of our worthy fathers, and settling down upon the New-Testament doctrine of the Divine humanity of Christ; regarding him as the manifestation of God, the incarnation and humanizing of the eternal Word. For a quarter of a century and more, our leading thinkers have occupied essentially the ground that Robertson held, and have trusted in "God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself." Channing, though sometimes wavering between the old Arian and Humanitarian theory, and resting, first upon pre-existence, and then on miracles, as the great proofs of Christ's authority, virtually belonged to the better school, and recognized the aptitude of man for communion with God, as the reasonable interpretation of the mission of him who claimed to give full communion with God from the supernatural indwelling of the Divine Word. Towards this faith, our leading thinkers, and our denomination as a body, now tend. Even the extreme Transcendental school of Theodore Parker has contributed to this result, by showing the reasonableness of believing in the Immanence of God, in face of the old legalists, who made light of the very idea of an Incarnation. History and Philosophy are both settling down upon positive

faith in the personal Christ, as the base of faith, and spring of power. The Christology of Robertson is essentially that which is prevailing among us. We call it pure Unitarianism, although we do not insist upon giving him our name. We only say, that to believe that the Divine in Christ was the human side of God, and that the Spirit is the power which enables God to mingle with men, is not to believe in any plurality of persons in the Godhead, or to deny our steadfast faith that God is One. His general idea of God in Christ is of course nothing new; but the love and manliness with which he makes his faith vital, and brings it home to our affections, surely give him a place among the benefactors of our liberal theology.

Then, in his view of human nature, he strengthens and comforts us greatly. Our good old fathers rejected the Calvinistic dogma of total depravity, but sometimes gave us little comfort in its substitute, — that human nature, innocent indeed, yet meagre and God-forsaken, is without positive divine instincts, such as the Locke school held forth. We were sometimes taught that man was not depraved, nor much of any thing at all, but a flexible mixture, to be duly moulded and stamped at will. Even the gifts of the Spirit in the gospel, instead of being presented as normal helps to human dependence, and incentives to aspire, were regarded as marvellous facts of the primitive and exceptional age. Such views, of course, never ruled the living heart of the people; but they were taught, and all our triumphs of spiritual conviction have been double victories over the old superstition and the new materialism. It is cheering to note the steps of our rise to the true views of the human soul and its life. There was a time when our scholarly leaders went almost mad for the classics, and delighted, as Robertson would have done, in quoting Plato and Zeno, Cicero and Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Antoninus, against Calvin and Edwards, and perhaps against Priestley and Belsham. Channing, with his ideal principles and glowing humanity, followed Buckminster, and put the fervor of the spirit into the stately classicism of the dominant Cambridge school. Orville Dewey brought the richness

of human life into the liberal pulpit with Shaksperian breadth. James Walker, with his massive logic, made divine philosophy preach the religion of Christ. Step by step they have been gaining and enlarging the old Hebrew legalism by more and more of the Greek culture, or the Indo-Germanic liberty and largeness. Step by step, and never more than within the last five years, we have been carrying out our essential principle, and bringing the One and All of the Godhead together in our faith, and accepting the All of Nature, Humanity, and Providence, for the One Infinite and Eternal Being.

In this point of view, we rejoice in all such large and luminous souls as Robertson. He helps us in our work of integration at our post within the kingdom of God. He helps our free thought much, and our true manhood more, alike by his valor and his inspiration. In the question between Rome and Reason, he mightily enforces Reason. Yet Reason is not all of true Protestantism, and of itself can as little repel the legions of Loyola as of Cæsar. In that greater question between Rome and free manhood, or between the strength that is trained in passive obedience, and that free virtue which is trained in the open word and spirit and kingdom of God, he is for free manhood, and a mighty champion of the great age coming, when God shall be served with our strength as well as our mind, and the imperial reason, with God its light, shall guide the imperial will; with God its strength within the Church, which trains men to be the children of God, and brothers of each other. The imperialism of Athanasius and Hildebrand, of Augustine and Calvin, we neither hope nor expect to see restored. That priesthood and that dogma are not the absolute truth or power. In Christ we find the absolute word, and in the Holy Spirit the absolute power. Such lives as Robertson's encourage the faith, that God will come nearer to us with our earnest striving and prayer, and make his dwelling with men.

ART. VII.—POSITIVISM IN THEOLOGY.

First Principles. By HERBERT SPENCER. London: Williams & Norgate. 1862.

POSITIVISM, properly speaking, is the name of that great reform in scientific method which has been gradually working itself out during the last three hundred years, and which, like the infant Hercules, is strangling even in its cradle the serpents of superstition and ignorance. It gives unmistakable signs of extending to every department of human thought, and achieving a radical revolution even in the treatment of the most recondite problems of philosophy and theology. It is so irresistible in its influence, because it is an all-pervasive spirit and method, rather than a system of definite results: it is anterior and superior to all systems, because these are, so to speak, merely its successive avatars or incarnations. Utterly regardless of consequences, and quite insensible to hope and fear, it devotes itself solely to the discovery of truth: fanciful hypothesis, impatient guess-work, dogmatic assumption, charlatanism of every name and nature, it sternly rules out of court, and proceeds calmly to weigh evidence, sift testimony, and pronounce judgment according to fixed and universal principles. Whoever disputes the validity of its decisions, only betrays his own misunderstanding of its claim to credence; for, in every province of human knowledge, the positive method is absolutely supreme. Whether it bears the name of Science, Philosophy, Rationalism, Naturalism, Positivism, or any other name, it must dominate in all investigations after truth as truth; and to its supremacy are to be attributed whatever stable results have been gained by human thought, study, and search.

But, although for ages the Positive method has been regnant in special departments of knowledge, and in some of these has caused most marvellous growth, it has neither extended itself to all of them, nor attempted to colligate them all in a high organic unity. Material Nature is now wholly

studied according to the Positive method, man only partially, and God scarcely at all. Yet to those who consider this method as the only possible organon of real science or knowledge, it is clear that it must ultimately be extended to every subject concerning which we may hope to possess real knowledge. How we know God, and what we know of him, are questions which depend, like all other questions, upon the answer to antecedent inquiries, *What are the facts or data? and what do the facts or data teach?* These inquiries indicate the spirit and tendency of Positivism, properly so called; and whoever attempts to solve all problems of human thought without exception, according to this method, is truly a Positivist. His solutions may be erroneous, but he works by the right rule.

The first attempted application of this method to human knowledge *as a whole*, with the design of attaining a genuinely scientific unification of all its branches, was made, we believe, by Auguste Comte in his great "*Cours de Philosophie Positive*." Had his mind not been warped by prejudices easily to be accounted for, this work would have been greatly enhanced in value: as it is, it is very crude and incomplete. His arbitrary rejection of all the mental sciences, and attempted substitution in their place of Sociology, which in fact greatly depends upon them, together with his quite unphilosophic contempt for metaphysics and theology, deprive his philosophy of the encyclopædic character he essayed to give it. Whole orders of phenomena and facts, and those most vitally interesting and important to the human race, were here overlooked, and there contemptuously ignored. Nevertheless, his work is of masterly genius, and is exerting a subtle and growing influence upon the times, unequalled since the days of Kant. According to Comte himself, Positivism originated with the earliest dawn of real science; but first took definite shape, as a scientific method, in the hands of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo. He laid no claim whatever to the discovery of this method, and hence never claimed to be the founder of Positivism; yet Positivism and Comtism are confounded by many, who fail to observe that the latter is a

very imperfect embodiment of the former. Comte holds that our study of Nature "is restricted to the analysis of phenomena in order to discover their *laws*; that is, their constant relations of succession or similitude; and can have nothing to do with their *nature* or their *cause*, first or final, or the mode of their production."* But the scientific study of Nature cannot in any way be arbitrarily restricted. It is surely unscientific in the extreme to determine beforehand what the phenomena shall reveal; the mind must be swept clean of all pet theories and preconceptions, before it is fitted to enter upon any investigation in the genuine spirit of science. If Positivism is to refuse any conclusion whatever, which is legitimately deducible from admitted phenomena, she is false to the law of her own being, and becomes the mere slave of *à priori* prejudice. It may very possibly turn out, and we believe will turn out, that phenomena reveal something besides their own laws or uniformities, inasmuch as these very laws suggest certain necessary implications of great importance.

Further, "Nature" should not be confined to the narrow sense in which Comte uses the word: it must include all that is or can be presented to experience, whether internally or externally. The issue between materialism and spiritualism cannot be thus peremptorily shut out. If the patient study of Nature, in its true and wide sense, shall make reasonably certain the existence of the immaterial, then this result will be incorporated into the great body of Positive truths. Comtism is guilty of many inconsistencies, of which Positivism is innocent. For instance, Comte inveighs against the "metaphysical" vice of treating mere abstractions, such as "chemical affinity" or "vital principle," as if they were real causes or active entities; yet he and his disciples not infrequently speak of "natural laws" in terms properly applicable to real agents alone.† The boasted triumphs of Positivism dwindle

* The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, translated by Miss Martineau. American edition, p. 200.

† A striking example of this semi-hypostatization of natural laws occurs in Mr. John Stuart Mill's recent work on "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste

to a mere catalogue of special relations observed at particular times, unless by interweaving ideas of absolute causation she can build up that grand conception of an inviolable constancy in Nature, existing beyond the limits of observation and experiment. But the belief in "invariable law" springs from a source ignored by Comte.

Comtism is further inconsistent with itself in sometimes regarding the organism as subordinated to the environment, and sometimes regarding the environment as subordinated to the organism; or, in other words, in alternately accepting and rejecting the freedom of the will.

"Our prevision disproves the notion that phenomena proceed from a supernatural will, which is the same thing as calling them variable; and our ability to modify them shows that the powers under which they proceed are subordinated to our own." *

"Placed in a given system of exterior circumstances, a definite organism must always act in a necessarily determinate manner; and, inversely, the same action could not be precisely produced by really distinct organisms." p. 307.

From these illustrations, which might be multiplied, it is evident that Comtism and Positivism are not synonymous, and that the former is only an imperfect embodiment of the latter. The essence of Positivism is the principle, that all human knowledge must be built on the broad basis of experience, according to laws which experience itself reveals, but cannot originate; that *facts*, duly certified and comprehended, must

Comte," p. 33. "Those laws [of organization and life] determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the existence and determine the phenomena of those which actually exist; but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and animals very different from these." This is merely careless writing; but it shows how even Comtists must employ the language of real causation.

* Martineau's translation, p. 198. Comte everywhere assumes that *will* is necessarily variable, and that the admission of invariability in natural laws is tantamount to denying their origination in a Will. But the only rational theistic conception is that of an Infinite Will directed by Infinite Wisdom, from which directly proceeds the conception of absolute invariability of law. This misapprehension is one root of Comte's hatred of all theistic interpretations of Nature.

yield all knowledge that shall stand the test of scientific criticism; that these facts must, at the outset, be assumed to harmonize, and to conform to subtle, all-pervasive, all-comprehensive law. Comtism errs conspicuously in repudiating certain facts which ought to be admitted; namely, facts of the spiritual order, which are as real to experience as any physical facts. Hence its extrusion of the psychological sciences from the circle of science, and its supercilious abolition of theology, vitiate it completely as a truly encyclopædical organization of knowledge. But it will not do to sneer at Comtism: it is the first product of a vast philosophical movement, too mighty for sneers to check. Our business as lovers of truth is to criticise it, note its deficiencies, appreciate its merits, recognize its limitations, and guide its onward course. It is not the last term in the progressional series, but almost the first. Comte has organized the idea of Law, applied it to the physical sciences, and very imperfectly to social science: to extend it into all departments of investigation, and to render it the guiding principle in inquiries hitherto exempted from its domain, is the task that awaits coming generations. When Positivism shall have supplied the missing links in Comtism, and completed the chain, then it will have accomplished that last and sublimest achievement of the human mind, still, alas! in the remote future,—the enduring vinculation of "Science and Religion."

The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer is the second great effort to organize all human knowledge,—a nearer approximation than Comtism, in some respects, to a genuine Positivism. He has disclaimed all discipleship to Comte in a letter in the "New Englander" for January, 1864, and more distinctly in a pamphlet, published in the same year, and entitled, "The Classification of the Sciences." The popular instinct is correct, nevertheless, in giving him the name of Positivist. If not directly affiliated upon Comtism, his philosophy yet springs from the same root. The determination of the exact amount of his personal indebtedness to Comte is a question chiefly interesting to himself, although we think this may be greater than he is himself aware; but there can be no doubt

that, as a rigorous and independent thinker, he is engaged in the same great work with Comte, and stands next in order to him. His central purpose, like Comte's, is the unification of all knowledge; and, although in the method of this unification he is not a Comtist, he is still, in the spirit of the attempt, a Positivist. The organization of knowledge, as all based on experience and colligated by law, so as to form one symmetrical and coherent whole, is the grand aim of Positivism; and, from this point of view, Comte and Mr. Spencer are both Positivists. Comte is superior to Mr. Spencer in perceiving that all phenomena could not be formulated under a single principle; * Mr. Spencer is superior to Comte in perceiving that the data of Positivism are more extensive than Comte allowed them to be. Comte pushed Positivism into biology and sociology; Mr. Spencer, Mr. G. H. Lewes, and Mr. John Stuart Mill, have pushed it into psychology; and the philosophy of the future will push it into universal anthropology and theology. In fact, Mr. Spencer has already pushed it to the very verge of theology, in his doctrine of a vague consciousness of the Absolute, and in his attempted reconciliation of "Science and Religion." Thus is accounted for the otherwise inexplicable phenomenon of religionists appearing among Mr. Spencer's warmest admirers; for although irresistible logic, unperceived by them, deduces from his premises and statements such consequences as will sweep away all their cherished ideas, they yet feel that this application of Positivism to theology harmonizes with the prescient instincts of the age, and must ultimately secure a glorious triumph for the very ideas which Mr. Spencer's special form of Positivism

* "Because it is proposed to consolidate the whole of our acquired knowledge into one body of homogeneous doctrine, it must not be supposed that we are going to study this vast variety as proceeding from a single principle, and as subjected to a single law. There is something so chimerical in attempts at universal explanation by a single law, that it may be as well to secure this work at once from any imputation of the kind, though its development will show how undeserved such an imputation would be. Our intellectual resources are too narrow, and the universe is too complex, to leave any hope that it will ever be within our power to carry scientific perfection to its last degree of simplicity." — *Martineau's translation*, p. 37.

remorselessly undermines. The conviction is daily spreading and deepening, that the future of theology depends wholly on the possibility of its coalescing with science, and on the ultimate abolition of all essential distinction between them. The Cosmos of matter and man is God's autobiography, the only Scripture his own hand has penned; and science, deciphering the scroll, becomes theology when it has spelt out the name of God.

The greatest merit of Mr. Spencer as a philosopher is his clear perception of the nature of philosophy, as the unification and verification of human knowledge. The first thing is to ascertain what is known,—that is, to separate real facts from fictitious ones; the second is to arrange these in their natural connection and interdependence, and thus reproduce in thought the absolute harmony of being. The Positive study of the universe must be the ground of true philosophy. The aims of Positivism and philosophy are identical,—out of infinite variety to educe unity; but this unity should be dynamical, not numerical,—the unity of mutual interpenetration and interaction, rather than the unity of barren, blank indifference. While Mr. Spencer proposes to himself the true end of speculation, the unification of knowledge, he mistakes the true means to accomplish this end, by seeking the reduction of all phenomena under a single abstract formula. Mere generalization is powerless to unify knowledge. Its unity must be found in the equipoise and dynamical correlation of being and thought, which are welded into one in the act of knowledge itself. But, although Mr. Spencer has mistaken the means of attaining his end, the very conception of this end makes him tower head and shoulders above his English and Scotch contemporaries. Awarding him all praise in this respect, and waiving at present further criticism of the nature of the means he adopts to secure the unification of knowledge, let us see how successfully he has employed it in the attempt to formulate all phenomena under the law of Evolution, which he claims to be an absolutely universal formula. He thus states it in full:—

“Combining these partial definitions, we get a complete definition, which may be most conveniently expressed thus: *Evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; through successive differentiations and integrations.*” *

Now, as the terms “homogeneous” and “heterogeneous” both imply plurality of constituents, which are like or unlike respectively, it is evident that this law of Evolution applies only to phenomena occurring in aggregations of parts. But, since the law is made to apply to all phenomena whatever without exception, it is also evident that Mr. Spencer regards all phenomena as consisting in the mere re-arrangement of parts in aggregates or masses. Nor does he shrink from this logical consequence of his theory:—

“The only obvious respect in which all kinds of Evolution are alike, is, that they are modes of *change*. . . . Note next, that the kind of change which constitutes Evolution is broadly distinguished from change of an equally general kind, in this, that it is change of internal relations instead of change of external relations. . . . Thus we narrow the field of inquiry by recognizing the change in which Evolution consists, as a *change in the arrangement of parts*: of course, using the word ‘parts’ in its most extended sense, as signifying both ultimate units and masses of such units. . . . Thus, then, we reduce that which we have to investigate to its most abstract shape. Our task is to find the cause or causes of a certain order of change in the arrangement of parts.” †

This doctrine is also implied in Mr. Spencer’s attempt to formulate all phenomena in “terms of Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force:” for Space and Time being made the conditions of all phenomena, and Force their universal cause, phenomena without exception must be simply *Motions of Matter*; that is, changes of position among material wholes and parts, masses and atoms. In order to prove, therefore, that the law of Evolution is really applicable to all phenomena, it must first be proved that all phenomena can be truly reduced to changes of position among atoms and masses. It is not

* First Principles, p. 216.

† Ibid., pp. 220, 221.

enough to prove that all phenomena *are accompanied by* such changes (although even this is insusceptible of positive proof); but it is also necessary to prove that all phenomena *consist in* such changes, which is absolutely impossible. If two synchronous series of phenomena are taking place, it is neither philosophy nor common sense to assert that what is true of one series must necessarily be true of the other, until the nature of their connection is perfectly made known. For instance, two synchronous series of phenomena take place in the life of every human being; the one physical, the other mental. Admitting that all changes in the physical *organism* are changes of position among its component atoms, according to a certain order, it does not follow that all changes in the formation of intellectual and moral *character* are also re-arrangement of atoms: these are changes quite as real as the former, yet only rash and presumptuous hypothesis will pronounce them to be mere atomic redistributions. The connection between these two orders of phenomena may be as close as you please, and it is undoubtedly very close; yet the want of parallelism between them is too great to suffer a true Positivism, at least in the present state of science, to fuse the two, or regard one as the efficient cause of the other. The phenomena of the organism begin with Evolution, culminate in maturity, and end with dissolution; but the phenomena of character, in innumerable instances, proceed in glorious and uninterrupted evolution to the very end of life, even while the body is falling into decay, and often then with the greatest splendor. The culmination of complete and mellow ripeness still seems to be indefinitely distant in remote futurity. Who cannot recall signal instances of character becoming daily more and more beautiful, while the body wastes and withers away? Growth in character is a phenomenon as real, and as truly a fact for Positive study, as the phenomenon of physical growth; and the law of Evolution, if indeed applicable to all phenomena, must apply to this among the rest. Yet what dreary absurdity it would be to call growth in spiritual and manly character a mere "re-arrangement of atoms"! We insist that genuine Positivism will over-

look neither phenomenon; and, whatever may become of Mr. Spencer's law of Evolution, will eventually incorporate both in the data of Positive Science. His law is open to this fatal charge, that, professing to apply to all phenomena, it applies only to phenomena of re-arrangement of atoms.

Further, in assuming universal Nebula as the *homogeneous* of progressive heterogeneity, Mr. Spencer really makes an enormous assumption opposed to facts. What sort of homogeneity is that which would exist among sixty-two chemical elements, probably differing in atomic shape, and certainly differing in chemical affinities and properties? Are they any less diverse in their characteristics, when indefinitely comminuted, and detached from all chemical combination? The change from homogeneity to heterogeneity, on which Mr. Spencer lays such stress as the main fact of the universe, is purely an incidental and mechanical change; and the philosophy which makes it the main fact deals only with the outer rind of truth. Exactly as much real heterogeneity existed in nebulous matter as now exists in the organized Cosmos. The real secret of Unity in Variety, and Variety in Unity, must be deeper than mere "re-arrangement of parts." Every mechanical philosophy, like Mr. Spencer's, touches only the surface of things, since mechanism is inexplicable except through dynamism. And, although Mr. Spencer has much to say about Force, he identifies Force with the Unknowable, and thus empties his philosophy of all dynamism that is intelligible. He borrows largely from a source which is shut to every consistent empiricist, in taking from Transcendentalism the idea of strict universality. When he universalizes all phenomena as Motions of Matter, and all causes as one omnipresent Force acting throughout Space and Time, he quite goes beyond his premises, and transcends the teachings of empiricism. Force must be either a personal God, an impersonal Entity, or a property of Matter. Mr. Spencer denies that it is a personal God: he ought to treat it as a property of matter, whereas he seems to regard it as an impersonal entity. He predicates of it unity, omnipresence, and causation, — attributes surely not predicable of a mere quality or

property of matter. At the same time, he declares it to be utterly incomprehensible or unknowable: how he can reconcile this position with the predication of any attributes whatever, we leave to others to conjecture. We find an indistinctness and indetermination on all the fundamental points of philosophy which seriously detracts from the power of Mr. Spencer's speculations as a coherent system: they must become more pronounced before they can deeply impress the thought of the age.

If all phenomena can indeed be brought under a single law, it must be because at bottom all phenomena are alike in kind. Beneath all superficial variety there must be a hidden ground of oneness on which the law must rest. Hence the law, which is to formulate equally well all phenomena of mind and matter, must penetrate beneath their apparent diversity, and root itself in a real, aboriginal unity. In other words, it must reject dualism in every form, and start from the premise of pure monism. With this necessary condition, Mr. Spencer is forced to comply; and we find him, therefore, rejecting the issue between Materialism and Spiritualism as a mere logomachy.

"Perceiving, as he will, that the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is a mere war of words, in which the disputants are equally absurd,—each thinking he understands that which it is impossible for any man to understand,—he will perceive how utterly groundless is the fear referred to. Being fully convinced, that, whatever nomenclature is used, the ultimate mystery must remain the same, he will be as ready to formulate all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, as in any other terms; and will rather indeed anticipate, that only in a doctrine which recognizes the Unknown Cause as co-extensive with all orders of phenomena, can there be a consistent Religion or a consistent Science." *

By this contemptuous and somewhat flippant dismissal of a great question which has always exercised, and will always exercise, the profoundest thought of mankind, Mr. Spencer seeks to propitiate the minds of his readers, and predispose

* *First Principles*, p. 223. Compare p. 502.

them to the acceptance of his great Law. Recognizing the phenomenal diversity of Matter and Mind, and at the same time scouting the idea of their ontological diversity, to the inquiry *why* their ontological diversity must be denied, he has no sound answer to make. There is as great an assumption of knowledge in saying that there is no difference at bottom between Matter and Mind, as there is in saying that a radical difference exists. Positivism demands a valid reason for either assertion. But Mr. Spencer has here fallen hopelessly into a vicious circle. On the one hand, all phenomena can be formulated under a single law, because the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is absurd; on the other hand, the Materialist and Spiritualist controversy is absurd, because all phenomena can be formulated under a single law. He can neither surrender the indifference of matter and mind, which would be to surrender his Law of Evolution, nor yet give a respectable reason for it, which would imply a knowledge of what is professedly unknowable. Hence we find this postulate of monism very gingerly referred to, as rather a self-evident truth, than prominently discussed and stoutly defended, as the very corner-stone of his philosophy. We must therefore look behind Mr. Spencer's own explicit statements, to understand the true spirit of his system.

There are but three forms of monism possible, — Idealism, Materialism, and Identity. The first reduces all phenomena to Mind, the second to Matter, and the third to a single Substance or substratum of which mind and matter are merely diverse manifestations. Every monistic philosophy which is artistically beautiful and coherent (and without these characteristics no philosophy can be true, for nothing is more beautiful or coherent than truth) must rest on one of these three bases; exclusively and consistently. Now, to a superficial reader, there is in the *First Principles* an appearance of great rigor, both in method and form; but to one who looks deeper, this appearance is dispelled. The one simple law of Evolution is applied to all phenomena, and developed from a vast mass of scientific facts with great precision and ability; it is overlaid with illustrations, and, from its very wealth in this

respect, the volume becomes monotonous reading. But Mr. Spencer's attitude towards monism is vacillating and irresolute. There are some passages from which, taken by themselves, Idealism would be logically inferable; although there can be no doubt that his system, as a whole, is opposed to Idealism. His professions of impartiality in the controversy between Materialism and Spiritualism more than justify the expectation of a precise, definite, and unswerving adhesion to Identity. But, notwithstanding his protests and disclaimers, we do not hesitate to pronounce his system, in its spirit and necessary implications, to be unqualifiedly a materialistic one. Very likely, Mr. Spencer may himself be unaware of its tendency: if so, he is not the first philosopher who has mistaken the legitimate ultimation of his own principles. Neither do we say this in the spirit of censure, or even of deprecation: we desire the truth alone; and if this be materialism, or fatalism, or atheism, or any other *ism*, may it spread far and wide, and beat down all opposition! The day will surely come, when free thought, if honest thought, will command the respect of mankind. No odium can attach, among educated men, to any opinions honorably and fearlessly maintained. We state simply a naked fact, as we believe, when we say that, if Mr. Spencer's philosophy is true, materialism is true.

That this is no random charge, is easily made evident. His philosophy is avowedly an attempt to formulate all phenomena in terms of Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force. Now, see what this implies. Space and Time must be set aside as merely the conditions of phenomena, and Force as their universal cause, reducing "all phenomena" to Matter and Motion alone. That is, every phenomenon in the universe is only *motion in matter*. Of what value, then, is Mr. Spencer's defence of his reasonings, that "their implications are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic, and no more spiritualistic than they are materialistic"?* By his own confession, there are no phenomena but those of Motion in matter; with what face, then, can he write thus?—

* First Principles, p. 502.

"Before proceeding to interpret the detailed phenomena of Life and Mind and Society, in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force, the reader must be reminded in what sense the interpretations are to be accepted. . . . And, notwithstanding all evidence to the contrary, there will probably have arisen in not a few minds the conviction that the solutions which have been given, along with those to be derived from them, are essentially materialistic. Let none persist in these misconceptions." *

If it be said that under Force Mr. Spencer includes what is commonly meant by Spirit, it must be remembered that he refuses to admit this understanding of it as legitimate. Force, according to him, is the absolutely unknowable Cause of phenomena; but, because it is unknowable, we are distinctly warned not to call it personal, conscious, or intelligent. It cannot be God in any sense which Theism holds dear; and it cannot include the human soul, since all phenomena of life and thought and feeling are merely phenomena of motion in matter, which must cease with the disintegration of the organism. Since all phenomena without exception are mere manifestations of one omnipresent Force, there can be no permanent, or even transient, *individuality*, in any significant sense of the word. Hence to formulate all phenomena in terms of Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force, is absolutely to exclude from the universe all real or spiritual personality, whether human or superhuman; and, consciously or unconsciously, Mr. Spencer conducts to a most rigid and thorough-going Materialism. Of all monists, Spinoza alone has held the balance even, and been strictly impartial between Materialism and Spiritualism.

But Mr. Spencer's pretence of impartiality is singularly baseless, in view of his reduction of all phenomena of "Life, Mind, and Society," to mere motions of matter. Spinozism and Dualism are alone impartial, but Mr. Spencer espouses neither. There is a remarkable passage in the preface to his "Psychology," which seems to hint at certain esoteric doctrines impolitic to make public:—

* Ibid., p. 501.

"It may be well further to say, that, originally, I had intended to add a fifth division, which should include sundry deductions and speculations that could not properly be embodied in the other divisions. But, before being compelled to do so, I had decided, that as this fifth division was not strictly necessary, and as certain of the suggestions contained in it might prejudice some against the doctrines developed in the others, it would be better to withhold it, — at any rate for the present."

Has Mr. Spencer refrained from developing consequences which he perceives to follow from his principles, for fear lest they might prevent the acceptance of the principles themselves? We could not regard such a course as either very manly or very wise. A bold and conscientious thinker plainly states the legitimate results of his principles, never desiring to smuggle them into the public mind; and all the more because they might offend public prejudice, for then he would be sure he had gained no proselytes under false pretences, but had said the very worst at the outset. We are utterly unwilling to attribute any such timid and disingenuous course to Mr. Spencer, and prefer to fall back on the conclusion that he is so thoroughly English in the structure of his mind, that he is blind to the evident bearings of his own theory, and with genuine insular inconsistency stoutly maintains doctrines whose logical consequences he as stoutly disowns. We are glad to be able to efface the somewhat painful impression produced by the above-quoted extract from the preface to the "*Psychology*," by the following most noble and high-minded words from the "*First Principles*."

"Not as adventitious, therefore, will the wise man regard the faith that is in him. The highest truth he sees he will fearlessly utter, — knowing that, let what may come of it, he is thus playing his right part in the world; knowing that if he can effect the change he aims at, well: if not, well also; though not so well." p. 123.

Whether, therefore, Mr. Spencer is aware of it or not, we believe that his philosophy is radically and irretrievably materialistic. Such an inference is, as we have seen, directly deducible from the attempt to formulate all phenomena in

terms of Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force; and also from the necessary implications of the formula he presents. But it follows quite as logically from the theory of Empiricism, which he adopts and states very explicitly in his "Classification of the Sciences":—

"All knowledge is from experience, holds M. Comte; and this I also hold, — hold it, indeed, in a wider sense than M. Comte: since, not only do I believe that all the ideas acquired by individuals, and consequently all the ideas transmitted by past generations, are thus derived; but I also contend that the very faculties by which they are acquired are the products of accumulated and organized experiences received by ancestral races of beings." p. 31.

In other words, the soul, with all its magnificent powers, is a mere fascicle of impressions from without, accumulated, organized, and hereditarily transmitted: there is nothing in the mind which is not derived ultimately from its material surroundings. We purposely say *material* surroundings; for if Empiricism admits any formative nucleus or germ whatever not evolved out of matter, even in the primordial organism which heads the series of biological Evolutions, then it commits suicide by postulating an immaterial principle at the start, co-ordinate with the material organism, and is convicted of stealing the premises of its antagonist.

To be consistent, Empiricism must utterly sink the soul in its material surroundings. The profoundest question of philosophy turns on the relation of Thought to Being, Mind to Matter, Subject to Object, or (in empiricistic phrase) Organism to Environment. Is the Organism purely the product of the Environment? Then we have Empiricism, Sensationalism, Materialism, whose motto is that of Destutt-Tracy, — *Penser c'est sentir*. Is the Environment the product of the Organism? Then we have Transcendentalism, Egoism, Idealism, whose motto is that of Berkeley, — "The *esse* of objects is *percipi*." Are the Organism and Environment both products of some underlying and active Unity? Then we have Identity or Pantheism, whose motto is the proposition of Spinoza, — *In rerum natura non nisi unam substantiam dari*. Are

the Organism and Environment given simply in the co-ordination and correlation of actual knowledge? Then we have Dualism, Natural Realism, Positivism, whose motto is that of Sir William Hamilton,—“The Ego and Non-Ego are both given in consciousness.” Mr. Spencer makes his election in Empiricism, but shrinks from the acceptance of its necessary implications, and thereby forfeits his title to rank among the great leaders of philosophy. Teaching that every faculty of the mind is the effect of impressions made by the Environment upon the Organism, he should also teach that the mind is nothing distinct from the organism, and that the mind’s faculties will perish at the disintegration of the organism; that, as fire is a mere phenomenon of chemical combination, ceasing with it, so life is a mere phenomenon of organic “re-arrangement of parts,” and will cease when the Dissolution which is the converse and sequel of Evolution has become complete; and that the theory of a “soul” is as completely exploded as the theory of “phlogiston.”

But, even if he accepted these inevitable corollaries from the ground-principle of Empiricism, we should still object that Empiricism is thoroughly unscientific. Positivism, which is simply *Science true to herself*, finds two radically distinct orders of phenomena presented to her observation and study,—the one material, the other mental; and, in her present stage of development, she can neither reduce one to the other, nor yet trace their ontological connection. Any hypothesis as to their ontological dualism or monism is at present premature, or at best can serve only as a convenient supposition which may turn out either a reality or a fiction. The philosophic instinct favors, perhaps, the theory of monism; but, until this instinct shall be either inductively or deductively justified by verification, the question between monism and dualism must remain an open one. All fanciful guesses, however plausible, must be rigorously shut out from the sphere of science, and never elevated to the rank of positive results. The purely spiritual phenomena of thought and feeling are just as much data for positive science as the purely physical phenomena of respiration and digestion. Leave these facts,

then, in their unperverted integrity, and admit that the armies of science must march by parallel roads. There are two co-ordinate points of departure, matter and mind; and there are two co-ordinate termini to be reached in physical and spiritual laws, scientifically yet independently ascertained. No quarrel or mutual collision can occur, so long as each *corps d'armée* adheres to its own legitimate route. If any higher synthesis shall become positively attainable by which mind and matter may be ontologically unified, well and good: until then, let us leave the question open. The basis of physical science is the immediate intuition or knowledge of matter: the basis of mental science is the immediate intuition or knowledge of mind. In either case, the basis is *given* as a datum of consciousness. From this double starting-point, science may advance in a double progress by parallel lines; and, so long as this independent parallelism is respected, no clashing is possible between physical and mental science. But, if physical science sneeringly objects that mental science proceeds on a sheer assumption of mind, the retort is cogent and crushing that physical science proceeds on the sheer assumption of matter. Who ever yet demonstrated the existence of either? Something must be *given* as a basis, a *ποῦ στῶ*, as the condition of all science, whether physical or mental; and the problem of the connection between these two bases, if it cannot be positively solved, may be indefinitely postponed. But this is clear, that, starting from matter alone, science can never arrive at mind; and, starting from mind alone, can never arrive at matter. If science repudiates either basis, then scepticism or absolute nihilism definitively triumphs. Only by admitting what can neither be demonstrated without a begging of the question, nor doubted without a *reductio ad absurdum* of all intelligence,—namely, the natural veracity of the intuitive and cognitive powers,—is a truly positive science possible.

Hence, by the flippancy dismissal of dualism as unworthy of a serious thought, Mr. Spencer only betrays his disqualification for the task he has assumed. We decline, therefore, to accept his philosophy as a true unification of the sciences, or

a faithful exposition of genuine Positivism. It remains to examine his pretended reconciliation of "Science and Religion," and estimate its value.

The form in which he presents this problem shows how utterly he misconceives the issues involved. Science, properly interpreted, includes the whole body of human knowledge on all subjects whatever, in whatever mode attained. Hence, "Religion," so far as religious *knowledge* is concerned, is merely one department of Science; and reason, acting on given data, is the sole agent in its generation and development. Rationalism, or the application of reason to facts, is the universal method of Science. But Religion is a term more properly confined to the emotional and moral phenomena which reciprocally cause, and are caused by, the consciousness of our relations to God; while Theology is the term properly applicable to the intellectual apprehension of these relations. Hence, Science and Religion cannot conflict, because they are not in the same category; while Science and Theology, being related as a whole and its part, cannot conflict, unless they adopt the incompatible methods of natural reason and supernatural authority. All knowledge or science must conform to scientific principles and methods, as a necessary condition of being *real* knowledge or science. Every opinion, as such, is the product of reason; and, even if swayed, biassed, or perverted by prejudice, reason is not discarded, but only misapplied, and made to sanction falsehood rather than truth. There is no difference in kind between opinions concerning God, and opinions concerning the physical universe: they are both subject to the laws of thought, that is, logic, and must conform to the general principles which regulate the investigation of all truth. The controversy between "Religion and Science" must continue until Religion [Theology] is merged in Science as a part in the whole.

Now, Mr. Spencer adopts the vulgar distinction between Religion and Science as co-ordinate departments of knowledge,* and proceeds to argue that Religion is no department

* "Every Religion is an *à-priori* theory of the Universe." — *First Principles*, p. 43.

of knowledge at all. To reconcile the two, he quietly extinguishes Religion [Theology] altogether. He first stretches Science on his Procrustean bed, and lops off every member that is not the direct outgrowth of purely material data; reducing all phenomena of "Life, Mind, and Society," to mere motions of matter, he abolishes all Science but physical Science, which he pushes up into the very highest departments of biology. Having thus mutilated Science, he stretches "Religion" on the same couch, in order to leave it a lifeless corpse. That this is a strictly fair representation of his position, will appear from a glance at his very peculiar mode of "reconciliation." In order to find the hidden truth which underlies all forms of religious belief, he cancels every thing which "Religion" adds to Science, and retains only those most abstract truths in which "Religion" and Science agree. If he were consistent, he would likewise cancel every thing which Science adds to "Religion," retaining only the truth they hold in common. But, since the reality of a great "mystery" is the only truth in which they unite, this consistency would cost him too much, and expose the transparent worthlessness of his mode of reconciliation. Turning the tables reveals the fallacy. If Science, accepting this great "mystery" of the origination of the universe, can yet proceed to build up an edifice of real knowledge peculiar to itself, why may not "Religion" do the same? Why must "Religion" sacrifice all her peculiar results to Mr. Spencer's eclecticism, while Science is allowed to retain all of hers? Only one of two courses is open to him, if he aims at genuine impartiality, — either to allow *each* to build up its own special results on this substratum of "mystery," or else to allow *neither* to do so. The method he actually pursues is therefore saved from obtrusive self-annihilation only by the astonishing inconsistency with which he applies it; for, if impartially applied, it would destroy Science as well as "Religion" (by which it must not be forgotten that he means Theology, or the intellectual *theory* of Religion). He sets aside the three theories of Theism, Atheism, and Pantheism, as equally claiming to comprehend the incomprehensible, and will not suffer "Reli-

gion" to use either of them as means or helps in the discovery of truth. Yet, by his own showing, the ideas of Space, Time, Matter, Motion, and Force, which he allows Science to use in her own investigations, are precisely as incomprehensible as the idea of God. What sort of consistency or impartiality is this? And further, when we find him identifying the Unknowable with the scientific idea of Force, and predicating of it Unity, Omnipresence, and Causation, at the very same time that he denies our right to predicate of it any attributes at all,* what shall we say of such surreptitious and ostensibly disallowed predications? Surely the idea of One Omnipresent Cause is by no means identical with the absolutely Unknowable. If physical Science can legitimately make such predications as these, theological Science can as legitimately add Infinity, Eternity, Self-Existence, and Personality.

We conclude, therefore, that Mr. Spencer's philosophy is chiefly valuable as indicating the rapid spread of the true spirit of Positivism, and as foreshadowing the application of Positivistic method to every branch of human thought and knowledge. But, like Comtism, it possesses little or no value as an exposition of Positivism in the highest departments of science. Its great influence among the more courageous thinkers of the times lies in the fact, that it is an attempt, however imperfect, to approach the problems of Theology candidly and appreciatingly from the purely scientific standpoint. While we respect Mr. Spencer as a sincere and high-minded thinker of uncommon genius, we regard his philosophy as not sufficiently profound or coherent to entitle him to rank among the great leaders of human thought. He truly represents the spirit of Positivism in asserting the supremacy of its method throughout the whole field of knowledge; but he fatally misrepresents it in restricting this field to the narrow limits of Empiricism. The world is waiting for a creative and organizing intellect which shall integrate Empiricism and

* "And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever, on the ground that such attributes, derived as they must be from our own natures, are not elevations, but degradations?" — *First Principles*, p. 109.

Transcendentalism in a deeper and wider synthesis than any yet attempted, and thus inaugurate the reign of a truly stable philosophy.

The great "religious" problem of our age, as of every age marked by intellectual activity, is this,—Shall Theism or Atheism finally prevail as the faith of the future? Every effort to narrow the question, or sink it in some side issue, is necessarily abortive. While the sects of Christendom are quarrelling among themselves about some miserable triviality, the real battle-ground lies outside of them all. The hearts of men are anxiously pondering the momentous question, Is there, or is there not, a God? If the inevitable and rapidly approaching triumph of Science is also to be the triumph of Materialism, then Christian sects are merely so many cattle fattening for the shambles,—Unitarianism among the rest. Whatever sect or denomination undertakes to force back the rising tide of Positivism will re-enact the drama of Mrs. Partington and the Atlantic Ocean. Theism and Atheism are in the scales, and Science holds the balance. There is no alternative besides them, and the faith of coming ages is slowly and silently shaping itself in the stillness of many a musing soul. And what are Theism and Atheism?

The essence of Theism is the personality of God, and the absolute nature of all personality. These given, every other theistic doctrine follows. Theism differs from the old English Deism, chiefly in this, that, while Deism rejected revelation and inspiration, Theism adopts and universalizes both; that is, instead of repudiating these sublime truths, or limiting them to special epochs or localities, it teaches that God everywhere and always reveals himself in universal Nature, and everywhere and always inspires each soul in proportion to its spiritual purity and fidelity. Atheism is properly whatever rejects or discredits this central principle of God's personality; and it exists in three main forms or phases. The first form, or Positive Atheism, is a blunt denial of God's existence, and is seldom met to-day among cultivated men. The second form, or Pantheism, is a much more widely spread phase of Atheism: we call it Atheism, not because it avows

itself as such (for it has much to say about God), but because it denies the personality of God, which is the pivotal point of Theism. It contains the great truth that God is omnipresent and immanent throughout the universe; but it also contains the great error, that God's immanence and omnipresence are incompatible with his personality. It is not a bold and outspoken Atheism, but rather a halting, inconsequent, halfway kind of Atheism; attractive rather to a dreamy and poetic mysticism, than to severe and scientific thought. In calling Pantheism a form of Atheism, we intend no reproach of any kind, least of all do we desire to excite any *odium theologicum*: theology, like every other science, should be passionless, and, while affixing names to opinions according to their intrinsic nature, should scorn to greet the honest thought of any man with the hostility of bigotry or ill-will. If Atheism is the truth, by all means let us know it: truth is the only wholesome and innocuous diet of the soul, and he who fears it is worse than an Atheist. The third form, or Negative Atheism, consists simply in ignoring God as not proved to exist, or, if existing, as utterly beyond the reach of human cognition. This is, perhaps, the most widely diffused of all the three forms, especially among scientific men, who sometimes reject with asperity the idea that the Unconditioned can exist as a Person, or come under the "limitations" of intelligence and will. Refraining alike from affirmation or negation as to the existence of a God, they turn theology out of doors, as the bastard offspring of priestcraft and popular superstition. Not a little of this ill-concealed contempt appears in Mr. Spencer's "First Principles,"* and some who, like Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel, would shake off with indignation and horror the imputation of Atheism, yet propound doctrines which make theology an excrescence that needs nothing so much as the surgeon's knife.

This, then, is the question that confronts every one who keeps abreast with the age,—Theism or Atheism? God or no God? And the answer to it, as we believe, depends on

* See pp. 110-112.

the answer to another question, underlying it and preceding it in the order of thought. We cannot better present this anterior question than in the words of one who himself, as we believe, wrongly answers it:—

“The Bible or the Mathematics as the basis of preaching,—in the long-run it must come to that.”

And so it must. We quietly accept the alternative, and without hesitation take our stand upon “the Mathematics.” By this dilemma we understand Dr. Hedge to mean that the struggle between conservatism and radicalism is between the principles of infallible supernatural Authority and fallible natural Reason,—between Anti-Naturalism and Naturalism, which is a much more appropriate nomenclature than “Supernaturalism and Anti-Supernaturalism.” By “the Mathematics” we understand him to mean, not necessarily *demonstrative* science, but science in general; for otherwise his dilemma would be a rhetorical extravagance, unworthy of one who aims to present the issue fairly. And that this is the true meaning of it, we think is conclusively shown by a subsequent passage:—

“My quarrel with the Anti-Supernaturalism of the present day is, that it satisfies no spiritual or intellectual want. It is neither one thing nor the other,—neither religion nor science; too self-willed for the one, not positive enough for the other.”

Not only do we agree with Dr. Hedge in his presentation of the issue, which has been causelessly exclaimed against, but we also agree with him in his strictures upon “the Anti-Supernaturalism of the present day.” But the remedy lies, *not in a retreat to the leading-strings of Authority, but in a bold advance to the freedom of Positive Science.* Naturalism must be *more* naturalistic, not *less* so. Let who will go back, Liberal Christianity must go forward. It must suppress its lingering hankerings after the flesh-pots of Egypt, its timid back-glances towards the abandoned principle of authority. The “ark of the Lord” is in its hands, and retreat is treason. In the issue, then, between “the Bible and the Mathematics,”

we behold the conflict between Anti-Naturalism and Naturalism, Authority and Reason, Dogmatism and Positivism, Traditionalism and Science. Without temerity, without timidity, we cast in our lot with Science.*

But, lest we be misunderstood, a word of explanation is needed. We claim that the Bible itself, when regarded simply as part of universal literature, comes strictly and legitimately within the pale of Science, as part of the data from which it deduces its results. Cancel the Bible's pretensions to infallibility (or rather the pretensions made in its behalf by a senseless bibliolatry, for the Bible makes none), and spiritual Science or Theology finds in it her richest deposit of spiritual treasures, her most valuable thesaurus of religious experiences and ideas. Let Jesus stand in his native power and beauty, as simply the manliest, and therefore the divinest, of men, without the disfigurement of a supposed infallibility, and Theology finds in him the widest and deepest channel through which the Infinite God flows into finite souls. We refuse to be polarized, by the superstitions we condemn, into an attitude either hostile or apathetic toward Jesus himself. Our estimate of the world's debt to Jesus is not lessened, but greatedened, by the application of naturalistic criticism to his life and words. It is on grounds of Positive

* An attempt has recently been made to evade this plain issue by distinguishing between the Bible as an "authority," and as a "source of truth." But the question is simply as to infallibility. If the Bible is an *infallible* source of truth, it becomes necessarily an *infallible authority*; for, if infallible, its deliverances must not be gainsaid or even doubted by reason, which is thus enslaved to it hand and foot. But if it is not an infallible source of truth, then it is not only a "source of truth," but also a "source of error," and reason must sift out the wheat from the chaff. The debate hinges on a single question, — Can the Bible, or any part of the Bible, as for example the reported sayings of Jesus, be taken as an infallible, exhaustive, or final statement of truth, which reason has no right to challenge, fill out, prune, or wholly set aside? We answer, *No*. Even in the words of Jesus, filled as they are with the Spirit of God, there are unmistakable traces of popular errors on certain points, which can be explained away only at the expense of his moral purity. The sayings of Jesus himself are only finite lisplings of the infinite and unutterable Truth. To identify his words with the Word of God, of which these are only translations into poor human speech, is to confound the interpretation with the thing interpreted, the imperfect picture with the faultless beauty of the original.

Science that he is most entitled to the rational reverence of mankind; and we cannot but regret profoundly that disciples of Positive Science, in direct contravention of its true law and spirit, should ever suffer themselves to be betrayed into indifference or seeming irreverence towards him. The infirmities of her friends are the worst enemies of Truth.

Leaving, then, this question between Dogmatism and Positivism, Authority and Reason, as already foreclosed to all men thoroughly imbued with the advancing spirit of science; and believing that, by them at least, the decision in favor of the latter will never be reconsidered,—how will this decision affect that other and dependent question between Theism and Atheism?—Shall Science, building on facts of universal human consciousness, establish a positive basis for Theism in the very constitution of human nature; or shall its great ideas, resting only on the rotten underpinning of arbitrary dogmas and doubtful traditions, come crashing to the ground? What the cultured classes believe *to-day*, the people will believe *to-morrow*; and the fate of Theism or Liberal Christianity depends on the answer to this question. The majority of independent thinkers, in this age of severe and sceptical inquiry, will neither accept these ideas on the dogmatic ground of a “supernatural interposition in human history,” nor yet on the equally dogmatic ground of mere private and unverifiable “intuition.” To approach such men with arguments based on historical traditions which they reject as irreconcilable with Positive Science, or with appeals to individual intuitions of which they are unconscious, is absolutely futile. The principle of supernatural authority excites their contempt; the allegation of exceptional experiences, not common to all, is heard with incredulity: nothing but rational conclusions based on indisputable facts, and drawn in perfect harmony with logical laws, will even command their serious attention. Scientific method must obtain in theology, if theology is to rank among real sciences. The only way to make science more religious is to make religion more scientific. Science puts her foot down slowly, but she never draws it back. She has taken the position that natural laws

are unvarying, and from this she will never recede: the only form of Christianity with which she can coalesce is that form of Liberal Christianity which, from a different starting-point, has attained the same position. Science will retain every one of her hardly won truths, while Theology will show that they apply more widely than Science herself as yet dreams,—to religious phenomena and spiritual facts; and thus, by the final coalition of the two, both will be inconceivably strengthened.

But, as surely as Science is Science, she will sweep away every relic of the interpositional theology. Starting from the postulate of matter, physical science, if true to scientific methods, arrives only at material facts and laws, and never attains to a single religious truth. But, starting from the postulate of soul, theological science, if true to the same scientific methods, arrives at the great truths of Theism. The same reasoning from "organism to environment," which enables geology, from a few fossil bones of saurians, to reconstruct external nature after an extinct pattern, enables theology, from the constitution of the soul, to infer the reality of an invisible spiritual Environment, and thus climb to the stupendous truth of a God. The same reasoning which enables physiology to argue from organ to function, and thus predict to a limited extent the future habits and destiny of the *foetus*, enables theology, from the embryonic capacities of the soul, to foretell its perpetuation beyond the grave. In neither case is the argument demonstrative; room is still left for mistakes and doubts: yet the two processes are approximately correct, and equally worthy of rational confidence. Doubt will always be hereafter, as it has always been hitherto, possible and actual; a reasonable certainty is all that we have a right to expect, and this can only be attained from the starting-point of a universalized Positivism.

It is the same hankering after infallible revelations, generated and fostered by the ancient pretensions of priestcraft, which prompts men to hunt for them, here in historical traditions, and there in mystical intuitions. Neither history nor intuition ever yet revealed the formless God to the curious

eye of consciousness; we truly feel and know him, yet not as an object of direct perception, whether physical or spiritual. He is the underlying Ground of Being, revealed alone in his works and ways, and personified by the soul through faith in the reality of its own divine nature. He is prophesied in the upreachings and outreachings of our noblest selves; but no man can say he has attained to an open vision of the Invisible One. Intellects rigorously and resolutely scientific have given up finally and for ever this hope of infallible revelation, as an artificial product of superstition rather than a real and natural want of the soul. Include in the general data of Science those facts which have hitherto been neglected and shut out,—let the profound experiences of the soul, in its temptations, struggles, sorrows, and sins, be summoned to bear witness to the workings of human consciousness,—and they will constitute as legitimate and positive a basis for theology as the facts of respiration, locomotion, digestion, circulation of the blood, and so forth, constitute for physiology. And if these, scientifically and profoundly studied, shall not warrant the conclusions of Theism, then our conviction is fixed that Atheism will triumph in the predestined triumph of Science. But we have no fear of the result. Physical and spiritual science will never conflict, because working in parallel lines; and the results of both, attained by exactly the same severe methods, will fall with perfect harmony into their appropriate places, as parts of one coherent, glorious, and beautiful system of the universe. The results of theology will rest on precisely the same basis as the most assured facts of physical science. Thus, at last, shall an end be put to that unnatural combat between “Science and Religion” which is the product of ignorance alone.

Naturalism, Rationalism, Positivism,—these are all one, and signify *real knowledge* as contemplated from different points of view. Naturalism indicates the object of knowledge, or Nature taken in its widest sense as the total constitution of things, including the universe of Mind as well as of Matter. Rationalism indicates the method in which all knowledge is attained; namely, the application of Reason, in-

tuitive and discursive, to universal Nature. Positivism indicates the system of results, or totality of real Science, which is the fruit of this application of Reason to Nature. The three are thus merely different aspects of the same reality. Nature includes all that is given us to know directly, and, from a high plane, becomes the Word of God, who manifests himself in Nature alone. The distinction between the Natural and the Supernatural, therefore, is the distinction between God and his creation. The Supernatural must be perpetually and universally manifested in Nature, if manifested at all; and thus the possibility of any transient or local "interposition" in Nature, as if the action of God in Nature were ever suspended, is altogether precluded. Naturalism, consequently, has an inconceivably deeper and vaster faith in the Supernatural than Anti-Naturalism. And yet, as seems to have been done by Mr. Sears, in his recent brilliant address, Naturalism is often construed as a denial of the Supernatural. The address fights a phantom of its own creation, and wins an easy victory over a non-existent antagonist. Its arguments do not reach a Naturalism which includes not only material Nature, but also Human Nature, with all its magnificent spiritual life and prophecy, and which finds them alike permeated and saturated with the immanent Spirit of God,— which beholds in Nature God's unending Word to man, and in history, alas! man's answer to God.

Subjected to the tests which only genuine science can undergo, the present theology of Liberal Christianity appears to be in so chaotic a state as not to deserve the name of science at all. It is a strange jumble of real truths and arbitrary assumptions, rational doctrines conjured from irrational premises, and irrational doctrines tortured from rational premises. It asserts the supremacy of reason, yet professes to build on "Scriptural authority." It coquets with Calvinism on the one hand, and Rationalism on the other. It undertakes to reconcile irreconcilable ideas, and disowns the inevitable consequences of the principles it ostensibly defends. The criticism of Comte, though caustic, contains too much truth:—

"In countries where the philosophical movement has not fully penetrated the public mind, as England and the United States, we see the Socinians and other sects, which have rejected almost all the essential dogmas of [the popular] Christianity, persisting in their original restriction of free inquiry within the purely biblical circle, and fostering a thoroughly theological hatred toward all who have pursued their spiritual liberty beyond that boundary."

And yet, while presenting a chaos of true and false ideas, Liberal Christianity wonders that it is not a power in the world, and laments that independent thinkers and the common people stand apathetically aloof. What else could be expected? Ideas rule at last; and, until Liberal Christianity shall have organized its ideas, it will remain to the world at large an object of mingled suspicion, fear, and contempt. Whatever power it happens to possess is due exclusively to the individual genius and worth of some of its adherents, not at all to its native force as a definite phase of religious belief. If any thing, it is, so far as belief is concerned, a philosophical movement, a transition and advance in human thought, an effort to reconcile the enlightened intellectual activity of the age with the indestructible religious sentiment. It will remain an infructuous germ, if it shall not come to a full and fearless consciousness of its allotted agency in universal human progress. And this implies three things:—

1. Liberal Christianity must unequivocally and emphatically distinguish between Religion and Theology. It must inculcate the one as simply *living in God and for man*; it must relegate the other to the domain of pure science, as perhaps auxiliary, but not essential, to the highest spiritual development. In other words, as a religion, it must regard personal righteousness and genuine devoutness as alone important; while, as a theology, it must regard unlimited freedom of thought as both a right and a duty, and build entirely on the basis of Positive Science. Character, not creed, is to be the test of Christianity; *he who aims to live the life of Christ is the Christian, and in the exact degree in which he lives it*,—Christian in the only sense of the word that is worth retaining: for, as expressing a type of theological

belief, it means any thing and every thing, and is applied to whatever opinions men think they extract from the sayings of Jesus and his apostles; whereas these depend on the opinions they bring to their study. These principles are really implied in the course Unitarianism pursues, at least to a certain extent; for it lays great stress on practical philanthropy, while it virtually neglects pure theology, and thus in effect identifies Christianity with simple fidelity to the law of our highest nature. But they must be frankly and fearlessly avowed, before Unitarianism will signify any thing to the world at large. If, however, we are bent on making Christianity designate a special theology, then,—

2. Liberal Christianity must adopt the general method of all true science,—analysis of verified facts, and synthesis of the results deducible from them. At present, it pretends to discard the infallibility of “Scripture,” yet rests all its doctrines on a “Scriptural” basis. This obtrusive inconsistency robs it of all claim on the attention of thinkers.

3. Liberal Christianity must, then, after relinquishing the pretence of being “Scriptural” or “Evangelical,” concentrate its energies on the difficult task of working out a *coherent theological system*,—a rational, yet religious, philosophy of the universe. As a theology, it must be either dogmatic or scientific; but, to be either, it must comply with the one condition of success,—system. Catholicism and Calvinism have both tried dogmatic systems; the former with, and the latter without, the accompaniment of a systematic or hierarchical ecclesiasticism. The time has come to attempt scientific systematization, or the organization of Theism as theological science.

It is surprising that any student of opinions should be found to sneer at “system” and “logic.” Logic, in its practical aspect, means the *laws of correct thinking*; and what is thought worth that is incorrect? Is a special miracle to be wrought in favor of Unitarianism, by which it shall be allowed to attain truth by thinking illogically? All thinking whatever, to be any thing but worthless and false, must be rigidly logical; and, to be any thing but fragmentary and imbecile,

must be systematic. The pretence of attaining objective truth by flashes of intuition alone, comes from indolence or charlatanry. Intuition gives only the crude material, the chaotic elements, of truth; reason combines and organizes these according to logical laws. Intuition and logic, or reason intuitive and reason discursive, are as indispensable in every cogitative act as the two feet in every act of walking. The distinction between "logicians" and "intuitionists" as two complementary orders of thinkers, the one burrowing in the mud, the other soaring in the pure ether, is one of those popular delusions which inexplicably re-appear among educated men. It is a distortion of the real distinction between what may be called microscopic and periscopic minds. Microscopic intellects are mere analysts,—think deeply in a narrow compass, but take in no comprehensive relations, no grand sweeps of truth; periscopic intellects are mere synthesists or generalizers,—think over large areas, but sink no shafts. Every truly great intellect combines the two tendencies, and unites broad survey with deep insight. To such an intellect, no apology is needed in behalf of "system:" the apology should be offered for the attempt to dispense with it. Truth is harmonious and organic in all its countless ramifications: theology, as the theory of religious truth, must be systematic in order to mirror it.

The secret of the weakness of Unitarianism, as a body of doctrines, is its utter disjointedness. Although conventions and denominational organization may give it ecclesiastical coherency and power, it must remain theologically a zero until scientifically methodized and systematized. It is nothing till it becomes an organized idea. To launch its loose planks on the stormy sea of human thought, is to embark on a heap of boards for a cruise round the world. Unitarianism is a woodpile, not a ship. Before the New-York Convention, there was a reasonable ground to hope, that the elements of Liberal Christianity, being, as it were, in solution and free to move, might arrange themselves naturally in symmetrical form, according to the laws of spiritual crystallography; but there is now great danger that the ill-timed stir-

ring of the liquid with the Convention's one dogma will result in the deposition of a hopelessly amorphous mass. The crying need of Unitarianism is system. It is true, every system must be transitional,—the stepping-stone to a better; but every successive approximation to truth becomes less and less revolutionary with reference to its predecessor. The principles of a science, once ascertained, remain fixed and undisturbed: all changes are made for a more complete and thorough application of them.

We believe that Unitarianism must be re-theologized on the basis of pure Positivism, as the absolute condition of its future growth. Nor do we believe that this radical change will lessen its spirituality, its power, or its beauty; but, on the contrary, these will be immeasurably enhanced. Nothing is taken from the loveliness of special truths by showing that all truths are bound together in one perfect and glorious whole. The poetry of Christianity has scarcely begun to be revealed. From a lofty tower whose only outlook is through the narrow slit of a window here and there, how little of the beauty and sweetness of the landscape is unveiled! Scraps of meadow, fragments of forest, slices of mountains, sections of rivers,—these only fret the gazer with hints of concealed charms, and make him long for one soul-filling draught of nature uneclipsed. Not till the broad sweep of hills and valleys, the majestic undulations of an unbroken horizon, and the boundless arch of blue above, blend into one magnificent scene, can his spirit breathe freely the inspiration of the hour. And so with Theism, which is the infinite multiplicity of Nature's broken gleams, made one for ever in the wondrous Central Sun. In the world of ideas, system is power, beauty, and life. It is time to cease our flings and cheap sarcasms about "system-builders," and remember, that, as practical Christianity or Religion is the evolution of concord out of spiritual discord by obedience to the one supreme law of *love*; so theoretical Christianity, or Theology, is the evolution of concord out of intellectual discord by obedience to the one supreme law of *reason*. When our chaotic and fragmentary truths shall be marshalled into systematic unity, and with

due co-ordination and subordination blended into one harmonious whole, their mutual relations luminously revealed, and their affiliated sequences genetically traced, the totality will be as much more majestic than the solitary elements, as a magnificent cathedral is more majestic than the isolated stones which compose its arches and spires; and Positivism must be our Michael Angelo.

ART. VIII.—THE PRESIDENTIAL POLICY.

THE slow and tentative character of the proceedings at Washington, while somewhat discouraging to those who have but one idea,—the full enfranchisement of the negro,—accurately represents the practical difficulties connected with the reconstruction of our national unity. Legislation at the Capital ought not to anchor in advance of public sentiment, and public sentiment is now afloat,—seeking rest, and finding none. Until it has settled itself, it is better that Congress should not commit itself upon the points most in debate.

The war was begun, continued, and ended by President Lincoln in the spirit of a follower, and not that of a leader, of the nation's will. He waited patiently till the mind of the country had disclosed itself on every important measure of his administration, and then only took immovable ground. We recollect none in which the Government undertook to lead the nation, except in regard to the case of the "Trent." There, no doubt, public opinion went one way, and the Government the other. But it was upon a question of international law, where the people felt their own ignorance, and were willing to be led by diplomatic experts, even contrary to their prepossessions. Nothing ever more nobly exhibited the rare power of the American people to distinguish between matters within their proper purview and matters out of their reach, than the instant, uncomplaining acquiescence of the nation in the unpalatable decision of the Government.

The cautious Everett had thrown his judgment upon the popular side. Mr. Lincoln himself, it was well understood at Washington, was expecting and was prepared to defend the action of Commodore Wilkes. But our shrewd and peace-loving Secretary of State saw the untenableness of the popular ground. The President had the great wisdom to accept his warning and adopt his opinion, and the people have since fully endorsed it. With this exception, the Government always leaned on the popular judgment.

We owed our success, whether in arms, in legislation, or in diplomacy, to this tentative process. The war was waging hardest in the old political caucus-rooms, — in Wall Street and State Street; in the village post-offices and country taverns. Party passions, antipathies of race, commercial interests, — all were enemies of Union, next in peril and power to the armies of Secession. They had to be conquered first, — conquered before a vigorous and successful onslaught could be made on the embattled enemy; conquered before emancipation could be proclaimed, or negroes be enrolled as soldiers. The President watched the public opinion of the North-west, of the Democratic party, of the Border States, with the most patient anxiety. He took no step in advance of their progress. The war, with its scourges and necessities, was slowly educating the people. The more intelligent were wondering at the procrastination of the Presidential policy, and at the slowness of our armies, when the President and the army were wondering when the people would back them both in decisive measures. If ever the secret history of McClellan's campaigns is written, it will turn out that he was put in command because he represented the very qualities then most popular; that his Fabian policy echoed the vacillating, undetermined mind of the nation; and that his failures were not more his than ours. When the people of the loyal States — so large a proportion of whom, when the rebellion broke out, were in sympathy with the ultra-States' rights and the proslavery sentiments that had caused the war — were ready to abandon their various prejudices, and unite with all their hearts and hands in crushing the rebellion at any necessary

cost, the war, for the first time, took the turn that carried it to success.

The policy of President Lincoln, in opening, conducting, and closing the war, is the only policy which can be safely pursued in reconstructing or restoring the normal condition of affairs in the Union. We did not know what we were going to do when we began the war. The people followed the education of circumstances and the lead of events; the Government followed the people, and reaped glorious fruits, — as rapidly gathered and with as little cost, as ever so splendid a harvest was brought in. So the people do not yet know what wisdom, justice, and expediency suggest or require in regard to the restoration of the Southern States to their old places, — the admission of their Senators and Representatives to Congress, — the basis of representation, and the future political *status* of the negro. Public opinion on these subjects is in a state of high fermentation. And, with the exception of a few *fanatics* and *doctrinaires*, there seems to be no considerable number of people in the country who are bent upon forcing an artificial settlement. Parties in Congress — the extremes led somewhat crustily by bachelors tightly wedded to their own ways for want of other brides — are otherwise amiable and patient, willing to discuss with deliberation and thoroughness all questions purely on their merits. Those all-knowing critics, who are weary of these long speeches, must wait till the more modest and consciously ignorant people are tired of them. They bring formally and in excellent array before the nation the *pros* and *cons* of the national policy now to be adopted. Abstract as the themes may sometimes be, they touch points really underlying all practical measures. We must determine if States are in the Union, or out of the Union; are alive or dead; have forfeited their soil and are mere territories, or are only paralyzed, and in the temporary disuse of certain immortal and inextinguishable functions. The people listen to Senators Howe and Doolittle — both from one State, but taking precisely opposite grounds — with great instruction. And it is folly to say, that two able and patriotic Senators, represent-

ing each a great constituency at home, and confronting each other thus earnestly in the Senate, do not show the existence of a still disturbed and honestly disputed opinion among the people of the loyal States, which must have time to clear and quiet and crystallize.

Meantime, while Congress, with its able debates, is educating the nation, the nation, with its slow practical instincts and its accumulating observations, is educating Congress. We do not look with more curiosity and attentiveness to what our legislators say, than they look to see what resolutions are passed by our great public meetings, and what are the opinions of our newspapers, our popular leaders, our Loyal-Leagues Clubs, our Chamber of Commerce, our ecclesiastical conventions, our committees representing agricultural, mechanical, and commercial interests. Even foreign criticism, however unfriendly, — all the keener because meant to hurt, — educates our home sentiment, and is an important element in our now-shaping opinions. We are in favor of the longest incubation upon eggs so full of meat as the questions now under national brooding. It is with great comfort that we watch the wheel-horses in Congress, who, however much they admire the prancing of the leaders, hang on to the pole, and steady and hold back the chariot of State, freighted with our future peace and prosperity. The country has reason to be proud of the practical wisdom of men like Fessenden and Doolittle.

It seems to many, we are aware, a great misfortune, that the President and his immediate friends should not be in greater accord with the predominating or national party in Congress. But it should not be forgotten, that President Johnson represents at this time the whole country, and that he is the only representative of that part of the country still within the Union, (for, if Tennessee be not in the Union, what right has the President himself to his office?) which, having been in rebellion, is now waiting our terms of re-admission to its old place. If the eleven States, lately in rebellion but now subdued, have no other friends in the Government, they are all the more entitled to the consideration of their and our

united representative,—the President. He is their safest friend and adviser. They fly to him necessarily, and find sympathy and protection in his counsel and favor. It seems to us providential, that, with a Congress representing only those who have conquered the rebellion, and whose biases and prejudices must almost unavoidably run one way, we should have in the presidential chair, at this time of reconstruction, a Southern man,—one who had himself been a slaveholder; who is acquainted with every class of the Southern population; sprung from the mean whites; a successful planter; a politician intimately familiar with Southern policy and Southern leaders, and yet a tried and proven friend and lover of the country; a principled upholder of the national unity and the fruits of the war.

Congress is too strong in its purposes, too thoroughly loyal, too much master of the situation, to allow any well-grounded fears to exist, that the softening of the President towards the South, and his disposition to humor their wishes, can endanger the cause of freedom. The recent passage of the District-of-Columbia Bill, the enlargement of the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau, and the passage in the Senate of the Civil-Rights Bill, show plainly enough where the heart of Congress is. There is no dispute in Congress as to the necessity of reaping the fruits of the victory over the rebellion, of making the Proclamation of Emancipation good, and of protecting the Freedmen in their rights, nor even of the duty of restoring the representative rights of the States lately in rebellion at the earliest possible moment. It is purely questions of expediency, questions touching the safest and surest way of accomplishing these points, which divide Congress, or separate the President and Congress.

And they are not more separated than they ought to be, to secure proper consideration for both sides of the subject. If Congress were agreed at this early stage of their session, they would be agreed in some hasty and impolitic course. If they agreed with the President entirely, it would be unsafe for him to lean towards the South; if he agreed with them entirely, it would be unsafe for them to lean so stiffly to the North. It

is better as it is. The South needs a friend in the Government, who is no traitor to us in being sympathetically bound to her. The President of the whole country should look kindly, hopefully, smilingly, into the face of every half-penitent State. It is no part of his business to be frigid, suspicious, and offish. Congress has that disagreeable duty to perform; and there is no danger, while Messrs. Stevens and Sumner are spared to us, that it will not be faithfully performed. The President should hearken, meanwhile, to all that is favorable to the claims of the South: he should believe all he can in their promises of loyalty; all he can in the disposition of the late slaveholders to treat the freedmen with justice. The other side we are sure to hear from the Freedmen's Bureau and its agents; from the earnest and noble friends of the negro in Congress and out: and our fears are not that the Government will take a too lenient and incautious course with the Southern States, but rather one too timid and dilatory.

Much as we commend the hesitation with which the policy of universal negro suffrage is discussed, we are not among those who doubt where the mind of the country will finally be brought, certainly not where it ought to be brought. We believe universal suffrage to be not only the most powerful, but the simplest, form of popular education ever discovered. We have no sympathies with those who wish to abridge white men's privileges at the ballot-box, nor with those who fear to extend them to black men. The less fit they are to exercise them intelligently and satisfactorily, the more need have they of these stimulating, enlightening, and educating influences. Those who propose to substitute "ability to read the Constitution" for simple manhood, as the necessary qualification for a voter of either color, must have a very conventional idea of education. We have known too many stupid creatures who could read, and too many bright and intelligent ones who could not, to subscribe to any such test of manhood or citizenship.

Let us adopt universal suffrage, with all its perils, as the least of the two evils of ignorant voters, or ignorant citizens

without the right to vote, and with the dangerous irresponsibility of those whose rights are denied them. It is the shortest way of elevating either poor whites or poor blacks, to give them the exposures, the temptations, the importance, and the power which belong to a valuable franchise. To own himself is the first step; to own a little land in fee, the next, and almost as important; to own a vote is the third step in the education of the slaves. Reading and writing come after; but they will come quickest where the right of suffrage has preceded them. But this view is not one likely to prevail immediately. It is asking too much of the country to see it at once. And it would be folly, indeed, to do nothing because we cannot at once do all we might desire. If we can begin with granting the right of suffrage to those who can read, it is an excellent step, and not in the least in the way of better legislation when the country is ripe for it.

But the same general principle, of trusting with power and responsibility those whom we are seeking to educate, should dispose Congress to admit representatives from the Southern States upon the easiest terms. We want to get back into our society, and within the circle of the new civilization, those who are only antagonized and hardened in their prejudices by exile, and want of contact and comparison of views with ourselves. Congress will not be so reckless as to admit traitors and slave-drivers into her councils. She will keep her own door, and see that no man dangerous to the republic or to liberty passes it. But, to keep out the representatives of the Southern States, one hour longer than the safety of the country requires, is a greater injury to ourselves and the nation than to them. We cannot appear strong, self-confident, trustful in our system, so long as we bar our doors against the men in the South ready to swear loyal oaths, and bringing the seal of their legislatures on their representative papers. We must seem ill assured of peace, uncertain of our future, and doubtful of ourselves, while we thus timidly watch for evil from every Southern quarter.

It is impolitic to wait till the era of good feeling is restored

before we give the States lately in rebellion a place in our Congress. This is waiting for the river to run by. What we should be doing is to create the era of good feeling by acts of magnanimity and confidence. It will come slowly enough under any methods we can adopt. All the wounds made in our soldiers' bodies will have long been forgotten before one single wound made in the pride of our late foe, solely humbled by our superior power, will be skinned over. It is folly to expect pleasant and comfortable feelings toward the North or the Government, on the part of those who for four years have been fighting us, and for forty years have been hating us. But we lived with them with mutual advantage when they hated us before the rebellion; and we can live with them, though they hate us, now that the rebellion is over, and specially now that the cause of the hatred and the rebellion both is removed. It is only the pestilent exhalations of a pool whose fountain is sealed, that we have now to endure till it slowly dries up. Formerly, it was an ever-flowing stream of bitterness that poisoned our peace. Many sensible and patriotic men, at the first threats of civil war, thought it wiser to let "our wayward sisters" go in peace, and chew the cud of their own folly unmolested. The instincts of the country forbade the surrender of any portion of the national territory, as an evil in its consequences worse than the worst civil war. If the country could bear the terrible sacrifices we have submitted to, to recover possession of the rebel territory and control of its population, surely it ought to bear, without too serious complaints, the ill-temper, the chagrin, the sour manners, the imperfect obedience, of the Southern States; and endeavor, by a proper consideration of their unhappy circumstances, to bring them to a better mind and a wiser conduct. What right had we to expect from an unschooled, uncommercial, unmanufacturing region, a purely agricultural country like the South, cursed with slavery for over a hundred years, any thing better than we find there,—ignorance, prejudice, passion, violence, hatred to the negro who has escaped their grasp, and hatred of the loyal people who have subdued them, and freed their slaves?

A whole generation must pass away before these evils can sensibly abate. We have to receive the South back with these evils; and the statesmanlike question, since we have determined to live together, is, Will these evils disappear soonest under the most liberal and trusting policy, — under a policy most scrupulously observant of our constitutional theory; or under the timid, self-saving, arm's-length policy, which has so many honest and able advocates in Congress and the country?

Just as we conclude our article, Mr. Bancroft's admirable survey, in his oration in the Capitol, of the situation in which the war has left the country, comes to aid our judgment. The country is fortunate in hearing the deliberate voice of its national historian in the Capitol, at so supreme an hour as that when the nation sits down in the shadow of its late President's tomb, to contemplate the work done under his leadership, in the fearful struggle for life through which the Union has passed. No orator ever had a more sublime theme, a more significant presence, a more difficult task. With the instinct of genius, Mr. Bancroft seizes the real subject by its heart-strings. Of his oration, it is enough to say, that it is worthy of the occasion, and worthy of himself. Full of knowledge, philosophy, and history, it is simple, frank, and sincere. Strong and calm, it has almost a judicial decisiveness in its tone. For the first time, Mr. Lincoln's real character has been publicly spoken of with discrimination, if we except some noteworthy observations upon it by his late law-partner at Springfield, in an address which attracted far less attention than it deserved. Mr. Bancroft, mindful of to-day, speaks also like a man conscious he shall be read fifty years hence; and says only what is true now, and will be true then. He treats the rise and the usurpations of slavery; the corruptions of Northern party spirit, and the defalcations of the Supreme Court under its blandishments; the necessity of the war to save liberty and the Union; of the wonderful providences by which an humble backwoodsman, born west of the Alleghanies, — a son of the soil, of the common people, and of the average American life, — was brought

to the headship of the nation, to vindicate, under his most democratic presidency, the original impulse and purpose of our free institutions,—like another David, to slay this Goliath with a shepherd's sling; and to die a blessed martyr to his fidelity to the country's hope and trust.

ART. IX.—REVIEW OF CURRENT LITERATURE.

THEOLOGY.

HORACE BUSHNELL,* with the Beechers, represents very significantly the direction in which modern Orthodoxy, as a theological system, is silently and rapidly moving, preparatory to a downfall of old belief such as Christendom has never witnessed. The result of a careful study of the most widely welcomed utterances of the modern Evangelical pulpit, assisted by considerable observation of the course of things within the communion which sustains this pulpit, is the strong conviction, that events, in the Orthodox religious world, are rushing on to a catastrophe of the gravest character. Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor—who deserved, as Professor of Didactic Theology at New Haven, to stand at the head of all the Orthodox divines New England had produced; a man of heroic figure, if only he could be rescued from the mean niche in which, as defender of Orthodoxy, he is doomed to stand—lamented, in his last days, the decline of the old faith of New England, in the strongest terms. He said, for example, “Things are growing worse and worse, and have been, since I have been on the stage, and are now going on faster and faster.” The acceleration of events since the death of Dr. Taylor, in 1858,—when he lamented, in some of the last words of his life, that ministers could not preach his new and revised edition of Orthodoxy, and thus would not long remain secure against the modern rationalistic spirit,—has been startling, even to those who trust most implicitly that the wise hand of God is in it. The question of the future is, undoubtedly, whether there shall be profound reformation, in which the spirit of sect and dogma shall be exorcised; or calamitous revolution, shaking the Christian faith to its foundations.

* The Vicarious Sacrifice, grounded in Principles of Universal Obligation. By HORACE BUSHNELL. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1866.

These remarks seem to us appropriate in a notice of Horace Bushnell's last and most remarkable utterance, because the work which contains this utterance is much more significant as a sign of the times, than as a contribution to theological discussion. Dr. Taylor used to say, in the rough fashion which was gladly tolerated in him, "Bushnell don't know any thing." This only meant, that Dr. Bushnell had no appreciation of his system. In this system, Dr. Taylor had *adjusted* the parts of Orthodoxy, correcting those which did not fit. Thus he revised the common notion of virtue, and put self-love for love as the fundamental principle of conduct. He did this to cut off the argument, that love would not permit the saint to consent to a "select heaven and general hell." Then he revised the New-England Divinity notion of justice. All his predecessors had taught, he said, a justice which logically involved universal salvation as the consequence of the atonement. To cut off this, he devised the notion of a justice peculiar to God as Governor, the aim of which should be to sanction positive law, and the nature of which should be punishment so adjusted as to *avoid* a reformatory effect, sometimes concurring with chastisement in the case of those saved under an atonement, but keeping clear of redeeming effect in all other cases. The atonement, in Dr. Taylor's corrected Orthodoxy, was a demonstration made by God upon Jesus, with his consent, for the purpose of showing his feelings about the law broken by man. The second person of God assumes the character and place of man. God the Father hides his face from him on the cross. By this drama, God is understood to show how much he hates sin. It is now made *possible* to omit showing this, in the case of those who secure the advocacy of Christ, by the otherwise necessary infliction of eternal punishment. This system is too hard and dry for the modern pulpit, which is much stronger in imagination and sentiment than in intellect and speculation. The rational spirit has quickened the moral nature, and destroyed sympathy with these hard dogmas, though it has not yet corrected intellectual conviction. Calvinism is passing rapidly from existence, not because the new generation of Calvinists have become convinced that it is false, but because they have acquired from the humane spirit of the time a blessed distaste for the whole thing. They are not prepared to hear eternal punishment denied; but they are prepared to forget that it was ever asserted. Dr. Bushnell represents, in his new work, this transition from dogmatism to liberalism.

The scholar will regret that Dr. Bushnell has a great horror of definitions, and "does not propose to establish any article whatever in this treatise." But this was inevitable. Dr. Bushnell can save his article, even in his own mind, only by keeping to vague and unlogical conceptions. Yet he has an article; and, in his way, he urges it with all his might. This article has been presented in the sermons of Henry Ward Beecher, and in Charles Beecher's "Redeemer and Redeemed," — a work of which Dr. Bushnell seems not to have heard. It is difficult to state this article of new Orthodoxy distinctly, and yet save it from manifest absurdity and blasphemy. It cannot be credited, that any one thinks that God feels our ague-pains, sympathizes painfully with our dyspepsia, and equally groans under our mental burdens, shares our heavy disgusts, and sinks beneath our shame. And yet this is the theory, boldly and distinctly stated. The "true seed-principle of the Christian salvation" is thus stated by Dr. Bushnell, in connection with the announcement, that "the exact *usus loquendi* of all the vicarious and sacrificial language of the New Testament" is found in the text, "Himself took our infirmities and bare our sicknesses:" —

"His heart accepts each one as a burden upon its feeling, and by that feeling he is inserted into the lot, the pain, the sickness, the sorrow, of each. . . . He bore our sicknesses, in the sense that he took them on his feeling, had his heart burdened by the sense of them, bore the disgusts of their loathsome decays, felt their pains over again, in the tenderness of his more than human sensibility. . . . He bore our sins in just the same sense that he bore our sicknesses."

This is said of Christ; but it is thereby said of God, since Christ is God living a human life, for the single purpose of showing men that this suffering sympathy belongs to his life. Thus our author says: —

"There is a cross in God before the wood is seen upon Calvary, hid in God's own virtue itself, struggling on heavily in burdened feeling through all the previous ages, and struggling as heavily now even in the throne of the ages."

Dr. Bushnell depicts the distress of God under the old dispensation, until "that moment of relief to him, so blessed probably, when he came to Mary with his 'all hail,' and broke into the world as God with us."

According to this view, the purpose of the incarnation was not to meet man's need, but God's. God could not reach man; therefore

he "broke into the world" to get at his last offspring. He came to acquire with man a character, and thus to secure the influence of character. Remark the following statements:—

"The moral power of God, in the gospel of his Son, is a new kind of power — the greatest and most sovereign power we know — which God undertakes to have, by obtaining it under the human laws and methods. . . . He is constrained to institute a new movement on the world, in the incarnation of his Son. The undertaking is to obtain, through him and the facts and processes of his life, a new kind of power; viz., moral power."

It seems that God was unable to succeed in having, without the incarnation, any other than "a certain kind of power; viz., that which may be called attribute power, . . . a kind of abstract excellence," in the conception of which we make him "thin and cold," and "feel him as a platitude more than as a person."

This theory hardly deserves to be criticised. Even Dr. Bushnell himself inadvertently gives it up, when he says, "I will not undertake to solve the mystery of these physical pains; for it must be admitted, that God is a being physically impassible." We should think so, decidedly; yet Dr. Bushnell does not see that this exposes his wild fancies about God's burdened heart and wounded sensibility. "More than human sensibility," he says; as if this did not mean more than humanly weak. Sympathy of the glad lover of men is one thing: groaning sensibility is incident to human weakness. We advise Dr. Bushnell to study the end of John Brown, as a lesson in spiritual philosophy. He may be forced — which we should regret — to do more than say what he now does of the apparent aspect of the life of Jesus: "The end of it so dark, if not weak, . . . stamped as another exploded pretender;" and, at least, he will appreciate our second objection to his theory, viz., that candid criticism does not allow us to find in Jesus either the powers or virtues of Godhead. Dr. Bushnell rests the case of his gospel on "the look of capacity" displayed in the miracles of healing. "If these mighty works had not been wrought," he says, "nothing else that Christ could have done, in the sphere of truth and the spirit, would have had the necessary energy of a gospel. Not even his cross would have signified much beyond the proof of his weakness." Weakness it must be, then; for the works of healing have no "look of capacity" different from that seen in many other cases, as honestly reported, and some of them as veritably proved. And, for a third objection, it is only necessary to have a reasonable amount of faith in God to make this story of God's

wounded sensibilities quite superfluous. If God in himself were not a "platitude" to Dr. Bushnell, he would soon dispense with his Christ-God.

And to this, Orthodoxy is coming. Our Unitarians, who make much of the "Lord Christ," must not flatter themselves that Orthodoxy will pause upon their position. The inevitable sweep of the movement is to Theism pure and simple for those who do not lose faith, and to Atheism for those who do. To some, who have merged God in Jesus, there will soon be no God at all; to others there will be, by a recoil of faith of the grandest sort, one only God and Saviour, God and Sanctifier, the Father-Spirit of the universe. In either case, Jesus will pass to the place of a man among men: with some, even to a low place, as Dr. Bushnell forces us to fear; with others, to the high place of an instance of the Christ-nature of man, under the spiritual fatherhood of God.

E. C. T.

HISTORY AND POLITICS.

THE world has made much progress, doubtless, in historical science, since the days when the Greek monk Syncellus wrote, that on the first day of the Hebrew month Nisan, — the 25th of the Roman March, and the 29th of the seventh Egyptian month Famenoth, — 5502 B.C., God the Father, through his incarnate Son, created the heavens and the earth. It is easy to believe with Bunsen, that the chronology of the Asiatic world, as hitherto received, is a tissue of arbitrary assumptions; but it is not easy to substitute for the inventions of credulous monks, or bigoted mediæval scholars, a system of chronology which can withstand the tremendous criticism that is now brought to bear upon the ancient traditions.

Observing that the Hebrew text differed from the Greek version of the Septuagint, Clement of Alexandria was led to fix the birth of Adam at 5624 B.C. Seffert made him only about two hundred and fifty years older, while Suidas assumed 6000 B.C., and the Alfonsini tables in Spain 6934 B.C. for the date of his advent. How much more profoundly conscious of the immensity of that past from which they had emerged with their civilization so sombre, if not so hopeless, were the Brahmins of India, going back 13,902 years before Christ for the creation of the world, and the Egyptian priests of Memphis affirming that Helius reigned 23,331 B.C.! Well might Volney and Dupuis prefer the wisdom of the heathen, when men like Larcher rejected every system of chronology which conflicted with the super-

stitious theories in which they have enshrined for themselves the divinity of the Bible.

But though the data for the determination of the age of man — more confused with every new discovery, philological as well as geological — do not permit us as yet even to approach the solution of that problem, it is likely, nevertheless, that the researches which are now carried on into the earliest migrations of races will lead in the end to a probable conclusion as to the centres whence man first began to spread over the earth, in his long struggle for dominion over all that it possesses.

The theory generally maintained hitherto has been, that out of some favored spot in central Asia there went forth, long before the historic period, two great streams of population, — one eastward, giving rise to the empires of India; the other westward, developing itself by degrees in the diverse races of Europe. The monuments of Egypt, which are the oldest known to us, furnished strong proof, it was contended, apart even from language which furnishes the strongest, of this original migration. Bunsen endeavored to show, that the Egyptians were Canaanites, moulded in the course of ages by the African spirit. From Asia, Egypt received, he said, at once its life and its task, its inspiration and its doom.

But Dr. Henne,* with a boldness which does credit to his scientific independence, and an industry which does no dishonor to German scholarship, now undertakes to combat this whole theory, which we had come to accept almost as an established fact in history. His work covers a broad field; and deals with many subjects. One of its main points, however, we may remark in passing, is the restoration of Manetho's lists; a task which, after all the labors of Scaliger and Petavius and Zoega and Prichard and Heeren and Raske and Bunsen, still remain apparently as exhaustless as ever. Dr. Henne's position is, that Manetho's dynasties were not collateral, as Lepsius thought, but successive. And the fact, that he was removed by a narrow-minded priesthood from his professorship in the cantonal school of St. Gall, on the ground that his theory as to the Pharaohs

* MANETHÓS die Origines unserer Geschichte und Chronologie. Von Dr. ANTON HENNE von Sargans, gewesenem Professor der Geschichte an der St. Galler Kantons- und der Berner Hochschule, 1834 bis 1855: an letzterer Dekan der philosophischen Fakultät, 1847 bis 1850. Mit einer synoptischen Tafel der alten Chronologie. Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. 1865. New York: Westermann.

tended to lower the Bible in the estimation of his pupils, will certainly be no argument against his conclusions. * That so well-known a writer, however, as Schlosser should have ridiculed his views, would have occasioned no greater doubt, if we did not remember that they had been commended by so acute a critic as Fallmerayer.

Another point, we may add, is to prove that the Hyksos, or shepherd kings of Egypt, — who seem to have existed for the express purpose of baffling the curiosity they excite, — are the *Ἑρμῆοι* of Syncellus, a non-Semitic race, who are spoken of in the Hebrew traditions as the “sons of God” who “saw the daughters of men, that they were fair;” the corruption of the human race — that is, the Hebrew part of it — being thus ascribed to foreign invaders. Wilkinson concluded, on his own authority, that they came from Assyria. No one, however, but an Englishman perhaps, could have overlooked the fact, that Tacitus reached the same conclusion eighteen centuries before.

But the great doctrine of our author's work — and we shall merely state it, being utterly unable, without at least twenty years' hard study, to criticise it — is, that Europe is the exclusive home of the white race; that all the white nations between the Archipelago and the Indus went forth from Europe as conquerors; in a word, that this emigration of whites from Europe is the great world-embracing subject of antediluvian history, the threads of which are first caught up in Genesis in Armenia, and followed eastward towards India, and southward towards Babylon.

To establish this proposition is of course to create a revolution in historical science. But, after reading Dr. Henne's very long and very turbid argument, we may be permitted, at least as some reward for our labor, to express a doubt — and a doubt is not criticism — whether he has really done any thing towards overturning the ancient tradition, that we all came originally from some pleasant land in central Asia; whether, indeed, it is at all clear that the same persons appear as rulers contemporaneously over Greece and Crete and Lydia and Cyprus and Phœnicia and Assyria and Persia and Egypt; in short, that a great Egyptian monarchy ever extended from the Indus to the Alps, with its seats in Babylon and Memphis and Thebes. Undoubtedly there is something in the fact, that Herodotus, ever ready to derive the Greek from the Egyptian customs, should speak expressly of a mystery which the Hellenes had received, not from the Egyptians, but from the Pelasgians, —

the mystery, that is, of the Kabeiri. Strabo, an Asiatic, may have recognized the Phrygian origin of the worship of Cybele and Dionysus. The secret doctrine of Orpheus—of which Cicero says, that it teaches us not merely how to live with joy, but how to die with a better hope—may have been monotheism. But does it follow from these things alone, that the Greeks were autochthonous? Creuzer collects much evidence to show that the Greek worship came originally from the banks of the Nile and the Ganges. Dr. Henne has only to see a representation of an Italian shepherd in the Abruzzi to feel sure that he has discovered a Phrygian Paris; he has only to listen to the sound of the bagpipe, as it quavers from the Scottish Highlands to the passes of the Alps, to revive again in fancy the processions of the Berecynthian Mother.

The Caucasian race, according to our author, is thus the race which went from the highlands of Europe to Asia, now known as the Iranian or Arian, carrying with them that purer sun-worship already containing the germ of monotheism, which we commonly suppose to have had its origin in the East, but which really only took the place there of the degrading Phallic element of the African and Asiatic races. In view of all that has been written upon the subject, this is certainly a startling assertion; but Dr. Henne maintains his ground with so much ingenuity, and with such an evident intense sincerity, that to those who have time to put up with an execrable style, and to master as confused an accumulation of paragraphs as were ever heaped together, we cannot but commend his treatise as a very curious whim of German learning, if it be nothing more.

H. J. W.

THE new work of Dr. Brownson* is valuable not only as a vigorous and independent contribution to the great political discussion of the day, but as a study of our nation and institutions, from a fresh, a Catholic, point of view. It is undoubtedly true, as he says, that the portion of our people for whom and to whom he especially speaks, deserves to be considered more and more in our political speculations,—not only as a power in the State, but as an element in the intellectual life of this country. And we are the more disposed to do this in the present case, because, with Dr. Brownson, Catholicism shows itself not as a creed, but rather as a philosophy and a method.

* *The American Republic: its Constitution, Tendencies, and Destiny.* By O. A. BROWNSON. New York: P. O'Shea. 8vo. pp. 439.

He definitely disclaims the right — or rather the need, without which the right could hardly exist — of the Church to sustain itself by external force; in other words, that doctrine of persecution which was all that made the church-power of other days either possible or intolerable. And with his Catholic philosophy, which he interprets as the true theory of our own political life, we have small ground of quarrel. In its assertion of the divine ground of authority in human governments; in its protest against the theory of radical democracy; in its vindication of the suffrage as a public trust, and as a political rather than a natural right; in its interpreting of the Constitution as not creating the nation, but defining its form of government, — in all these special points, as well as in the general drift and aim of the volume expounding them, we find a gratifying coincidence with the principles coming more generally to be accepted among thoughtful men, as to what, in truth, constitutes a Christian State, — what is the true theory and life of the American Republic.

But Dr. Brownson is constitutionally inapt to hold any opinion very strongly, without holding it at the same time antagonistically and aggressively. There is something of ecclesiastical rancor in the tone with which he refers to the European revolutionists, — such as Mazzini, Kossuth, and Garibaldi, — men whose nobleness of personal character and aim, whose unselfish patriotism and deep religious faith in their principles, will certainly have a share in whatever better political future Europe has to hope for. There is something of a partisan's exigency in the logic which asserts the legitimacy of the French Empire, as founded on universal suffrage, while denying the same of the Italian Kingdom, set up in the Pope's despite. And along with the frank honor, the intellectual hospitality, the controversial fairness, with which the patriotic and philosophic American treats the elements of thought and life in his own country, it seems too fine a point of casuistry, which argues that the "Pope's Encyclical" invades no one of the liberties which we Americans hold dear.

Two points especially mark this treatise, and will make its chief value in the view of the reader: the first, concerning the philosophic interpretation of history; the second, concerning the exposition of our own form of government. They are the two points on which the main argument of the book turns.

The first is, that the working-out of modern history shows a constant struggle between the ancient civilization, — the "Græco-

Roman" element, represented in the civil law, the municipal traditions, and forms of constituted authority, — and the Barbarian element of individual liberty or of feudal rule. This struggle has been slowly decided in favor of the former, — the Græco-Roman, — as seen in political institutions more and more highly organized, State authority more distinctly recognized, and national life established in more intricate, complete, and enduring forms. In illustration and carrying-out of this, France, the most highly organized State, is at this day the heart of European civilization, — England and the rest revolving about her as their centre, bitterly against their will; while Greece, the inheritor of the Byzantine tradition, is sure to overcome the barbaric Turkish element in less time, reckoning from the fall of Constantinople, than it has required for the new empire to rise from the ruins of the barbarian conquest of the fifth century. The coincidence of this style of political philosophy with the aspirations of Dante, with the argument of Vico, with the philosophy of Gioberti, will be seen at first glance: the new application made of it is to the political life and the constitutional authority of our own country. Here, it was the barbarian, personal, feudal, disintegrating element, in revolt against the national authority, that attempted the rebellion, and was so signally overthrown. It is the same barbaric element, in the crude theories of a radical democracy and a vague philanthropy, which makes the chief political danger threatening our country now. But this danger also is sure to be overcome, — not only because the clear sense of our people has been enlightened by the war, and the necessities of the time will compel them into a truer political wisdom; but because the destiny of this nation is providential: it has a mission to fulfil on the grandest scale, a wholly new plan of political society to develop, in strict accordance with the appointment and the will of God.

It should be said, however, that Dr. Brownson does not regard this destiny, or mission, as a fixed, fated, inevitable thing. It may be missed by ignorance, or forfeited by crime and error. It had well-nigh failed in the war of the rebellion, and is in equal danger of being lost through crude "humanitarian" theories, which

"recognize no State, no civil authority, and are therefore as much out of the order of civilization, and as much in that of barbarism, as is the slaveholder himself. Wendell Phillips is as far removed from Christian civilization as was John C. Calhoun; and William Lloyd Garrison is as much of a barbarian and despot, in principle and tendency, as Jefferson Davis"!

But Dr. Brownson has always held a genuinely noble and patriotic faith in the future of the republic; and he expresses a clear religious recognition of that truer instinct, that unconscious intelligence, that loyalty to a divine principle, in the people at large, which makes it wiser than its governors and teachers, and steadies its course among opposite perils.

The second marked feature of the book, as we have said, is its exposition of our form of government, and the nature of the American Union. The "solidarity" of the republic is not conventional, resulting from a simple political compact and the acceptance of a Constitution: it is essential, transcendental, providential. From 1848 till 1861, as he informs us, Dr. Brownson held to the Calhoun theory of the sovereignty of States. Driven from this heresy by the storm of that period, and choosing his part with the uncompromising defenders of the nation, he yet did not abandon the logical ground on which that theory rested. Webster's argument, that the sovereignty of the States was merged in that of the Union by constitutional compact, he considers to have been fully refuted by Calhoun, on the ground that sovereignty is a thing which, from the nature of the case, can no more be surrendered than one's personality: a mere compact among equals can, of course, be forsaken by any party to it. So far, the secessionists, he holds, are clearly right, whatever may be thought of the policy or the morality of their way of enforcing that right. Nor is their argument sufficiently met by the statement, that the theory of the founders of the Constitution was that expounded by Mr. Webster: undoubtedly it was so, as Mr. Madison makes clear in a letter to Edward Everett, printed in the "*North American Review*." But this was because the philosophy these men held was the revolutionary, individualizing philosophy of the eighteenth century. In truth, "they builded wiser than they knew." It was *as a nation* that the United States won the acknowledgment of their independence; it was *as a nation* that the country at large was recognized in the writings of that period; the exercise of sovereignty was had only by the Confederation or the Union, never by the several States: nay, in adopting their State constitutions, they acted under authority of a Resolution of Congress, — equivalent to the "enabling act" under which a Territory now becomes a State (p. 225). The nationality is not created, but assumed: it rests on deeper grounds than a political arrangement; it is, in truth, a transcendental or religious fact, to be recognized in our Christian philosophy respecting the nation's

life. The real Constitution of the American Union is an unwritten constitution: the document which goes by that name is simply the outline defining the form of government.

This doctrine of a Union, or nationality, behind the written Constitution, and making the real object which laws and constitutions are but meant to serve, has become tolerably familiar during the discussions that have grown out of the war. It is the theory, essentially, we suppose, which was struggling for clear recognition and expression in the mind of Mr. Lincoln, when he had to justify himself for saving the nation by measures which his predecessor justly qualifies as "extra-constitutional." It is the theory which is compelling his successor's reluctant assent, through the obstacle of more rigid pre-judgments and a less yielding temper. It is the theory which the people themselves have unconsciously clung to, till it gets wrought into clearer consciousness through the effectual working of events. But it has not been stated before with so clear intelligence, or with so deep a religious and philosophic interpretation. And we consider that the work before us does a valuable service by challenging the political intelligence of the nation to view the doctrine in its larger bearings, and accept it as the only solution of our great controversy, — the only justification of the nation's heroic self-defence.

The inferences from this ground-doctrine are rapid and clear. States are the units of which the national organism is framed. State rights and State sovereignty are special functions, or derivatives, of the national sovereignty: they cannot be exercised outside of the national organization; they are forfeited or extinguished, not maintained, by the act of secession. "A Territory, by coming into the Union, becomes a State; a State, by going out of the Union, becomes a Territory" (p. 308). Such of its laws as still remain valid are so by the understood ratification or sufferance of the nation. The war of the Union was fought for a cause deeper and grander than the special issues of philanthropy which were involved in it. It was a war of opinions equally honest on both sides; and the defeated in it have committed no "moral crime" of treason. "Their defeat, and the failure of their cause, must be their punishment. The interest of the country, as well as the sentiment of the civilized world, — it might almost be said, the law of nations, — demands their permission to return to their allegiance, to be treated according to their future merits, as an integral portion of the American people" (pp. 332, 333).

We have been the more full in our notice of this volume, because its place and style of publication may perhaps keep it a little aside from the main stream of our literature, and because of the interest which always attaches to Dr. Brownson's clear, strong, nervous utterance of his thought. We easily enough overlook his dogmatism and his prejudice, — shown in his astounding assertion, that all which is sound and durable in modern thought derives from the Church fathers; in his slur at his old friends, the Unitarians; in his bitter hostility to modern humanitarian reform, — for the sake of the satisfaction we find, that a political doctrine on the whole so sound, so patriotic, and so liberal, should be addressed to that large and important class of our countrymen with whom he gallantly associates himself. J. H. A.

MISCELLANEOUS.

CHILDREN'S books make now a literature apart. And, with all that are poverty-stricken in thought and style, there are yet many that are worth while and fit to their purpose. Of this sort was the first series of "Hymns for Mothers and Children;"* and it is good to know that editor and publisher have found the first so well used, that a second is needed.

To those who have to do with little folks, it will be most welcome. Here are hymns for the littlest and for the older children; hymns of nature, of loyalty, and of fairies; hymns of religious trust and of home pleasure, with many more. The needs of mothers and the moods of children are well served. The selection is various, from many sources, as is right for a book which will go into many sorts of homes. That the selection is guided by good taste, the name of the editor is guarantee enough; and, better than good taste, or rather as part and parcel of good taste, a true simplicity has guided. Without that grace, what forlorn work is made of children's books! But this is thoroughly childlike. Some of the hymns, to be sure, are for mothers; but there are none which, for simplicity, do not belong to the children. We hope this volume does not close the series.

* Hymns for Mothers and Children. Second Series. Compiled by the Editor of "Hymns of the Ages." Boston: Walker, Fuller, & Co. 1866.